Michael Lane Williams v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 262nd District Court of Harris County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-02-00747-CR
Michael Lane WILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 262nd Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas
Trial Court No. 919564
Honorable Mike Anderson, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 16, 2003

AFFIRMED

Michael Lane Williams ("Williams") appeals his conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon. Williams contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. Because the issues in this appeal are settled by existing precedent, we affirm the trial court's judgment in this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

1. In his first point of error, Williams contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his arrest was not supported by probable cause. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Williams was initially stopped by two officers for a defective headlight. It was dark outside at the time of the stop. An officer may lawfully stop and detain a person who commits a traffic offense. State v. Cardenas, 36 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). The officers not only had the right to stop and detain Williams for driving with only one headlight, but the officers also could have arrested him for that offense. See Tex. Transp. Code. Ann. 543.001, 547.302 (Vernon 1999); Hardiway v. State, 2 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928); Throneberry v. State, No. 02-01-00179-CR, 2003 WL 2101253, at *4 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth May 15, 2003, no pet. h.). When Williams failed to display his license upon the officers' demand, the officers also had probable cause to arrest Williams for that offense. See Tex. Transp. Code. Ann. 521.025 (Vernon 1999); Snyder v. State, 629 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Gaines v. State, 888 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1994, no pet.). Williams's first point of error is overruled.

2. In his second and third points of error, Williams contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he was in possession of the firearm that was recovered from the car Williams was driving at the time of his arrest. (1) In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In our factual sufficiency review, we must consider all of the evidence to determine whether the judgment is "so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

The State was required to prove that Williams knew of the firearm's existence and that he exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over it. Corpus v. State, 30 S.W.3d 35, 38 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). Williams contends that the State did not meet its burden of proof because no evidence was introduced to show that Williams owned the vehicle, that Williams exercised direct control over the firearm, or that Williams's fingerprints were on the firearm.

When the accused is not in exclusive control of the place the contraband is found, there must be independent facts and circumstances linking the accused to the contraband. Id. Courts have identified numerous factors that constitute "affirmative links" between the accused and the contraband. Id.; see also Hawkins v. State, 89 S.W.3d 674, 677 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). Factors that may establish affirmative links include whether: (1) the contraband was in a car driven by the accused; (2) the contraband was in a place owned by the accused; (3) the contraband was conveniently accessible to the accused; (4) the contraband was in plain view; (5) the contraband was found in an enclosed space; (6) the contraband was found on the same side of the car as the accused; (7) the conduct of the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt; (8) the accused has a special relationship to the contraband; (9) occupants of the automobile gave conflicting statements about relevant matters; and (10) affirmative statements connect the accused to the contraband. Hawkins, 89 S.W.3d at 677; Corpus, 30 S.W.3d at 38. The number of factors present is not as important as the logical force the factors have in establishing the elements of the offense. Hawkins, 89 S.W.3d at 677; Corpus, 30 S.W.3d at 38.

In this case, the firearm was in a car driven by Williams. The firearm was conveniently accessible to Williams as it was wedged between the center console and the driver's seat with the butt of the gun facing upwards. The firearm was visible from the driver's seat and could be seen without putting a hand between the seats. The firearm was on ths same side of the car as Williams. The logical force of these factors sufficiently establishes that Williams knew of the firearm's existence and that he exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over it. Williams's second and third points of error are overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. The firearm was recovered during an inventory search of the vehicle.