Alan Lynn Richardson v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 13th District Court of Navarro County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-94-296-CR

ALAN LYNN RICHARDSON,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 13th District Court

Navarro County, Texas

Trial Court # 25,177

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Alan Richardson attempts to appeal from his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, and the assessed punishment of eight years' imprisonment, probated for eight years, and a $500 fine. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 481.102(D), 481.115(a) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995). The conviction and punishment followed a negotiated plea of no-contest. In his brief he raises one point of error, claiming that the court erred by denying a pre-trial motion to suppress the cocaine. However, we find that we do not have jurisdiction over this cause because Richardson failed to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 40(b)(1); Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2684, 129 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1994); Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

After his motion to suppress was denied, Richardson waived his right to a jury trial and to confront the witnesses against him and pleaded no contest in exchange for a recommendation from the State that his punishment be assessed at eight years' imprisonment, probated for eight years, and a $500 fine. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon Supp. 1995). The court admonished him, accepted his plea, and set a sentencing hearing pending a presentence investigation report. See id. art. 26.13 (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1995). When the sentencing hearing convened, the court initially assessed punishment that exceeded the agreement reached between the State and Richardson. After some off-the-record discussion, the court changed the punishment and sentenced Richardson according to the agreement. Richardson filed a "general" notice of appeal, which merely states that he "hereby gives notice of appeal from his conviction in this case which occurred on 22 August 1994."

To appeal from a conviction "rendered upon [a] plea of . . . nolo contendere [when] the punishment assessed does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant . . . the notice [of appeal] shall state that the trial court granted permission to appeal or shall specify that those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial." Tex. R. App. P. 40(b)(1). A "general" notice of appeal, i.e., one that does not contain the extra statements required by the "but" clause of Rule 40(b)(1), only invokes the jurisdiction of this court to consider jurisdictional defects. See Lyon, 872 S.W.2d at 736. "A general' notice of appeal is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on a Court of Appeals to review a trial court's ruling on a pretrial suppression motion in an appeal from a conviction based on a negotiated plea bargain." Davis, 870 S.W.2d at 46. We may not allow Richardson to amend the notice of appeal out of time. See id. at 47; Jones v. State, 796 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

Because Richardson does not raise jurisdictional complaints, we must dismiss his appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Davis, 870 S.W.2d at 47.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction

Opinion delivered and filed May 3, 1995

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