State of Utah in the interest of S.C. and T.C.
Annotate this Casepublication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
----ooOoo----
Office of the Guardian Ad
Litem,
in the interest of S.C.
and T.C.,
persons under eighteen years
of age,
Petitioner,
v.
Honorable Joseph W. Anderson,
Third District Juvenile
Court,
Respondent.
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 990504-CA
F I L E D
September 2, 1999
1999 UT App 251
-----
Third District Juvenile,
Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Joseph W.
Anderson
Attorneys:
Jan Graham and John M. Peterson,
Salt Lake City, for the State of Utah
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent
Martha Pierce and Christine
Decker, Salt Lake City, Guardians Ad Litem
John E. Laherty, Salt Lake
City, for E.C., father of S.C. and T.C.
-----
Before Judges Wilkins, Davis, and Orme.
WILKINS, Presiding Judge:
¶1
This opinion supplements
our order of June 11, 1999 in which we granted Petitioner's request for
extraordinary writ compelling Respondent to hold a final adjudication hearing
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-308 (Supp. 1999), on or before
June 21, 1999.(1)
BACKGROUND
¶2
On April 19, 1999, the Division
of Child and Family Services (DCFS) took S.C., a nine-year-old girl, into
protective custody after she reported to school officials that she was
being abused by her father's live-in girlfriend. On April 21, 1999, a shelter
hearing was held at which the court determined that S.C. should be placed
in the temporary custody of DCFS. The State subsequently filed a verified
petition alleging that S.C. was an abused child and that her eleven-month-old
sibling, T.C., was at risk of being abused; and requesting that S.C. be
placed in the custody and guardianship of DCFS and that DCFS should assume
protective supervision over T.C.
¶3
At the pretrial hearing
on May 7, 1999, S.C. and T.C.'s father denied the allegations in the verified
petition and requested a trial date. Because the trial judge was unable
to schedule a trial within the sixty-day time limit imposed under section
78-3a-308(2) of the Utah Code, the father expressly waived the sixty-day
time limit. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-308(2) (Supp. 1999).
The Guardian Ad Litem, acting on behalf of the children, objected to the
waiver of the time limit, arguing: (1) further delay of the trial was not
in the best interest of the children; (2) section 78-3a-308(2) requires
that a trial be held within sixty days from the date of the shelter hearing;
and (3) under Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 54, the court could only
continue the matter beyond the sixty-day time limit if it found a continuance
would not adversely affect the children's interest.
¶4
The trial judge asked the
Guardian Ad Litem to contact the lawyers representing parties in other
cases already scheduled for trial, in an attempt to accommodate this trial
by having other cases delayed. However, the Guardian Ad Litem declined
to contact other counsel, stating she was unwilling to put the interests
of children in this case ahead of the interests of other children in equally
important matters subject to the same time constraints.
¶5
The judge concluded that
counsel's failure to find time to accommodate this trial constituted a
waiver of the right to a hearing within the sixty-day time period. Consequently,
the trial court denied the Guardian Ad Litem's objection to the time extension
and set the trial date on the verified petition for September 22, 1999--more
than ninety days beyond the sixty-day limit imposed by the statute.
¶6
The Guardian Ad Litem filed
a petition for extraordinary writ and sought an emergency hearing before
us asking for an order compelling the trial judge to begin the trial within
the sixty-day statutory period. We agreed and issued the requested extraordinary
writ on June 11, 1999. We now address the contentions raised by the Guardian
Ad Litem for the purpose of more fully explaining our prior action, and
hopefully assisting juvenile courts that are often faced with this and
similar conflicting demands and imposed deadlines on their limited available
hearing time.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶7
The issues presented for
review in this appeal are: (1) whether the sixty-day time limitation imposed
by section 78-3a-308(2) of the Utah Code is mandatory; and (2) whether
this time limitation may be waived or extended, and if so, whether it was
waived in this case.
¶8
Whether a juvenile court
may postpone a trial on an abuse, neglect, or dependency petition beyond
the sixty-day time period is a legal question "dependent on an interpretation
of section 78-3a-3[08(2)] of the Utah Code. 'We review questions of statutory
interpretation for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's
interpretation.'" A.E. v. Christean, 938 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (quoting State in re R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995)).
ANALYSIS
I. Section 78-3a-308(2)
¶9
Section 78-3a-308(2) provides
that in an abuse, neglect, or dependency case, "the final adjudication
hearing shall be held no later than 60 calendar days from the date
of the shelter hearing." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-308(2) (Supp. 1999)
(emphasis added). In interpreting the language of this section, we follow
the well-established rule that statutory language is generally construed
according to its plain language. See A.E., 938 P.2d at 815.
