Compton and Adams Warehouse, Inc., (APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE) v. Jimmy Powers and Jimmy Sellers, (APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS)--Appeal from 198th Judicial District Court of Menard County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-04-00099-CV
COMPTON AND ADAMS WAREHOUSE, INC.,
Appellant /Cross-Appellee
v.
Jimmy POWERS and Jimmy SELLERS,
Appellees /Cross-Appellants
From the 198th District Court, Menard County, Texas
Trial Court No. 01-4777
Honorable Emil Karl Prohl, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 20, 2004

AFFIRMED

Compton and Adams Warehouse, Inc. ("C&A") appeals the trial court's order awarding Jimmy Powers ("Powers") $6,539.26 for interest paid on a loan, $600.00 for transportation costs, treble damages, and court costs, and awarding Jimmy Sellers ("Sellers") $350.00 for transportation costs and court costs. On appeal, C&A contends that the DTPA violations found by the trial court were not the producing cause of the damages alleged by Powers and Sellers, and there was no evidence presented to support the trial court's finding. On cross-appeal, Powers and Sellers argue that monies deposited into the registry of the court represent out-of-pocket expenses and therefore are a proper element of damages that should have been awarded to them. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

Powers and Sellers were both in the business of raising goats and producing mohair. Both men stored their mohair at the facilities of C&A, which was in the business of storing mohair and brokering mohair sales. No written storage agreement existed between the parties; the oral agreement Powers and Sellers had with C&A concerned sales commission terms only.

While the mohair belonging to Powers and Sellers was in storage with C&A, both Powers and Sellers borrowed money from the United States Government, using the stored mohair as collateral. Subsequently, each secured a bank loan to pay off the government loan to prevent foreclosure on their mohair by the government. In 2000, Powers and Sellers first learned C&A was charging them a storage fee. At that time, they attempted to remove their mohair from the warehouse. C&A refused to release the mohair and represented to Powers and Sellers that C&A held a lien on their mohair. Because C&A would have offset the storage charges against the proceeds of any mohair sales, Powers and Sellers chose not to sell their mohair. As a result, they continued to accrue interest on their loans. Although Powers and Sellers informed C&A of the invalidity of the lien, C&A stated its intent to foreclose on the lien.

The trial court found that the parties' agreement did not contain any provisions for storage fees. The trial court also found that C&A's conduct in claiming an invalid lien against the mohair belonging to Powers and Sellers and in attempting to foreclose on that lien, even after receiving notice of its invalidity, constituted an unconscionable act within Section 17.46 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. (1) The trial court awarded Powers the interest he paid on the loan during the period C&A wrongfully refused to release the mohair, transportation costs incurred in moving the mohair to another warehouse, treble the aggregate damages above $1,000, and court costs. The trial court awarded Sellers transportation costs incurred in moving the mohair to another warehouse and court costs. (2)

No Evidence

On appeal, C&A contends that the trial court erred in awarding Powers interest he paid on his loan and in awarding Powers and Sellers transportation costs. Specifically, C&A argues that the DTPA violations found by the trial court were not the producing cause of the damages found by the trial court and that there was no evidence before the trial court to support such a finding.

Powers and Sellers were awarded the loan interest and transportation costs as damages resulting from the invalid lien claim. To recover, Powers and Sellers must establish that the actions of C&A were a producing cause of those damages. Home Sav. Ass'n v. Guerra, 733 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. 1987). A producing cause is an "efficient, exciting, or contributing cause, which in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages complained of, if any." Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1976). Additionally, "[t]here can be more than one producing cause." Id. To recover damages, a plaintiff must produce evidence from which the trial court may reasonably infer that the damages sought resulted from the conduct of the defendant. McKnight v. Hill & Hill Exterminators, 689 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. 1985). This requirement is met when the court is presented with evidence that establishes a causal link between the defendant's actions, the injury suffered and the damages awarded. Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 731-32 n.2 (Tex. 1984).

In reviewing a no evidence question, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that tend to support the trial court's findings, disregarding all contrary evidence and references. Best v. Ryan Auto Group, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Tex. 1990). It is not necessary to detail all competent evidence; rather, we must determine if there is some evidence to support the trial court's judgment. Both Powers and Sellers testified that but for C&A's claims of liens, they could have sold their mohair and avoided continuously incurring interest on the loans. Each also testified that but for C&A's actions, they would have left their mohair in the C&A facility until it sold. Generally, testimony that establishes a sequence of events providing a logically traceable connection between the event and the condition is adequate proof of causation. Griffin v. Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 450 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex. 1969). The testimony of Powers and Sellers establishes a sequence of events from which the trial court could properly infer that C&A's actions in claiming invalid liens caused Powers and Sellers to incur interest and transportation costs. Accordingly, there is some evidence in the record to support the trial court's award of damages.

Damages

On cross-appeal, Powers and Sellers request that the trial court judgment be reformed to award them an amount equal to the entirety of the monies they placed in the trial court registry. Powers and Sellers argue that paying the money into the court registry had the effect of depriving them of their money as though they paid C&A directly. Therefore, Powers and Sellers contend the money should be characterized as an element of damages subject to trebling.

Damages under the DTPA have been characterized as the "total loss sustained as a result of the deceptive trade practice." Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1985). Here, Powers and Sellers may have lost the use of the money deposited into the registry of the court for the length of time the money was held there, but the money was returned to them and cannot be characterized as a total loss. Therefore, we conclude that the payment made to the registry of the court is not a proper element of damages and affirm the trial court's ruling.

The argument by Powers and Sellers misconstrues the purpose for tendering money into the court's registry. Tender of amounts in controversy with the registry of the court is effective to prevent accrual of damages for use of such funds after the date of tender. Jonas Realty Corp. v. Coker, 716 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. App.-Tyler, 1986). Powers and Sellers agreed to tender the money into the registry of the court presumably to prevent accrual of damages. The money in the registry was subsequently returned to them, and they cannot be said to have been damaged as a result.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

1. Specifically, the trial court stated that C&A represented that the agreement between the parties conferred or involved rights, remedies, or obligations which it did not have or involve, or which were prohibited by law. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon 2002).

2. The trial court noted that while Sellers was entitled to the interest paid on his loans during the period C&A wrongfully refused to release the mohair, Sellers failed to provide any admissible evidence of the interest amount.