Frederick Louis Pugh v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 52nd District Court of Coryell County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-96-227-CR

FREDERICK LOUIS PUGH,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 52nd District Court

Coryell County, Texas

Trial Court # 13,842

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After the jury deliberated for over six hours, the court concluded that it was deadlocked on the issues presented in Frederick Pugh's retaliation trial and declared a mistrial. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 36.06 (Vernon 1994). Pugh filed a notice of appeal, seeking to bring the cause before us. After we questioned our jurisdiction over his appeal because there did not appear to be an appealable order in this cause, Pugh responded arguing that he "has a right of appeal per jeopardy . . . and pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure this court does have jurisdiction of this cause." Concluding that his response is inadequate, we dismiss this cause for want of jurisdiction.

We do not have jurisdiction over interlocutory orders unless that authority has been expressly granted by law. Apolinar v. State, 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Means v. State, 825 S.W.2d 260, 260-61 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.). To prosecute an appeal from an interlocutory order, the appellant must "point to some constitutional or statutory [provision] conferring such right and bring himself within the procedure prescribed." See Armes v. State, 573 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Pugh has not cited a statute or opinion allowing him to appeal from the court's ruling, and we have not uncovered such authority ourselves. We conclude, then, that he may not bring an appeal from the order.

We dismiss this cause for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Davis,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction

Opinion delivered and filed November 6, 1996

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