LaKeshia Stallworth v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 248th District Court of Harris County

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-06-00912-CR

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LAKESHIA STALLWORTH, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 248th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1059174

A jury convicted appellant, LaKeshia Stallworth, of the felony offense of injury to a child, enhanced by her prior burglary conviction, and sentenced her to life in prison. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.04(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Tex. Penal Code Ann. 12.42(c) (Vernon Supp. 2005). In two points of error, appellant contends that her life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment, and that the trial court erred by denying her Batson (1) challenge. We affirm.

Factual Background

While living at her mother's house in January 2006, appellant drew a steaming hot bath and forced her five-year-old child, T.S., into the water. Appellant's teenage daughter testified at trial that steam was coming off T.S.'s body when the child got out of the bathtub, and that appellant later cut away skin that blistered on T.S.'s legs. Appellant later moved to her own apartment. At that location, T.S. was kept nude and bound in either the laundry room or the patio closet. The record shows that T.S. was kept in the patio closet during February and, in addition, that appellant whipped T.S. with an extension cord. When she discovered how appellant was treating T.S., appellant's mother informed police, who took T.S. to a hospital for treatment.

Disproportionate Punishment Challenge

In her first point of error, appellant contends that her sentence violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the grounds that her life sentence was unjustified and disproportionate to her offense. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I 13; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.09 (Vernon 2005). The State contends that appellant waived her complaint because she did not object to the sentence in the trial court.

Well-settled law recognizes that almost every right, whether constitutional or statutory, may be waived by failing to object. Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Solis v. State, 945 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd). To preserve error for appellate review, an appellant must object timely, with reasonable specificity, and obtain an adverse ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Steadman v. State, 31 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). Failure to object specifically to an allegedly disproportionate sentence in the trial court waives any error. See, e.g., Nicholas v. State, 56 S.W.3d 760, 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) (holding that defendant waived cruel and unusual punishment point of error by not objecting either at sentencing or by posttrial motion); Steadman, 31 S.W.3d at 742 (noting that defendant's failure to object at sentencing hearing waived point of error); Solis, 945 S.W.2d at 301 (determining that defendant waived point of error by failing to object at sentencing). (2)

Appellant did not object to the trial court that her sentence was constitutionally disproportionate and raises this challenge for the first time on appeal. Having failed to preserve her challenge, appellant has waived error. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Nicholas, 56 S.W.3d at 768; Steadman, 31 S.W.3d at 742; Solis, 945 S.W.2d at 301.

We overrule appellant's first point of error.

Batson Challenge In her second point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying appellant's Batson challenge because the State used its peremptory challenges to strike the majority of the African-Americans from the venire and used a disproportionate number of peremptory strikes to exclude African-American veniremembers. The State contends that appellant has not shown that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations were a pretext, and, therefore, that the trial court properly denied appellant's Batson challenge.

A. Batson-Article 35.261 Principles

Using a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror because of race violates the equal protection guarantee of the United States Constitution, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1717 (1986), as well as article 35.261 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.261 (Vernon 2006). In the face of perceived purposeful discrimination, the defendant may request a Batson hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.261(a).

The hearing involves a three-step process. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770-71 (1995); Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The defendant must first make a prima facie case of racial discrimination, based on the totality of relevant facts about the prosecutor's conduct during the trial. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2324 (2005); Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S. Ct. at 1770; Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 268; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.261. If the defendant makes a prima face case, the burden of production shifts to the State to present a race-neutral reason for its challenged strike, a reason that is "a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons" for exercising its strike. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 239, 125 S. Ct. at 2324; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.261(a) ("If the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the attorney representing the state to give a racially neutral explanation for the challenges."). A reason is deemed race neutral if no discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771; Thomas v. State, 209 S.W.3d 268, 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006 no pet.).

When the prosecutor responds by offering a race-neutral explanation, the inquiry whether the defendant has made a prima facie case becomes moot, Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 268, and the defendant may rebut the State's explanation. Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In the third and final step, the trial court must decide whether the defendant carried the burden to establish purposeful discrimination. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 239, 125 S. Ct. at 2325; Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771; Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 268. The trial court's inquiry addresses whether the prosecutor contrived the neutral reasons provided for the peremptory challenge in order to conceal racially discriminatory intent. Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d at 421.

