Roderick Stevenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc.--Appeal from 123rd District Court of Shelby County

NO. 12-04-00035-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

RODERICK STEVENSON, APPEAL FROM THE 123RD

APPELLANT

V. JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

TYSON FOODS, INC.

APPELLEE SHELBY COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Roderick Stevenson appeals the trial court s summary judgment in favor of Appellee Tyson Foods, Inc. In one issue, Stevenson claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. We affirm.

Background Stevenson, an employee of Tyson, suffered injuries compensable under the Workers Compensation Act. He asserts that after he filed a workers compensation claim, Tyson discriminated against him based on his injury. // Stevenson filed suit against Tyson for damages based on discrimination and for failing to reasonably accommodate him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

After a reasonable time for discovery, Tyson filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). In its motion, Tyson alleged that Stevenson failed to (1) produce any evidence that Tyson discriminated against him due to his workers compensation injury and (2) provide any evidence that Tyson violated the ADA. Stevenson timely responded to Tyson s motion, attaching only an affidavit from himself as summary judgment proof. The trial court then ordered Stevenson to amend his petition to (1) clearly state his cause of action for Tyson s alleged discrimination in violation of Section 451 of the Texas Labor Code and (2) specify with reasonable particularity the factual and legal basis to support a claim for punitive damages. The record reveals that Stevenson failed to comply with the court s order. The court subsequently granted Tyson s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

Summary Judgment

Standard of Review

Texas uses summary judgments merely to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989). In a no-evidence summary judgment, a party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2097 (2004).

In reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we apply the same legal sufficiency standard as a directed verdict. Id. at 750-51. A no-evidence summary judgment is improperly granted if the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 751. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Id. If the movant s motion and summary judgment proof facially establish its right to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a material fact issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Dolcefino v. Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 917 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). If the issue raised is based upon undisputed and unambiguous facts, then the reviewing court may determine the question presented as a matter of law. Gramercy Ins. Co. v. MRD Invs., Inc., 47 S.W.3d 721, 724 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). However, if resolution of the issues rests on disputed facts, summary judgment is inappropriate, and the reviewing court should reverse and remand for further proceedings. Id.

When the order granting summary judgment does not specify the particular grounds the trial court sustained, on appeal, the summary judgment opponent must defeat each summary judgment ground argued by the movant. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989). Otherwise, an appellate court must uphold the summary judgment on any ground that is supported by the evidence and pleadings. Id. Because the propriety of summary judgment is a question of law, we review the trial court s summary judgment de novo. See Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994).

Applicable Law

The well-established rule in Texas is that employment for an indefinite term may be terminated at will and without cause. Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990). But the legislature has created a number of restrictions and exceptions to this at-will doctrine. Id. at 724 & n.1. One of these exceptions is that a person may not discharge or discriminate against an employee who files a workers compensation claim in good faith. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. 451.001 (Vernon 1996).

When an employee alleges that the employer terminated him in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim, he must show that (1) he filed a workers compensation claim in good faith and that (2) a causal link exists between the termination and the filing of the claim. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. 451.001; Benners v. Blanks Color Imaging, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 364, 369 (Tex. App. Dallas 2004, no pet.) (citing Garcia v. Allen, 28 S.W.3d 587, 600 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied)); see also Tex. Lab. Code Ann. 451.002(c) (Vernon 1996) (providing that employee has burden of proof). The issue Tyson raises in this appeal relates to the second element, the causal link.

To establish a causal link between termination and filing a workers compensation claim, an employee need not show he was fired solely because he filed the claim. See Lee v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., 129 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. App. Dallas 2004, pet. denied). Rather, he must show that but for the filing of the claim, the discharge would not have occurred when it did. Id. Circumstantial evidence, and the reasonable inferences from such evidence, can prove the causal link. Continental Coffee Prods. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Tex. 1996).

Discussion

In its motion for summary judgment, Tyson asserted that Stevenson failed to (1) produce any evidence that Tyson discriminated against him due to his workers compensation injury and (2) provide any evidence that Tyson violated the ADA. Stevenson responded to the motion and attached only his affidavit as summary judgment proof. Stevenson s affidavit, in relevant part, reads:

After I was injured on the job at Tyson[ ]s, I was given certain restrictions by my doctor. When I returned to Tyson[ ]s, I was told to do work that violated my restrictions. When I objected to doing work that violated my restrictions, I was told by the nurse to go to personnel for a different job assignment. I was told by personnel that there was no job available for me, and my paycheck stopped. I was also told that if I didn t return to work, my workers[ ] compensation benefits would be cut off. When I found out there was a job I could do, Tyson sent the wrong job description to my doctor. I was denied the job I could do because of that.

Stevenson wholly failed to provide any evidence concerning his ADA claim nor does he argue in his appellate brief that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on his ADA claim. Therefore, we consider only whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on Stevenson s workers compensation claim. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1.

Stevenson presented no direct evidence that Tyson terminated him for filing his workers compensation claim. Circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a causal link generally includes (1) knowledge of the compensation claim by the person terminating him, (2) expression of a negative attitude toward the employee s injured condition, (3) failure to adhere to established company policies, (4) discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly situated employees, and (5) evidence that the reason for the discharge was false. See Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d at 451.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Stevenson, his affidavit, if true, shows that Tyson had knowledge of Stevenson s workers compensation claim. Specifically, Stevenson stated that he was told that his workers compensation benefits would cease if he did not return to work. // Thus, Stevenson met the first element. But this fact, knowledge of the compensation claim, standing alone, is not sufficient to raise a fact issue concerning termination for filing a workers compensation claim. See Vallance v. Irving C.A.R.E.S., Inc., 14 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App. Dallas 2000, no pet.). Instead, the fact must be considered along with the remaining evidence. See id.

Stevenson presented no evidence (1) of Tyson expressing a negative opinion concerning his physical condition, (2) of Tyson s company policies or how they were violated, (3) of other similarly situated persons receiving different treatment, or (4) of conflicting reasons for discriminatory treatment. Thus, he failed to establish the remaining four elements set forth in Cazarez. See id.

Conclusion

Stevenson offered no evidence, either circumstantial or direct, that showed Tyson discriminated against him because he filed a workers compensation claim. His affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning a causal connection between his filing the workers compensation claim and any adverse treatment from Tyson. Affidavits that contain conclusions or expressions of subjective belief are not competent summary judgment proof. See Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984). Under these circumstances, the trial court properly granted Tyson s motion for summary judgment. Consequently, we overrule Stevenson s sole issue and affirm the trial court s judgment.

JAMES T. WORTHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered March 23, 2005.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J. and DeVasto, J.

(PUBLISH)