Juarez Miguel Bibbs v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 25th Judicial District Court of Guadalupe County

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-03-00046-CR

Juarez Miguel BIBBS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. 02-1015-CR

Honorable Dwight E. Peschel, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Sitting: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 17, 2003

AFFIRMED

A jury found appellant, Juarez Miguel Bibbs, guilty of possession of a controlled substance and assessed punishment at forty-five years' confinement. In a single issue on appeal, Bibbs asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on March 24, 2002, City of Seguin Police Officer Adrian Garza was on patrol when he was dispatched to the location of an individual wanted on a possible arrest warrant. When Garza arrived at the location, a two-story apartment complex, he observed two men standing at the bottom of a stairway. Garza passed the two men, one of whom was Bibbs, on his way up to the second floor apartments. Garza knocked on the door of the apartment of the woman who had called the police station to report that her fiancé was wanted for arrest. The woman, who refused to identify herself to Garza, indicated Juarez Bibbs as the man wanted on the warrant. She identified Bibbs by describing his clothing to Garza.

Garza walked back down the stairs and asked Bibbs for his name. Bibbs said his name was "Juan," but he refused to state his last name. Because Bibbs began to act evasive, Garza placed him in handcuffs. A search of Bibbs's pockets revealed a Blockbuster video card in the name of "Juarez Miguel Bibbs." Garza called his dispatcher to obtain additional identifying information confirming Bibbs as the subject of an active arrest warrant. After the warrant was confirmed, Garza transported Bibbs to the Guadalupe County jail. During a search at the jail, contraband was found in Bibbs's clothing.

On appeal, Bibbs asserts he was illegally arrested when he was placed in handcuffs and the subsequent search was illegal because it was not pursuant to a valid arrest. Bibbs contends the trial court improperly applied the attenuation doctrine to break the connection between the initial illegal arrest and the subsequently discovered contraband. The State counters that the attenuation doctrine is inapplicable here because Garza was justified in attempting an investigative detention of Bibbs at the apartment complex. We agree with the State.

The attenuation doctrine is a method of determining whether evidence was obtained in violation of the law. Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 744, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Under this doctrine, evidence sufficiently attenuated from the violation of the law is not considered "obtained" from the violation. Id. at 750. However, if the evidence was not obtained initially in violation of a law, the doctrine does not apply. Id. at 750-51. Accordingly, we must first determine whether Garza's detention of Bibbs at the apartment complex amounted to an illegal arrest.

An investigative detention requires an officer to have "a reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is involved in criminal activity." Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We examine the reasonableness of a temporary detention in terms of the totality of the circumstances. Id. A temporary detention is justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead him to conclude that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Id.

During an investigative detention, an officer may use such force as is reasonably necessary, including handcuffing an individual, to accomplish the goal of the stop, whether it be investigation, maintenance of the status quo, or officer safety. Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 771; Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Thus, handcuffing is not always the equivalent of an arrest. Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 771; Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 118. Instead, when evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 118.

The facts known to Garza when he decided to detain Bibbs gave him reasonable grounds to suspect Bibbs actually was, had been, or soon would be engaged in criminal activity. A woman identifying herself as knowing Bibbs called police dispatch to report that Bibbs had an outstanding warrant for his arrest and where the police could find him. Garza was dispatched to the location of the caller to look for an individual by the name of Juarez Miguel Bibbs. While en route, dispatch checked the name of Juarez Miguel Bibbs and obtained a "hit," which indicated Bibbs was wanted under a warrant. Garza spoke to the woman who had called dispatch and she described Bibbs to Garza. When Garza asked Bibbs to fully identify himself, Bibbs provided only the name "Juan," he appeared evasive, and he began to move around as "if he was going to run or something. " At this point, Garza placed Bibbs in handcuffs.

Garza testified he did not place Bibbs under arrest when he handcuffed him. This testimony is one factor the court may consider in determining whether an arrest has taken place. Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 117. Garza said he handcuffed Bibbs for the purpose of detaining him while he obtained other identifiers from dispatch regarding the individual named in the outstanding warrant. Garza explained that when an individual is detained on a possible warrant, other identifiers are obtained and the warrant is confirmed as "active." This continued investigation to confirm that Bibbs met the description of the individual wanted under the warrant and to confirm that the warrant was still active is another factor the court may consider in determining whether a detention is an investigatory stop or an arrest, and whether the detention is reasonable. See Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 770; see also Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 119-20 (Meyers, J., concurring and dissenting).

We conclude that Garza's initial detention of Bibbs was an investigatory stop supported by reasonable suspicion. To the extent Bibbs was restrained, the restraint was reasonable under the circumstances to accomplish the goal of the stop. Accordingly, the detention did not evolve into an unlawful arrest. Because the detention was lawful, the subsequently-seized evidence was not "obtained" in violation of the law; thus, the attenuation doctrine has no application here. For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bibbs's motion to suppress, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH