In the Matter of M.A.T., A Juvenile--Appeal from 73rd Judicial District Court of Bexar County

No. 04-97-00918-CV
IN THE MATTER OF M.A.T.
From the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 97-JUV-02036
Honorable Andy Mireles, Judge Presiding(1)

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Tom Rickhoff, Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 12, 1998

AFFIRMED

This appeal concerns the admissibility of a juvenile's confession. The trial court found that appellant, M.A.T., voluntarily confessed, in a noncustodial setting, to burning a vehicle. Consequently, the trial court denied M.A.T.'s motion to suppress this statement. Because we agree that this statement was not the result of a custodial interrogation and was made voluntarily, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Factual and Procedural Background

M.A.T. had been at Fernando Delgado's house on the day of the arson. Investigators learned that there had been a disagreement or fight between M.A.T. and some of the persons at this house. Delgado reported that M.A.T. left the premises but threatened that he would return. The next morning Delgado discovered that his vehicle had been burned. Police officers visited M.A.T. at his residence and questioned him about the incident. M.A.T. admitted that he burned the vehicle. The officers informed M.A.T. and his mother that they needed to take a statement downtown, and that the officers would provide transportation to the station if needed. At the police station, the officers questioned M.A.T. about the incident and typed up his statement. No juvenile officers were present and M.A.T. was not read his Miranda rights. After approximately a half an hour, one of the officers called M.A.T.'s mother into the office. M.A.T.'s mother read the statement to him and they both signed the document. M.A.T.'s brief contains a copy of a psychological evaluation which reveals that M.A.T., age 15 at the time of the incident, reads at a second grade level, has a verbal IQ of 56--indicative of mild retardation, but has completed the eighth grade. This psychological evaluation, however, was not introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court found that M.A.T. voluntarily went to the police station and was not in custody when the statement was given. The court also found that M.A.T. was a target of the police's investigation, but that he was not under arrest when he made the statement. Finally, the court recognized that after giving his statement, the police had probable cause to arrest M.A.T., even though they took him back home.

Motion to Suppress

In reviewing a trial court's ruling, we must first determine the applicable standard of review. A trial court's determination of historical facts is afforded almost total deference. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A trial court's determination of a mixed question of law and fact will also be reviewed with almost total deference when that determination turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. However, a mixed question of law and fact which does not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor will be reviewed de novo. Id. The historical facts of the incident at hand as testified to were not disputed; M.A.T. only disputes the trial court's finding in light of these facts. The trial court's determination of whether appellant was "in custody" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and whether the statement was voluntary are mixed questions of law and fact which do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 105 n. 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Consequently, we consider the trial court's judgment under a de novo standard. See Wachter v. State, 961 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, pet. ref'd) (reviewing a judge's denial of a motion to suppress under a de novo standard where the facts were undisputed and application of the law of search warrants was at issue).

Custody

The admissibility of a confession given by a juvenile is controlled by the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. 51.095 (Vernon Supp. 1998). A juvenile confession, if given pursuant to custodial interrogation without the required admonishments in the Family Code, cannot be admitted against the juvenile in a subsequent trial. See id. Consequently, our first step in determining whether the motion to suppress was properly denied is to consider whether M.A.T. was in custody when he made his statement.

M.A.T. contends that he was in constructive custody if not actual custody when he gave his statement. M.A.T. notes that the trial court found (1) that he was the focus of the investigation and (2) that the police had probable cause to arrest him--the two viable factors of the four articulated in Meek v. State indicative of whether a defendant was in custody. See Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

In Meek, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted four factors that are traditionally considered in determining whether a person is in custody: (1) whether there was probable cause to arrest; (2) whether the defendant was the focus of the investigation; (3) the subjective intent of the police; and (4) the subjective belief of the defendant. Id. In Stansbury v. California, the Supreme Court revamped custody analysis by making the two factors dealing with subjective intent or belief irrelevant except that they may be manifested in the words or actions of law officials. Stansbury, 511 U.S. 318, 323-25 (1994); Bradley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 791, 801 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1997, pet. ref'd). Under Stansbury, the determination of custody is based entirely upon objective criteria, which include whether there is probable cause to arrest and whether the accused is the focus of the investigation. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323; Blanks v. State, 968 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd).

Any questioning of a crime suspect by a law enforcement officer will have coercive aspects, but such an interview will not necessarily be considered custodial. See Parra v. State, 743 S.W.2d 281, 285 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1987, pet. ref'd) (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). Thus, neither being the focus of a criminal investigation nor being subjected to station house questioning, in and of itself, constitutes custody. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). Rather, a court should "examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Abernathy v. State, 963 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd).(2)

Appellant analogizes the present case to In the Matter of S.A.R., 931 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, writ denied), in which a juvenile was taken to the police station by four police officers in a marked police car. The officer questioning the juvenile informed her that she was a suspect and photographed and fingerprinted her. Id. at 587. The court concluded that the juvenile was in custody because a reasonable person would have believed that their freedom of movement had been significantly curtailed. Id.

In the present case, it is true that the police officers suspected M.A.T. of the crime, and as the trial court found, he was the focus of their investigation. But here, M.A.T.'s trip to the police station was not the result of force or coercion. After M.A.T. admitted burning the car, the police told him "Well, we need to take a statement and we need to take it downtown. If you don't have a way we'll take you and bring you right back." Officer Rios further testified that they did not tell M.A.T. that he had to come to the station, but that they merely asked him whether he was able to give them a statement where they could put it on a computer. M.A.T., his mother, and two siblings all rode together to the station in a patrol car.

