Arturo Castro and Judith Sanders-Castro, as next friend of Laura Castro v. Northside Independent School District, Dr. John Folks, Superintendent, and Larry Martin, Principal of Sandra Day O'Connor High School--Appeal from 408th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-04-00563-CV
Arturo CASTRO and Judith Sanders-Castro, as Next Friends of Laura Castro,
Appellants
v.
NORTHSIDE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Dr. John Folks, Superintendent,
and Larry Martin, Principal of Sandra Day O-Connor High School,
Appellees
From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2004-CI-08301
Honorable Pat Boone, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 21, 2004

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Appellants seek to appeal two orders entered by the trial court. The first order is an order holding one of the appellants in contempt. This court does not have jurisdiction to review contempt orders by direct appeal. Norman v. Norman, 692 S.W.2d 655, 655 (Tex. 1985); In re C.N.J., 2004 WL 1195969, at *1 (Tex. App.--San Antonio June 2, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Contempt orders may only be reviewed by an application for a writ of habeas corpus, if the contemnor has been confined, or by a petition for a writ of mandamus, if the contemnor has not been confined. See Rosser v. Squier, 902 S.W.2d 962, 962 (Tex. 1995); Ex parte Williams, 690 S.W.2d 243, 243 (Tex. 1985). On August 16, 2004, we issued a show cause order questioning our jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the contempt order. Appellants responded that this court should have jurisdiction under these circumstances; however, the case law expressly states that this court does not have jurisdiction to consider contempt orders by direct appeal.

The second order appellants seek to appeal is an order granting the appellees' motion for sanctions. A trial court's power to decide a motion for sanctions pertaining to matters occurring before judgment is no different than its power to decide any other motion during its plenary jurisdiction Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. 1996). An order that does not dispose of all parties and causes of action is not final and appealable. See Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. 1986); Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966). In its order, the trial court struck through the sentence that read, "It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this cause be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE." Our show cause order also questioned our jurisdiction to consider the sanctions order since a final judgment had not been entered in regard to the appellants' original application for temporary restraining order, temporary injunction, and permanent injunction. The only other order entered by the trial court that is contained in our clerk's record is the temporary restraining order. Appellants responded that the sanctions order disposed of the final issue remaining in the case. We disagree. The request for the injunction has never been considered by the trial court. Until that claim is non-suited or dismissed, the sanctions order is not a final, appealable order.

This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Costs of the appeal are taxed against the appellants.

PER CURIAM