Circle X Land and Cattle Co., LTD v. Mumford Independent School District--Appeal from 82nd District Court of Robertson County
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Affirmed and Opinion filed August 31, 2010.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-09-00330-CV
CIRCLE X LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY, LTD., Appellant
V.
MUMFORD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee
On Appeal from the 82nd District Court
Robertson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 06-09-17,614CV
OPINION
This case arises out of a school district‘s condemnation of thirty acres of ranch
land in Robertson County. Circle X Land & Cattle Company, Ltd., is appealing the trial
court‘s grant of Mumford Independent School District‘s motion for partial summary
judgment. Circle X contends the school district failed to meet its burden to prove as a
matter of law it was entitled to the summary judgment because it did not establish there
was a purpose for the condemnation or that the condemnation of all thirty acres was
necessary. Circle X argues that its response to the partial motion for summary judgment
raised fact issues about whether the school district acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
condemning the land. Finally, Circle X complains the trial court erred in including in its
judgment a clause stating Circle X does not have the right to ingress and egress on the
condemned property for the purpose of exploring, developing, drilling, or mining for oil
and gas. We affirm.
I
In 2002, Mumford Independent School District and Robertson County expressed
their desire to acquire thirty acres of land to develop a sports and recreation complex.
When the county decided to withdraw from the deal, the school district did not proceed
with the acquisition. But the school district revisited the idea three years later, and on
August 11, 2005, its board of trustees voted to start condemnation proceedings. A panel
of three special commissioners reviewed the district‘s petition and approved the
condemnation of thirty acres of Circle X‘s land. Circle X sued in district court claiming
the school district had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding to condemn the land.
The school district filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which the trial
court denied. But after the district moved for reconsideration, the trial court granted the
motion. After the partial summary judgment was granted, the school district and Circle X
agreed on the amount of just compensation for the thirty acres. The trial court then
signed a final judgment in favor of the district. This appeal followed.
II
We review the trial court‘s summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v.
Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott,
128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Here, the appellee moved for a traditional summary
judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). The party moving for a traditional summary
judgment has the burden to show that no material fact issue exists and that it is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); M.D. Anderson Hosp. &
Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam). We will assume that
all evidence favorable to the non-movant is true and indulge every reasonable inference
2
in favor of the non-movant. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp.,
988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999).
A non-movant has the burden to respond to a
traditional summary-judgment motion if the movant conclusively (1) establishes each
element of its cause of action or defense, or (2) negates at least one element of the nonmovant‘s cause of action or defense. See Little v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 148
S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. 2004); Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984).
Although the school district claims in its brief that it moved for both a traditional
and a no-evidence summary judgment, the motion itself is ambiguous. Compare Tex. R.
Civ. P. 166a(c), with Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Circle X contends that because the district‘s
motion was ambiguous, we should construe it as a traditional motion for summary
judgment.
The two summary-judgment standards are distinct; therefore, we must
determine which type of summary judgment is at issue. Grimes v. Reynolds, 252 S.W.3d
554, 558 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). In Grimes v. Reynolds, we
held ―[s]ince a motion that does not clearly and unambiguously state it is being filed
under Rule 166a(i) does not give the non-movant notice that the movant is seeking a noevidence summary judgment, we will construe it as a traditional motion under Rule
166a(c).‖ Id. Here, as in Grimes, we will construe the summary judgment to be a
traditional motion.1
Additionally, when a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed after a
summary-judgment motion is heard and ruled upon, the trial court may ordinarily
consider only the record as it existed prior to hearing the motion the first time. See Auten
v. DJ Clark, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.);
Chapman v. Mitsui Eng’g & Shipbuilding Co., 781 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied). However, the trial court may consider evidence
submitted with a motion for reconsideration so long as it affirmatively indicates in the
Furthermore, during oral argument, the school district‘s counsel conceded the motion for partial
summary judgment invoked only the traditional summary-judgment standard.
1
3
record that it accepted or considered the evidence. Auten, 209 S.W.3d at 702; see also
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (summary-judgment evidence must be timely filed, ―except on
leave of court‖).
Here, after the trial court originally denied the school district‘s motion for partial
summary judgment, it granted the motion to reconsider and rendered partial summary
judgment. The court‘s order reflects that in so doing, it ―considered the affidavits and
exhibits submitted by Condemnor and Condemnee on the [Motion for Reconsideration]
and the arguments and authority of counsel.‖ The trial court, therefore, considered the
arguments and evidence presented in the motion to reconsider and response. Thus, we
may review the same to determine whether the trial court erred in ultimately granting the
school district‘s motion for partial summary judgment.2 See Stephens v. Dolcefino, 126
S.W.3d 120, 133–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), pet. denied, 181 S.W.3d 741
(Tex. 2005).
Condemnation
The school district‘s eminent-domain powers are statutorily derived from section
11.155 of the Texas Education Code. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.155 (Vernon
2006). Section 11.155(a) provides that ―[a]n independent school district may, by exercise
of the right of eminent domain, acquire the fee simple title to real property for the
purpose of securing sites on which to construct school buildings or for any other purpose
necessary for the district.‖ Id. § 11.155(a). A district court may determine all issues,
including the authority to condemn property and assess damages, in any proceeding for
2
Neither party has complained that the trial court considered any evidence that it should not have.
Both parties supplemented the summary-judgment record at the motion-for-reconsideration stage without
objecting to any untimeliness of the other‘s filings or any lack of notice.
4
eminent domain involving a political subdivision of the state. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §
21.003 (Vernon 2004).3
Generally, a condemnor must prove three essential elements to prevail on its
condemnation proceeding. See Whittington v. City of Austin, 174 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (discussing the requirements for a city to prove in its
condemnation case). First, a condemnor has to establish that it satisfied the procedural
requirements needed to proceed to the trial court. Id.; see Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas
Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172, 179 (Tex. 2004) (describing the requirements in the
Texas Property Code). In Texas, if the parties cannot agree as to the specifics of the
condemnation, the eminent-domain entity with authority to condemn should file a
petition with the proper court. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.012 (Vernon 2004 & Supp.
2009); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Houston Sys. v. FKM P’ship, Ltd., 178 S.W.3d 1, 4
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.), aff’d, 255 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2008).
The condemnation petition must include: (1) the property to be condemned; (2) the
purpose for which the entity intends to use the property; (3) the name of the property
owner; and (4) a statement that the entity and the property owner are unable to agree on
the damages. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.012; FKM P’ship, Ltd., 178 S.W.3d at 4.
The court then appoints three disinterested property owners as special commissioners to
assess the damages that the condemnee will incur. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.014
(Vernon 2004). The special commissioners must then conduct a hearing to assess the
damages.
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.015 (Vernon 2004).
Until the special
commissioners‘ award, the proceedings are deemed to be purely administrative. Amason
v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 682 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1984). If a party timely objects
to the commissioners‘ findings, the court must try the case in the same manner as other
3
One prominent exception to this general rule is Harris County, where the legislature has vested
this authority exclusively in the county civil courts at law. Tex. Gov‘t Code § 25.1032(c) (Vernon 2004);
Taub v. Aquila Sw. Pipeline Corp., 93 S.W.3d 451, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
5
civil cases. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.018 (Vernon 2004); FKM P’ship, Ltd., 178
S.W.3d at 4.
Additionally, a condemnor needs to prove the taking is for a public use. See Tex.
Const. art. I, § 17; Maher v. Lasater, 163 Tex. 356, 354 S.W.2d 923, 924–25 (1962).
There are two aspects to the ―public use‖ requirement, which constitute the second and
third elements a condemnor needs to prove. See Whittington, 174 S.W.3d at 896. The
first aspect is that the condemnor must intend to use the property for a recognizable
public use under Texas law.
Id. The second aspect is the condemnation must be
necessary; this is known as the ―necessity‖ requirement. Id. at 896–97.
The Texas Supreme Court has held that private property may be taken only for
public use. Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 98 Tex. 494, 86 S.W. 11, 15
(1905). What is public use is a question of law.4 Tenngasco Gas Gathering Co. v.
Fischer, 653 S.W.2d 469, 474 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref‘d n.r.e.). But
when the legislature delegates to an entity the power to condemn, and the entity
condemns the property for public use, the extent to which the property is taken is a
legislative question. Block House Mun. Util. Dist. v. City of Leander, 291 S.W.3d 537,
541 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.); see Hous. Auth. of City of Dallas v.
Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79, 85–86 (1940); Harris County Hosp. Dist.
v. Textac Partners I, 257 S.W.3d 303, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no
pet.). In other words, the legislative declaration that the use is presumptively public is
binding on courts unless the use is ―clearly and palpably‖ private.
Higginbotham, 143
S.W.2d at 83. The entity‘s power to condemn is subject to judicial review, however,
when there is a showing of bad faith, arbitrary or capricious action, or abuse of discretion.
Block House Mun. Util. Dist., 291 S.W.3d at 541; see Malcomson Rd. Util. Dist. v.
