Luther Gerald Edmondson v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 of Bell County

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
AT AUSTIN
NO. 3-92-487-CR
LUTHER GERALD EDMONDSON,

APPELLANT

 
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

 
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF BELL COUNTY
NO. 2C92-3048, HONORABLE JOHN BARINA, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

The county court at law found appellant guilty of unlawfully carrying a weapon. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 46.02 (West 1989). Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the court assessed punishment at incarceration for three days and a $350 fine. In two points of error, appellant contends the court erroneously overruled his pretrial motion to suppress evidence.

Temple police officer Willis Craik testified that he stopped the pickup truck driven by appellant because, "The vehicle had a cardboard buyer's tag in the rear window. The buyer's tag was faded; and since it was in the rear window and not back in the license plate holder, I couldn't see the expiration date on it. It appeared to be expired. I couldn't tell." The officer explained that buyer's tags "are only good for twenty days . . . [and] the sun generally fades them out after that." An inspection of the tag following the stop disclosed that it had, in fact, expired. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6686(a)(3) (West 1977).

In the course of this traffic stop, Craik saw a pistol on the backseat of appellant's truck. The officer seized the pistol and arrested appellant for unlawfully carrying a weapon. Appellant moved to suppress the pistol on the ground that the stop of his truck was without probable cause. The court agreed that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that an offense was being committed but overruled the motion to suppress, reasoning that the officer had a reasonable basis for stopping appellant for investigation.

A police officer may detain a person for investigatory purposes if, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). In order to justify the intrusion, the officer must have specific and articulable facts which, in light of his experience and personal knowledge, together with other inferences from those facts, would reasonably warrant the intrusion for further investigation. Johnson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Contrary to appellant's argument in his first point of error, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the facts warranted Craik's temporary detention of appellant for further investigation of the suspected vehicle registration violation. The first point of error is overruled.

In point of error two, appellant contends that a temporary investigative detention on less than probable cause violates the constitution and statutes of Texas. Tex. Const. art. I, 9; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (West 1977) & art. 38.23 (West Supp. 1993). This Court has held that, under the circumstances discussed in the preceding paragraph, a temporary detention on less than probable cause is reasonable under the Texas Constitution. Spillman v. State, 824 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, pet. ref'd); and see Brown v. State, 830 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). Article 14.01, relating to arrests without warrant, does not apply because a temporary investigative detention is not an arrest. Article 38.23, the state exclusionary rule, is also inapplicable because a temporary detention on adequate grounds does not violate the constitution or laws of Texas or the United States. Point of error two is overruled.

 

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

 

[Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Aboussie and Jones]

Affirmed

Filed: April 28, 1993

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