In the Interest of I.J.G. Appeal from 317th District Court of Jefferson County (memorandum opinion)
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In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-18-00299-CV ____________________ IN THE INTEREST OF I.J.G. ________________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 317th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. C-230,177 ________________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION R.G. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, I.J.G. 1,2 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds exist for termination of R.G.’s parental rights, and termination of her rights would be in I.J.G.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2) (West Supp. 2018). 1 To protect the identity of the minor, we use the initials for the child and his parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 The Order of Termination also terminated the parental rights of I.J.G.’s father, V.O., however, V.O. is not a party to this appeal. 1 Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which counsel contends there are no meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional evaluation of the record. Counsel certified Appellant was served with a copy of the Anders brief filed on her behalf. This Court notified Appellant of her right to file a pro se response, as well as the deadline for filing the response. This Court did not receive a pro se response from Appellant. We have independently reviewed the appellate record and counsel’s brief, and we agree any appeal would be frivolous. We find no arguable error requiring us to appoint new counsel to re-brief this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating R.G.’s parental rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by R.G.’s court-appointed appellate counsel, because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B) (West Supp. 2018); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). In the event R.G. decides to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, counsel’s obligations to R.G. can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28. 2 AFFIRMED. _________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice Submitted on October 29, 2018 Opinion Delivered November 8, 2018 Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ. 3
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