Newsom, 171 S.W.3d 257, 268–69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
The term ―public use‖ has been defined various ways, and the Texas Supreme Court has
construed ―public use‖ liberally. See Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Pate, 158 Tex. 171, 309
S.W.2d 828, 833 (1958).
4
6
The Texas Supreme Court has held that when a statute vests a governmental
agency with discretionary authority to condemn, the agency‘s determination of public
necessity is presumptively correct. FKM P’ship, Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Houston Sys., 255 S.W.3d 619, 629 (Tex. 2008). The condemnor generally determines
how much land to take. Zboyan v. Far Hills Util. Dist., 221 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.) If a statute delegating the eminent-domain power does
not require proof of necessity, as is the case here, the condemnor need only show that its
governing authority determined that the taking was necessary. See Pizzitola v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 13-05-249-CV, 2006 WL 1360838, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi May 18, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.); Anderson v. Teco Pipeline Co., 985 S.W.2d
559, 565 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). The taking for public use ―must
actually be necessary to advance or achieve the ostensible public use.‖ Zboyan, 221
S.W.3d at 928 (citing Whittington, 174 S.W.3d at 896).
As with the ―public use‖
requirement, this determination is conclusive unless there is a showing of bad faith,
arbitrary or capricious action, or abuse of discretion. See FKM P’ship, Ltd., 255 S.W.3d
at 629; Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. Celanese Corp., 592 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. 1979).
A condemnee can make this showing if he can negate any reasonable basis the
condemnor had in determining what and how much land to condemn. Newsom, 171
S.W.3d at 269.
Circle X contends there is no summary-judgment evidence to prove what the
school district‘s purpose was in condemning Circle X‘s land. Circle X also argues the
amount of land the district condemned was arbitrarily decided because: (1) a federal court
had enjoined the district from accepting transfer students; (2) the land‘s only purpose was
for sports facilities, which did not warrant taking all thirty acres; and (3) even if the
purpose were for constructing a high school, there is still no evidence to support the need
for all thirty acres.
Conversely, the school district contends that because Circle X
presented no evidence that the decision to condemn was arbitrary or capricious, it failed
to meet its burden. The district also argues its justifications for condemning the land
7
never contradicted the allowable purposes in the Texas Education Code, and its evidence
showed that its actions were proper and not arbitrary or capricious.
In the condemnation context, arbitrary and capricious means ―‗willful and
unreasoning action, action without consideration and in disregard of the facts and
circumstances [that] existed at the time condemnation was decided upon, or within the
foreseeable future.‘‖ Textac Partners I, 257 S.W.3d at 316 (quoting Wagoner v. City of
Arlington, 345 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1961, writ ref‘d n.r.e.)). If
reasonable minds acting in good faith could deem the purpose of the condemnation to be
public, then the condemnation proceedings are lawfully authorized and justifiable. Id.
(citing Wagoner, 345 S.W.2d at 763).
The existence of another feasible plan not requiring condemnation is no evidence
of an abuse of discretion. Zboyan, 221 S.W.3d at 930. Additionally, it is not arbitrary or
capricious to base a condemnation on a reasoned prediction of future need or demand.
Pizzitola, 2006 WL 1360838, at *5 (citing Anderson v. Clajon Gas Co., 677 S.W.2d 702,
705 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ)). A condemnor also does not abuse
its authority if it later changes its plans for the use of the land, and sells or devotes the
excess to private use. Vilbig v. Hous. Auth. of City of Dallas, 287 S.W.2d 323, 330–31
(Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1955, writ ref‘d n.r.e.).
Furthermore, nothing in the
condemnation statute prohibits the condemnor from altering its specific plan for the
property after the commissioners‘ hearing even if the new plan allegedly prejudices the
landowner. See PR Invs. & Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. State, 251 S.W.3d 472, 476–79
(Tex. 2008); see also Blasingame v. Krueger, 800 S.W.2d 391, 393–94 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (explaining evidence at a trial de novo is not limited
to the evidence introduced at the commissioners‘ hearing).
In Pizzitola v. Houston Independent School District, the First Court of Appeals
reviewed HISD‘s condemnation of the appellants‘ land. 2006 WL 1360838, at *1. HISD
filed a motion for partial summary judgment in which it claimed it had the authority to
8
condemn the property, the acquisition was for a public use, the decision was not arbitrary
or capricious, and all proper condemnation procedures were followed.