¶10
In interpreting the meaning
of the word "shall" within the context of Utah statutes governing abuse,
neglect, and dependency proceedings, this court has stated that the "enactment
of and amendments to Utah's Child Welfare Act are intended to protect children
and assure that they are not placed in a 'legal limbo' for an unwarranted
time period." Id. at 814 (quoting State in re J.L.W., 900 P.2d 543, 549 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). This court has also noted that "judicial
efficiency cannot justify actions taken 'at the expense of a child's welfare.'"
Id. (quoting State in re J.L.W., 900 P.2d 543, 549 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995)). Accordingly, this court concluded that the meaning of
the word "shall" within the statute governing dispositional hearings is
mandatory. See id. at 816 (holding dispositional review hearing
must be held within twelve months "'to prevent a child from languishing
indefinitely in foster care'") (citations omitted)). Because the same concerns
exist for placing children in appropriate settings after they have been
removed from their homes--whether in foster care or with family members--we
hold that the word "shall" in section 78-3a-308(2) requires a juvenile
court to hold the adjudication hearing on an abuse, dependency, or neglect
petition within sixty days of the shelter hearing.
¶11
It is the duty of a trial
judge to ensure that hearings are held as required by law. This burden
may not be shifted to the parties or their attorneys. While we note that
it is useful and often necessary for trial courts to look to the parties
and their attorneys in seeking solutions to scheduling problems, the ultimate
responsibility for timely adjudication is on the juvenile court. "An overcrowded
calendar cannot relieve . . . [trial courts] of their statutory responsibility."
In re S.G., 661 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996), aff'd,
677 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. 1997).
¶12
When scheduling conflicts
such as the one in this case arise, a trial judge, and court personnel
under the judge's direction, must schedule matters coming before that court
based initially on the priority of cases imposed by law. Accordingly, constitutionally
mandated time restraints must be met first, statutorily imposed time limits
come next, and all other matters thereafter.
¶13
Although not constitutionally
mandated, our Legislature has stressed the importance of addressing in
a timely manner the needs of children who have been removed from their
homes. The purpose of the Child Welfare Reform Act is to either return
children to their homes or place them in another appropriate setting as
soon as reasonably possible after removal. See In re J.M.,
940 P.2d 527, 534 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating "policy underlying
the . . . Child Welfare Reform Act . . . is one of swift permanency").
The only way to accomplish this goal is for courts to adhere to the time
restrictions imposed by law.
[D]elay in the adjudication
of abuse, neglect, or dependency cases can cause grave harm to the child
and the family and . . . frustrates the effort to establish permanent homes
for children in need. The purpose of [the Child Welfare Reform Act] is
to insure that [judges] . . . will act in a just and speedy manner to determine
families in need, reunify families where appropriate and, if reunification
is inappropriate, find other permanent homes for children.
In re S.G., 661 N.E.2d
at 441.
¶14
Our conclusion is supported
not only by the weight of authority but also by sound public policy. Delaying
a final adjudication hearing under section 78-3a-308 necessarily interferes
with the entire statutory framework of the Child Welfare Reform Act. Decisions
regarding service plans, reviews, and permanency hearings are contingent
on decisions made at the adjudication hearing. Thus, a delayed adjudication
results in delayed services and a shortened period available for efforts
directed to the reunification of the child and parent. However, delaying
adjudication does not delay the permanency hearing. The permanency hearing
must occur within twelve months of removal, regardless of the timing of
the adjudication. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-312(1)(a) (Supp.
1999). In other words, a permanency determination must be made within twelve
months of removal, irrespective of whether the parent has had the full
twelve months to devote to rehabilitation. Accordingly, when a juvenile
court extends the time for a final adjudication hearing, formal reunification
and other necessary services are delayed, disadvantaging the children as
well as the parents, and increasing the chances that the children will
be unable to return to their homes.
¶15
Because the Legislature
has clearly mandated that child welfare matters have priority in the courts,
juvenile courts must do whatever is necessary to accommodate these cases
within the statutorily mandated time periods. Whether this means rescheduling
cases with lower priority or looking to judicial management for assistance,
the Legislature has determined that the best interests of children and
families in abuse, neglect, and dependency cases are served when judges
follow strict time limits. In light of the foregoing, we conclude the sixty-day
time limitation imposed by section 78-3a-308(2) is mandatory and that the
trial court must hold the adjudication hearing on the state's abuse and
neglect petition within sixty days of the shelter hearing.