Reviewing these facts, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that the statement was not given in a custodial setting in spite of the fact that the officers had probable cause and that M.A.T. was the focus of the investigation. The fact that the officers initiated contact, questioned M.A.T., and drove him to the police station in a police car does not constitute custody, implied or otherwise. See Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that a police officer's asking questions and requesting consent to search alone do not cause an encounter to become a detention--only when an officer conveys a message that compliance is required is a consensual encounter rendered a detention); Bradley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 791, 801 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1997, pet. ref'd) ("When a person is transported to a police facility by the police in the course of an investigation, if the person was acting upon the invitation, request, or even the urging of the police, and there were no threats, express or implied that he or she will be taken in a forcible manner and the accompaniment is voluntary and consensual, then the individual is not in custody."). A reasonable person simply would not have believed that there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest, especially when the officers informed this person and his family that they would bring them right back. M.A.T.'s first point of error is overruled.

Voluntariness

Although we have determined that M.A.T. was not in custody, due process requires that we also consider whether his confession was voluntarily given. See Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Because Officer Rios' testimony is undisputed, we focus our review on the application of the law to the facts as determined by the trial court. The determination of the voluntariness of M.A.T.'s statement is not restricted to the trial court's evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Thus, this mixed question of law to fact is reviewed under a de novo standard.

A statement is not voluntary if there was "official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Voluntariness is determined by reviewing the totality of the circumstances. Darden v. State, 629 S.W.2d 46, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Rodriguez v. State, 968 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

M.A.T. argues that comments made by the officers indicated to M.A.T. that he had to make a statement. He contends that because of his mental impairment, he did not fully understand the implications of his statements or that the officers were asking him to act voluntarily. Moreover, M.A.T. asserts that whenever a juvenile is questioned alone by police officers at police headquarters without an attorney present, the statement given is inherently involuntary. All this, M.A.T. contends, should result in our finding that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. We cannot agree.

Appellant asks this court to review evidence of his mental capacity in evaluating the voluntariness of his confession. However, "we may only review evidence that was before the trial judge when he was asked to render a decision on this matter." See Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 650-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 100 (1997). Because M.A.T. did not challenge the voluntariness of the confession at the hearing with regards to his incapacity other than in his cross-examination of Officer Rios, which indicated that M.A.T. could read a little, we hold that he has waived these arguments. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 651. Thus, we will not consider the potential mental incapacity of M.A.T. as reported in appellant's brief.(3)

However, we do recognize that the court should consider the fact that M.A.T. is a juvenile as one factor in the totality of circumstances when determining the voluntariness of the juvenile's confession. Griffin v. State, 765 S.W.2d 422, 427-28, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). M.A.T. relies on several cases in which courts have held that the juvenile's confession was involuntary. In E___A___W___ v. State, 547 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. Civ. App.--Waco 1977, no pet.), the court found that an eleven year old girl of average intelligence for her age, could not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waive her constitutional privilege against self-incrimination where she spent the previous night in a detention center and where she had no guidance from a parent or an attorney. In another case, the court held that a juvenile's statement was inadmissible where the child was taken into custody and the State failed to prove compliance with the procedures set forth in the Family Code. In the Matter of R.R., 931 S.W.2d 11, 14-15 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no writ). However, the present case is easily distinguishable from these cases. M.A.T. was accompanied by his mother and, as discussed, he was not in custody. M.A.T. did not spend any extended period of time at the police station. His mother read and signed his confession, as did M.A.T. Thus, these cases are inapposite and do not support reversing the trial court's determination.

M.A.T. also contends that the officers' statements to him constituted threats or coercion. He argues that statements such as "as soon as we'd take the statement, we'd take him back home" were, in fact, coercing M.A.T. to make the statement. M.A.T. notes that a confession must not be obtained by threats or violence, by any direct or implied promises, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. United States v. Barfield, 507 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897)). However, we do not believe that the statements made to M.A.T. implied any sort of promise or constituted coercion. After determining that M.A.T. and his mother did not have a way to get the station, the police officers merely indicated that they could provide transportation. The evidence introduced at trial is uncontradicted and clearly supports this finding. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding that M.A.T.'s confession was voluntary.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

CATHERINE STONE

JUSTICE

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. Juvenile Referee Patrick Garza presided over the delinquent conduct hearing, and the Honorable Andy Mireles signed the disposition order of commitment to the Texas Youth Commission.

2. M.A.T. urges us to consider that in light of M.A.T.'s mental incapacity he believed he was in custody. However, M.A.T. introduced no evidence of this mental incapacity at the suppression hearing, and custody is no longer determined by the subjective belief of the person questioned. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 321-23.

3. While we do not consider the potential mental incapacity of M.A.T., we note that mental deficiency is one factor to consider in reviewing the totality of the circumstances, but is not alone determinative in ascertaining the voluntariness of a confession. Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 744 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977 (1995). The question is whether the defendant's mental incapacity is so severe that he is incapable of understanding the meaning and effect of his confession. Casias v. State, 452 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). Courts have found confessions to be voluntary in cases of mentally-slow or retarded defendants. See Casias, 452 S.W.2d at 488 (confession admissible even though defendant had I.Q. of 68, was retarded and illiterate, had mental age of eight to ten years of age); Grayson v. State, 438 S.W.2d 553, 555-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (statements admissible from a defendant where evidence was presented that he had an I.Q. of 51 and mental age of six years).

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