Id. The trial
court granted the motion. Id. The appellants appealed claiming HISD acted arbitrarily
and capriciously and abused its discretion in determining the necessity of taking the
property. Id. at *2, *4. The appellate court reviewed the evidence attached to HISD‘s
motion for partial summary judgment, which included affidavits describing that the
taking was appropriate, necessary, and in furtherance of a public purpose. Id. at *4–5.
The court concluded HISD articulated a reasonable and necessary public purpose for the
taking. Id. at *5. Furthermore, the court held it was the appellants‘ burden, as the
objecting party, to demonstrate that the school district‘s action was arbitrary and
capricious. Id. (citing Austin v. City of Lubbock, 618 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Amarillo 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 628 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1982)).
In its brief, Circle X contends that the only viable evidence the school district
presented about the condemnation proceeding was the minutes reflecting the board of
trustees‘ decision to condemn the property. Circle X argues the minutes are vague and
state no purpose for the condemnation. Circle X also contends that like pleadings, Circle
X‘s affidavits cannot be evidence of an official action. We agree that the minutes are too
vague to amount to any evidence of a purpose. But the trial court was correct to consider
all the summary-judgment evidence, including the affidavits, in its effort to glean both
the purpose of the condemnation and a showing of its necessity. See Pizzitola, 2006 WL
1360838, at *4–5.
Circle X argues that the school district never intended to use the land for anything
other than sports and recreation. Circle X‘s summary-judgment evidence included the
affidavit of Garcia Thibodeaux, a reporter for the Hearne Democrat. In his affidavit,
Thibodeaux recounts a newspaper article he wrote in 2002, a copy of which is attached to
his affidavit.
superintendent.
The article featured a statement by Paul Bienski, the district‘s
Bienski conceded that the district did not need the entire sports
9
complex—just the baseball and softball fields.
Circle X‘s proof also included the
affidavit of Jim Singleton, a licensed architect, who opined that 5.5 acres would be
enough for just baseball and softball fields.
Another justification the district gave was the need for a new high school. Circle
X argues there is no evidence to support such a need. And even if there were, Circle X
continues, there is no evidence a new school would require thirty acres.
Circle X
maintains a federal-court ruling extinguished the district‘s new-high-school rationale.
For many years leading up to the condemnation, a majority of the district‘s students were
transferred from the Hearne Independent School District. Once a federal district court
enjoined such transfers, Circle X argues, the district could no longer prove that it was
growing or in need of new classroom space. Circle X also included in its summaryjudgment evidence the affidavits of Tommy Cowan, a licensed architect, and Gary
Marek, a facility and transportation manager for the Texas Education Agency. Both
affiants disputed the notion that a new high school for the district would require thirty
acres.
The district‘s evidence in support of its motion for partial summary judgment
included affidavits of Superintendent Bienski; Fred Patterson, a licensed architect
employed by the district; and Anthony Scamardo, president of the district‘s board of
trustees. The district also submitted Patterson‘s architectural drawings of the district‘s
new facilities and an email from an architecture firm to Bienski explaining why the
district needed to condemn thirty acres.
Additionally, attached to its motion for
reconsideration, the district included a supplemental affidavit and more drawings by
Patterson. The district contends Bienski‘s, Scamardo‘s, and Patterson‘s affidavits all
demonstrate the purposes of the land acquisition are within the meaning contemplated by
the Texas Education Code.
In Bienski‘s first affidavit, he notes the increase in the student population and the
need for physical-education and sports facilities. He also attests the board of trustees
10
wanted to use the land ―for the future development of school facilities (e.g. classrooms).‖
Bienski goes on to explain that Patterson believed the project required a minimum of
thirty acres. In his second affidavit, Bienski describes how and when the board of
trustees decided to condemn the property. According to Bienski, the board expected an
increase in future enrollment and decided a new high school was needed to accommodate
the growth. Bienski also maintains in his affidavit that the board was appealing the
federal-court injunction and was confident it would be overturned. Bienski adds: ―From
my experience, training and knowledge, I was aware that there were recommendations
that a high school campus would have a minimum requirement of thirty (30) acres . . .
Based on this information, I recommended [that the board] purchase and[,] in the absence
of purchase, seek by condemnation the thirty (30) acre tract.‖
In Patterson‘s first affidavit, he emphasizes that the optimum size for a high school
is thirty acres and includes the drawings of the district‘s proposed new facilities. He also
states that he understands the board intends to use the land for the proposed sports and
physical-education facilities. But he adds that if the district were unable to use the land
for that purpose, Bienski told him it would be used for other educational purposes. In
Patterson‘s supplemental affidavit, he mentions the board‘s plan to build a high school
and includes a drawing featuring the new facility. Ultimately, Patterson attests to two
proposed purposes for the condemned land—sports and recreation in the first affidavit
and a new school in the second. Either purpose would be legitimate. See, e.g., Lin v.
Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys., 948 S.W.2d 328, 333–34 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, writ
denied) (explaining although the school pleaded the condemnation purpose was only for
―school purposes,‖ this was sufficient to allege its intended use).
Scamardo attests that on August 11, 2005, the board voted to condemn the thirty
acres based on the long-range plans and educational needs of the district. According to
Scamardo, the district‘s need for outdoor sports facilities was immediate. But he adds
that the board also sought the land for a future new high school. Additionally, he
11
explains that based on the growth in the student population, the board of trustees also
wanted to construct a separate high school. Although the initial use of the land may be
for sporting facilities, it is not arbitrary or capricious for the district to acquire land in
anticipation of future needs. See Pizzitola, 2006 WL 1360838, at *5.
Circle X argues the district sought too much land and never determined an official
purpose for taking it. But if reasonable minds acting in good faith could deem the
purpose of the taking to be public, the condemnation proceedings are lawfully authorized
and justifiable. See Textac Partners I, 257 S.W.3d at 316 (citing Wagoner, 345 S.W.2d
at 763). Allegations the project is unnecessary and issues concerning the feasibility of
alternative plans are all foreclosed when the district, acting within the scope of its
authority, determines the use is necessary for its educational needs. See Zboyan, 221
S.W.3d at 930. The district‘s affidavits provide at least some evidence the use of the land
is necessary to further the district‘s public-education mission.
Moreover, it does not matter that the district changed its plan from a thirty-acre
sports complex to a thirty-acre sports complex and new high school; nothing in the
condemnation statute prohibits the condemnor from changing its specific plan for the
property after the commissioners‘ hearing, even if the change allegedly prejudices the
landowner. PR Invs. & Specialty Retailers, Inc., 251 S.W.3d at 476–79. The amount of
land remained the same and the new intended use was still allowable under the statute—
―for the purpose of securing sites on which to construct school buildings or for any other
purpose necessary for the district.‖ See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.155(a).
Circle X‘s reliance on the Cowan and Marek affidavits is unavailing.
Both
affidavits dispute the existence of an industry standard requiring thirty acres for any new
high school. But neither addressed the circumstances of this case specifically enough to
show that the district had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. As in Pizzitola, we
conclude that the district articulated a reasonable and necessary public purpose for the
taking, with a reasoned explanation for condemning thirty acres, and that Circle X failed
12
to satisfy its burden to show the district‘s taking was arbitrary and capricious.
Accordingly, we overrule Circle X‘s first and second issues.
Ingress and Egress
Circle X also argues the language in the trial court‘s judgment concerning its right
to ingress and egress for the purpose of exploring, developing, drilling, or mining for oil
and gas is not supported by any evidence. Because it does not own the mineral rights,
Circle X contends the language is inappropriate and should be stricken from the
judgment. The district responds that if Circle X does not have any minerals rights, then
the language has no effect and is harmless.
Circle X complains the language is confusing and allows the district to preclude
any right of use of the surface for mineral development; however, the language still
pertains only to the ingress and egress rights, if any, that Circle X owns. The final
judgment provides:
Condemnor shall be vested with and shall have and recover of and from
Condemnee all the fee simple absolute title and all right, title and interest
for the purposes authorized under Section 11.155(a) of the Texas Education
Code, providing that there is excluded from said estate all oil, gas and
sulfur, which can removed from beneath the land, if any, without any rights
whatsoever remaining to Condemnee of ingress and egress to and from the
surface of the land for the purpose of exploring, developing, drilling, or
mining same so as not to interfere with the improvements placed by
Condemnor on said surface estate.
If Circle X is not the mineral owner, and therefore does not have any right to ingress or
egress for development, exploring, drilling, or mining oil and gas, then this language in
the judgment does not negatively affect Circle X.
The language likewise does not
negatively affect the actual owner of the mineral rights, because it expressly applies only
to the condemnee—Circle X. Though it is inarticulately worded, we read the judgment to
exclude Circle X‘s right, if any, to ingress and egress on the property for purposes of
development, exploring, drilling, or mining oil and gas. Because Circle X has no such
13
right anyway, and because it has not cited any authority compelling us to alter the
language, we overrule Circle X‘s third issue. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
/s/
Jeffrey V. Brown
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Brown, Sullivan, and Christopher.
14
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.