Mary Ann Herrera v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services--Appeal from 25th Judicial District Court of Guadalupe County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-06-00890-CV
Mary Ann HERRERA,
Appellant
v.
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES,
Appellee
From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court No. 05-1671-CV
Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

 

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

 

Delivered and Filed: July 18, 2007

 

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION

Mary Ann Hererra appeals from an interlocutory order striking her petition in intervention. Because the record before this court fails to establish that we have jurisdiction over the appeal, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Michael and Lee Kraus filed a petition to adopt their foster children, C.J.H. and J.A.S.M. Herrera, the children's maternal grandmother, filed a petition in intervention seeking to adopt the children. In response to Herrera's petition in intervention, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed a motion to strike Herrera's pleading.

An associate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Herrera's petition in intervention. At the conclusion of the hearing, the associate judge ordered Herrera's petition in intervention stricken. Herrera subsequently appealed the associate judge's ruling in accordance with section 201.015 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 201.015 (Vernon 2002). On appeal, the Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, presiding judge of the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas, upheld the associate judge's order striking Herrera's petition in intervention. This appeal followed.

Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction to hear an appeal only if it is from a final judgment. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992). Appellate courts, however, have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-53 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam). Presently, "[n]o statute provides for interlocutory appeal of an order dismissing or striking a petition in intervention, or denying permission to intervene." Barrett v. Barrett, No. 14-03-00373-CV, 2004 WL 1925972, *1 (Tex. App.--Houston [14 Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (per curiam).

The record reflects that the trial court has not yet entered a final judgment in the underlying matter, and there are no severance orders appearing in the record. Therefore, the order striking Herrera's petition in intervention is interlocutory. See id. Because no statute provides for interlocutory appeal of an order striking a petition in intervention before the rendition of a final judgment, we dismiss Herrera's appeal for want of jurisdiction. See id.; see also Metromedia Long Distance, Inc. v. Hughes, 810 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1991, writ denied) ("It is settled law that an order dismissing or striking a petition in intervention may not be appealed by the intervenor before the rendition of a final judgment.").

 

Catherine Stone, Justice