Dolores Grunauer v. Irene Difilippo--Appeal from County Court at Law No 3 of Lubbock County
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NO. 07-03-0149-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL D
JANUARY 22, 2004
______________________________
DOLORES GRUNAUER, APPELLANT
V.
IRENE DIFILIPPO, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF LAW NO. 3 OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2003-593,853; HONORABLE PAULA LANEHART, JUDGE
_______________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.
Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded judgment in favor of Irene Difilippo
against Dolores Grunauer in a forcible entry and detainer proceeding declaring Difilippo to
be entitled to possession of the property in question. With one issue, Grunauer claims the
trial court abused its discretion in granting Difilippo’s motion to quash a witness subpoena.
We will affirm.
Grunauer and Difilippo are sisters. Their parents, Severiano and Vicenta Martinez,
owned a home in which Grunauer was living in their absence. In January of 2003, Difilippo,
who had been granted power of attorney for both Severiano and Vicenta, filed a sworn
complaint for eviction in the Justice of the Peace Court seeking to evict Grunauer from the
home. The JP court entered a default judgment against Grunauer, who then appealed the
case to County Court. In anticipation of the February 2003 trial setting in that court,
Grunauer served Severiano with a subpoena to compel his testimony at trial.1 In response,
Difilippo filed a motion to quash the subpoena claiming it was ineffective because it listed
the JP cause and court number instead of the county court ones. Difilippo also asserted
in the motion that requiring her 95 year old father, who was in failing physical and mental
health, to attend the proceedings “[was] undue and overly burdensome.” At the hearing on
the motion, Grunauer conceded the subpoena had some “typographical errors” and moved
the trial court for a continuance so she could correct them and secure Severiano’s
presence at trial. The trial court denied the motion for continuance, granted Difilippo’s
motion to quash the subpoena, proceeded to trial, and rendered judgment in favor of
Difilippo.
1
Grunauer served her 84 year old mother with a subpoena as well. However,
Grunauer did not object at trial to Difilippo’s motion to quash that subpoena, and she raises
no issue on appeal with respect to the trial court’s granting of the motion.
2
By her issue, Grunauer asserts that if the trial court granted the motion to quash
because the subpoena listed the wrong court and cause number, then it was without
jurisdiction to do so. We disagree. We will review Grunauer’s claim that the trial court
improperly quashed a subpoena under an abuse of discretion standard. Muennink v. State,
933 S.W.2d 677, 684 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1996, writ ref’d).2 Initially, we note that within
five days of the JP court’s signing of the eviction default judgment, Grunauer had filed both
her notice of appeal and appeal bond in that court, thus perfecting an appeal to county
court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 749 & 749c. Accordingly, the County Court obtained appellate
jurisdiction at that time and had the authority to rule upon the motion to quash. See Tex.
Gov’t Code Ann. § 26.042(e) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Next, although the subpoena reflected
the correct date and time for the bench trial, it failed to state the proper cause number and
court in which the suit was then pending as required by the rules of civil procedure. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.1. Thus, the subpoena, while duly issued by Grunauer’s attorney, an
official having jurisdiction to issue it, was legally insufficient in form to compel Severiano’s
appearance. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.4(b); cf. Plummer v. Harrison, 540 S.W.2d 835, 836
(Tex.Civ.App.–Texarkana 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (where there was no allegation in plaintiff’s
petition that the subpoena served upon her was not sufficient in form or was not issued by
2
We recognize the right to compulsory process in a criminal case is governed by the
Code of Criminal Procedure rather than the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, neither
party has supplied, nor has our independent review uncovered, any civil case declaring the
standard of review for a trial court’s grant of a motion to quash a subpoena. Because
Grunauer suggests abuse of discretion is the appropriate gauge, and because we discern
no reason in law or logic not to utilize it, we will review the trial court’s actions under that
standard.
3
an official having jurisdiction to do so, appellate court must presume subpoena was legally
sufficient). Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court rendered an arbitrary
and unreasonable decision or acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles in
granting Difilippo’s motion to quash. Koslow's v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. 1990).
That conclusion precludes a discussion of Grunauer’s remaining argument that “[t]here is
nothing in the record to indicate that Severiano Martinez was imposed to undue burden or
expense as mentioned in TRCP 176.7." See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Grunauer’s sole issue
is overruled.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Don H. Reavis
Justice
4
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