Imelda Martinez v. Rodney Bouffard and Karen Chadwell--Appeal from 98th District Court of Travis County

CV6-601 TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-96-00601-CV
Imelda Martinez, Appellant
v.
Rodney Bouffard and Karen Chadwell, Appellees
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 96-03270, HONORABLE PETER M. LOWRY, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

 

Imelda Martinez appeals from the trial-court judgment dismissing her cause based on her failure to state a cause of action in her employment dispute with appellees. We will affirm the trial-court judgment.

Background

The Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Fund (the Fund) hired appellant as an employee-at-will. Appellant eventually became vice-president of fraud investigations, reporting to Rodney Bouffard and Karen Chadwell as her supervisors. In March 1994 Bouffard and Chadwell fired appellant. In March 1996, appellant sued Bouffard and Chadwell, alleging causes of action for tortious interference with appellant's business relations with the Fund and for tortious interference with her prospective business relations with the Fund. In response to special exceptions, appellant abandoned the latter claim and proceeded only on the claim that appellees tortiously interfered with her business relations with the Fund by firing her. She alleged that appellees, as agents of the Fund, had authority to fire her, but acted out of malice.

Appellees then lodged amended special exceptions based on appellant's continued failure to state a cause of action. After a hearing, the trial-court sustained the special exceptions, struck appellant's pleading, and gave her thirty days to amend. On appellant's filing an amended pleading stating the same claim, the court dismissed the cause with prejudice.

Employment at Will

The employment-at-will doctrine provides that an employer can fire an employee at any time with or without cause. See, e.g., Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888). With a few narrow exceptions that do not apply in this cause, the decision maker's motivation in the discharge is irrelevant. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985). Thus, the doctrine effectively bars contract and tort claims based only on the discharge decision. Jones v. Legal Copy, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).

In general, a party cannot interfere with his or her own contract, nor can an agent tortiously interfere with its principal's contract. John Masek Corp. v. Davis, 848 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Schoellkopf v. Pledger, 778 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, writ denied). This principle would mean that appellees, as agents of the Fund, could not interfere with appellant's "contract" with the Fund. Appellant relies on several authorities that are distinguishable because none involves an at-will employee attempting to sue a supervisor based only on that supervisor's termination decision. (1)

Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex. 1994) held that a corporate agent could tortiously interfere with that corporation's contract but only in circumstances in which the plaintiff shows that the agent committed wilful and intentional acts that served the agent's interest at the expense of the corporation. Holloway did not involve a supervisor firing an employee at will and ultimately rejected the tortious interference claim based on the facts. Similarly, John Masek Corp., 848 S.W.2d at 175, involved a partnership agreement and allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and Eloise Bauer & Assoc., Inc. v. Electronic Realty Assoc., Inc. 621 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), dealt with questions concerning a licensee's performance under a real estate franchise contract. Neither involved an employment-at-will situation.

Similar attempts to bring a tortious interference with contract or business relations claim based only a supervisor's termination of an at-will employee have been rejected. See Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 320, 327 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (rejecting claim based on allegations that supervisor acted out of malice or own interest; refusing to examine supervisor's motive); Jones, 846 S.W.2d at 925 (refusing to examine supervisor's motive for firing at-will employee when allegations of bad-faith discharge made).

We decline to extend the tortious interference with contract or business relations cause of action to encompass the firing of an at-will employee under these circumstances. We affirm the trial-court judgment of dismissal.

Before Justices Powers, Jones and Kidd

Affirmed

Filed: April 10, 1997

Do Not Publish

1. 1 Appellees note that the employment-at-will doctrine would not bar all claims arising out of the termination. For example, a defamation claim would not be barred.

re to state a cause of action in her employment dispute with appellees. We will affirm the trial-court judgment.Background

The Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Fund (the Fund) hired appellant as an employee-at-will. Appellant eventually became vice-president of fraud investigations, reporting to Rodney Bouffard and Karen Chadwell as her supervisors. In March 1994 Bouffard and Chadwell fired appellant. In March 1996, appellant sued Bouffard and Chadwell, alleging causes of action for tortious interference with appellant's business relations with the Fund and for tortious interference with her prospective business relations with the Fund. In response to special exceptions, appellant abandoned the latter claim and proceeded only on the claim that appellees tortiously interfered with her business relations with the Fund by firing her. She alleged that appellees, as agents of the Fund, had authority to fire her, but acted out of malice.

Appellees then lodged amended special exceptions based on appellant's continued failure to state a cause of action. After a hearing, the trial-court sustained the special exceptions, struck appellant's pleading, and gave her thirty days to amend. On appellant's filing an amended pleading stating the same claim, the court dismissed the cause with prejudice.

Employment at Will

The employment-at-will doctrine provides that an employer can fire an employee at any time with or without cause. See, e.g., Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888). With a few narrow exceptions that do not apply in this cause, the decision maker's motivation in the discharge is irrelevant. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985). Thus, the doctrine effectively bars contract and tort claims based only on the discharge decision. Jones v. Legal Copy, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).

In general, a party cannot interfere with his or her own contract, nor can an agent tortiously interfere with its principal's contract. John Masek Corp. v. Davis, 848 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Schoellkopf v. Pledger, 778 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, writ denied). This principle would mean that appellees, as agents of the Fund, could not interfere with appellant's "contract" with the Fund. Appellant relies on several authorities that are distinguishable because none involves an at-will employee attempting to sue a supervisor based only on that supervisor's termination decision. (1)

Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex. 1994) held that a corporate agent could tortiously interfere with that corporation's contract but only in circumstances in which the plaintiff shows that the agent committed wilful and intentional acts that served the agent's interest at the expense of the corporation. Holloway did not involve a supervisor firing an employee at will and