Justin Addison Brown v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court of Kimble County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-03-00142-CR
Justin Addison BROWN,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court, Kimble County, Texas
Trial Court No. 02-0131
Honorable Delbert R. Roberts, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 19, 2003

AFFIRMED

Justin Addison Brown appeals his conviction of driving while intoxicated, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and review the application of the law to the facts de novo. Id.

An investigative detention requires an officer to have "a reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is involved in criminal activity." Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 768. "The reasonableness of a temporary detention must be examined in terms of the totality of the circumstances and will be justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead him to conclude that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Id.

Officer Thomas testified that he was responding to a dispatch regarding a fight at London Hall. Officer Thomas stated that the altercation could involve illegal activity. As Officer Thomas was approaching the location, he received a second dispatch that the subjects had left the area. The second dispatch described the vehicles in which the subjects left. The vehicles were described as a white Chevrolet pickup and a dark-colored pickup. Officer Thomas was told that the vehicles were traveling south, and the only road other than the road Officer Thomas was taking to the location was a dirt road that Officer Thomas believed dead ended. As Officer Thomas was drawing closer to the location, he saw the vehicles matching the description and stopped Brown's vehicle.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Thomas was responding to reports of a crime, and he observed vehicles matching the description on the only probable road that the subjects would take in departing the scene of the crime. See Sanders v. State, 992 S.W.2d 742, 748-49 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1999), pet. ref'd, 16 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J., dissenting to refusal of appellant's petition for discretionary review). Although the information relayed through dispatch was from a caller who was not identified to Officer Thomas, the caller was in a position to be held accountable for his or her intervention. See State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). As Officer Thomas testified, "the dispatch would know." "Furthermore, a person who is not connected with the police or who is not a paid informant is considered inherently trustworthy when he advises the police that he suspects criminal activity has occurred or is occurring." Id. Accordingly, we hold that Officer Thomas had sufficient specific articulable facts to lead him to conclude that Brown had been engaged in criminal activity. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown's motion to suppress.

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Catherine Stone, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH