Dionisio G. Torres d/b/a Torres Design & Construction, Torres Design & Construction, Inc., and Torres Construction v. Leticia HayesAppeal from 49th Judicial District Court of Webb County (memorandum opinion )
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Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-12-00522-CV
Dionisio G. TORRES d/b/a Torres Design & Construction, Torres Design & Construction, Inc.,
and Torres Construction,
Appellant
v.
Leticia HAYNES,
Appellee
From the 49th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2011CVF001094-D1
Honorable Jose A. Lopez, Judge Presiding
Opinion by:
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Sitting:
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: November 6, 2013
AFFIRMED
Dionisio Torres appeals from a no-answer default judgment. In two issues, he contends the
trial court erroneously denied his motion for a new trial, and in the alternative, he is entitled to a
remand for a new hearing on damages. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Leticia Haynes hired Torres to build a restaurant in Laredo, Texas. In July 2011, Haynes
filed suit against Torres alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, violations of the DTPA,
and negligence. The record shows Torres was served with citation in August 2011, but the record
04-12-00522-CV
does not reflect that Torres filed an answer or any other pleading. 1 On February 27, 2012, Haynes
moved for the entry of default judgment against Torres. Shortly after Haynes filed her motion, the
case was transferred from the 111th Judicial District Court to the 49th Judicial District Court. On
April 5, 2012, the 49th Judicial District Court held a hearing on Haynes’s motion and her
unliquidated damages. The court rendered a default judgment, finding Hayes’s damages to be in
the amount of $232,587.32 and awarding her attorney’s fees and court costs in the amount of
$10,456.00.
ANALYSIS
Denial of Motion for New Trial
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment and grant a new
trial for an abuse of discretion. See Norton v. Martinez, 935 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1996, no writ). We apply the familiar Craddock standard:
[a] default judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered in
any case in which the failure of the defendant to answer before
judgment was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference
on his part, but was due to a mistake or an accident; provided the
motion for a new trial sets up a meritorious defense and is filed at a
time when the granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise
work an injury to the plaintiff.
Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939); Olivares v. Cauthorn,
717 S.W.2d 431, 432 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, writ dism’d). No hearing was held on the
motion for new trial. Torres’s motion for new trial failed to meet at least two of the Craddock
requirements.
First, Torres’s motion does not show that his failure to file an answer was due to a mistake
or was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference. The motion alleged that Torres’s
1
The clerk’s record contains a filing labelled “Defendant’s Designation of Expert Witnesses.” However, it is apparent
that it was filed by Haynes’s counsel.
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04-12-00522-CV
counsel appeared when the case was originally called in the 111th Judicial District Court and that
his counsel was under the impression that constituted a general appearance. The motion further
alleged that his counsel never received notice of the case’s transfer to the 49th Judicial District
Court. These allegations—although they may explain why Torres did not appear before the 49th
Judicial District Court—do not explain why Torres never filed an answer or any other pleading in
either the 49th Judicial District Court or 111th Judicial District Court.
In addition, up until April 5, 2012, the date on which the default judgment hearing was
held, there is no affirmative showing in the record that Torres or his attorney appeared before either
court. The record does not support Torres’s assertion that his attorney appeared when the case was
originally called in the 111th Judicial District Court—as the motion for new trial itself
acknowledged. The docket sheet reflects that Haynes’s counsel appeared when the case was called
in that court, but it makes no mention of Torres or his attorney appearing. The docket sheet reflects
that Torres’s attorney made his only appearance on the same day as the default hearing in the 49th
Judicial District Court, but only after the court had held the hearing and rendered the default
judgment.
Second, for a motion for new trial to “set up” a meritorious defense under Craddock, “[t]he
motion must allege facts which in law would constitute a defense to the cause of action asserted
by the plaintiff, and must be supported by affidavits or other evidence proving prima facie that the
defendant has such meritorious defense.” Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966). The
motion for new trial stated that “[Torres] has a defense to the allegations filed against him.” That
bare statement plainly does not meet the Craddock standard. See id. (“[A] new trial should be
granted to a defaulting defendant if his motion ‘sets up a meritorious defense.’ This does not mean
that the motion should be granted if it merely alleges that the defendant ‘has a meritorious
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04-12-00522-CV
defense.’”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Torres’s motion for new trial,
and we overrule Torres’s first issue.
Unliquidated Damages Hearing
In his second issue, Torres asks this court to remand the case for a hearing on unliquidated
damages. His briefing on this issue is not clear: he appears to contend either the trial court failed
to hold a damages hearing or the trial court committed error by not allowing Torres to be heard at
the hearing.
Before rendering a default judgment, a court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing to
assess unliquidated damages. TEX. R. CIV. P. 239. The record reflects the trial court did conduct
the required hearing, at which Haynes testified and offered documentary evidence about her
damages and attorney’s fees. The docket sheet and the reporter’s record show that neither Torres
nor his counsel appeared at the hearing. We note a defendant who does not appear and does not
file an answer after being served with citation is not entitled to notice of a default hearing. Long v.
McDermott, 813 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); Olivares, 717
S.W.2d at 434. We overrule Torres’s second issue.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
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