Throughout the challenge, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.261(a), who may continue to rebut the prosecutor's explanations before the trial court decides the Batson challenge. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771; Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 268 & n.48; see Thomas, 209 S.W.3d at 270.

B. Standard of Review

We cannot reverse a trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous. See Gibson v. State, 144 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that court of appeals erred in applying standard). To hold that a trial court clearly erred, we must have a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Goldberg v. State, 95 S.W.3d 345, 385 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). We may not substitute our opinion for the trial court's factual assessment of the neutrality of the prosecutor's explanation for exercising strikes, and we focus on the genuineness, rather than the reasonableness, of the prosecutor's asserted nonracial motive. Gibson, 144 S.W.3d at 534 & n.5 (citing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S. Ct. at 1771-72). We give great deference to the trial court's determination, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Gibson, 144 S.W.3d at 534 n.6 (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)); Jasper, 61 S.W.3d at 422.

C. Batson Hearing

In response to the State's exercise of its strikes, appellant's trial counsel asserted a Batson challenge, contending that the State had struck veniremembers 1, 11, 18 and 31, based solely on race. The prosecutor replied that his primary reason for striking these individuals was their response to his inquiry regarding whether punishment or rehabilitation was the purpose of the criminal justice system. The prosecutor stated that he had additional reasons for excluding these members of the venire, but explained that their shared preference for rehabilitation was his basic reason. The prosecutor pointed out that the jury about to be empanelled included an African-American whom the prosecutor had not struck. In addition, the prosecutor explained that he had excluded not only veniremembers 1, 11, 18 and 31, but every member of the venire who had responded that the purpose of the criminal justice system was rehabilitation and not punishment. The record confirms that the prosecutor struck ten potential jurors, including veniremembers 1, 11, 18, and 31, all of whom had stated their preference that rehabilitation, and not punishment, is the purpose of the criminal justice system.

In response, appellant's counsel opined that preference of rehabilitation over punishment was a "well-known fact" in the African-American community, and that "virtually four-fifths" of the African-American venire stated a preference for rehabilitation. The trial court ruled that the State's reason was race neutral and denied the Batson challenge.

D. Analysis

A belief that rehabilitation is the primary purpose of the criminal justice system may adversely impact a juror's ability to assess punishment. See Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 224-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Adanandus was a death-penalty case in which the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, as not clearly erroneous, a trial court's ruling that the State had excused a veniremember for "numerous race neutral reasons." Id. at 225. Among the race-neutral reasons advanced by the prosecutor was the veniremember's belief that rehabilitation is the primary goal of punishment. Id. at 224-25. Later cases relying on Adanandus recognize that a veniremember's belief that rehabilitation is the primary goal of punishment in the criminal justice system can be a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. See Montgomery v. State, 198 S.W.3d 67, 76 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd); Victor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (both citing Adanandus, 866 S.W.2d at 224-25).

In accordance with Adanandus, Montgomery, and Victor, we hold that the prosecutor stated race-neutral reasons for his strikes. See Adanandus, 866 S.W.2d at 224-25; Montgomery, 198 S.W.3d at 76; Victor, 995 S.W.2d at 222. (3) We next address whether the trial court clearly erred by rejecting appellant's claim that the reason advanced was pretextual. See Gibson, 144 S.W.3d at 534.

As in both Montgomery and Victor, the record in this case establishes that the prosecutor struck every member of the venire, including four African-Americans, who stated a preference for rehabilitation over punishment as the primary goal of the criminal justice system. See Montgomery, 198 S.W.3d at 76; Victor, 995 S.W.2d at 222. In addition, the prosecutor noted that he chose not to strike another African-American who was eventually seated on the jury. We hold that the trial court did not err by failing to conclude that the prosecutor's stated reason was a pretext for racial discrimination. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.261(a); Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 268. Thus lacking a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," see Goldberg, 95 S.W.3d at 385, we further conclude that the trial court's ruling was not clearly erroneous. Gibson, 144 S.W.3d at 534.

We overrule appellant's second point of error.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Bland.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).

2. Appellant does not contend that her assessed punishment was fundamental error.

3. Because the State offered a race-neutral explanation, we need not address whether appellant made a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).