II. Waiver
¶16
Although the Legislature
has mandated that adjudication hearings on abuse, neglect, and dependency
petitions be held within sixty days of the shelter hearing, Utah Rule of
Juvenile Procedure 54 provides that this time limitation may be waived
if the parties and the Guardian Ad Litem stipulate to a continuance, and
the moving party demonstrates to the trial court that "the continuance
will not adversely affect the interest of the child." Utah R. Juv. P. 54(c).
Thus, the mandatory sixty-day time limit imposed by section 78-3a-308(2)
may be waived only when two requirements are met: (1) the parties and Guardian
Ad Litem stipulate to a continuance, and (2) the juvenile court
finds the continuance will not adversely affect the child's interests.
See id.
¶17
In this case, the Guardian
Ad Litem stated it would not be in the best interests of the children
to hold the trial after the required time limit and refused to waive the
time limitation on the children's behalf. Although the father expressly
waived his right to the sixty-day time limit, Rule 54(a) requires the consent
of both "the parties and the guardian ad litem" before a continuance may
be granted. Utah R. Juv. P. 54(a). Furthermore, the juvenile court made
no findings concerning whether holding the trial after the sixty-day time
period would adversely affect the child's interests. Cf. In Interest
of S.B., 742 P.2d 935, 937 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming trial court's
extension of ninety-day time limit in neglect case because "it was in [the
child's] best interest to do so" and stating: "If the court determines
that a delay is necessary, it shall set forth the specific reason why such
delay is necessary and shall schedule the adjudicatory hearing at the earliest
possible time following the delay"). Therefore, we conclude that under
Rule 54 there was not a valid waiver of the sixty-day time limit.
¶18
Alternatively, the trial
court suggests the sixty-day time limit was waived because counsel failed
to comply with the court's request to assist in scheduling the trial within
the statutory time period. We disagree. As previously stated, trial courts
may look to parties for assistance in dealing with scheduling conflicts.
However, the ultimate responsibility to ensure compliance with section
78-3a-308(2) is on trial courts alone--a responsibility that may not be
shifted to the parties or their counsel.
¶19
The trial court also suggests
the sixty-day time limit was waived because the Guardian Ad Litem delayed
filing her request for extraordinary relief with this court--making compliance
with the sixty-day time requirement "nearly impossible." Again, we disagree.
While our order requiring the trial court to hold the adjudication hearing
no later than June 21, 1999, was issued on June 11, 1999, the shelter hearing
in this case was held on April 21, 1999. At that time, the trial court
was aware that a final adjudication was required to take place within sixty
days. Moreover, the trial court's written order was not signed until June
2, 1999, and the Guardian Ad Litem filed her petition with this court only
five days thereafter. While the trial court's order implementing its decision
may have been delayed, there was no meaningful delay in the action of the
Guardian Ad Litem requesting our intervention. Therefore, we conclude there
was no effective waiver of the sixty-day time requirement under section
78-3a-308(2) and reject the alternative waiver arguments.
CONCLUSION
¶20
We conclude that juvenile
courts are charged with the responsibility to comply with the sixty-day
time requirement under section 78-3a-308(2) and this burden may not be
shifted to the parties or their counsel. Also, we hold the statutory time
limit of section 78-3a-308(2) may be waived only by strict compliance with
the requirements of Rule 54. Finally, we conclude the father's express
waiver was insufficient under Rule 54, and that the Guardian Ad Litem's
five day delay in seeking extraordinary relief and her failure to comply
with the trial court's scheduling request do not constitute a waiver of
the sixty-day time limitation in this case.
¶21
For these reasons, we previously
granted the Guardian Ad Litem's petition for extraordinary writ, and ordered
the adjudication hearing in this matter to be held within the sixty days
mandated by section 78-3a-308(2).
______________________________
Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
-----
¶22
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge
______________________________
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. The Order Granting Petition for Extraordinary Writ was issued on June 11, 1999. The order was unpublished, and specifically contemplated this published opinion "containing the court's reasoning in support of [the] order." Upon invitation from this court, all parties submitted supplemental briefs. The court has chosen this somewhat unorthodox method because of the urgency of the petition, the necessity of immediate action by the trial court in response to our decision, and the importance of a full explanation of our reasons given the significance and pervasiveness of the issues presented in the work of the juvenile courts.
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