In Re: P.K., Kirtland Realty Group, L.P., et al Appeal from 302nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County (memorandum opinion)

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DISMISS and Opinion Filed December 19, 2018 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-18-01222-CV IN RE P.K., KIRTLAND REALTY GROUP, L.P., 1907 ELM GP GROUP, 1900 PACIFIC GP CORP., PETROCORRIGAN GP, LLC, PETROCORRIGAN DEVELOPMENT GP CORP., KRG GENPAR, LLC, T.W. DUKE CAPITAL, L.P., AND TWDC GENPAR, LLC, Relators Original Proceeding from the 302nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-17-11304 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Wright and Justices Lang-Miers and Fillmore Opinion by Chief Justice Wright In this original proceeding, relator P.K. and his business entities, Kirtland Realty Group, L.P., 1907 Elm GP Corp., 1900 Pacific GP Corp., PetroCorrigan GP, LLC, PetroCorrigan Development GP Corp., KRG GenPar, LLC, T.W. Duke Capital, LP, and TWDC GenPar, LLC (collectively, “the corporate relators”) complain of a temporary injunction against P.K. and a temporary restraining order against the corporate relators rendered in a divorce.1 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.501, 6.502. Review by mandamus of temporary orders under subchapter F of the family code is proper because those orders, other than an order appointing a receiver, are not subject to interlocutory appeal under the family code. See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 6.507; In re 1 The injunction was rendered by the associate judge and upheld by the trial court following a de novo hearing. Although the associate judge’s ruling was to remain in effect “until further order of the court,” as opposed to expiring in fourteen days subject to an extension for good cause shown or unopposed extensions, relators characterize the ruling as a temporary restraining order. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 680. Vitol, Inc., No. 14-10-00049-CV, 2010 WL 308792, *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding) (per curiam). However, we dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction to the extent it complains of the restraining order against the corporate relators as those complaints have expired and are moot. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) (“Appellate courts are prohibited from deciding moot controversies.”); Hermann Hosp. v. Thu Nga Thi Tran, 730 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (complaints about expired orders are moot). As to the temporary injunction, we deny the petition as no abuse of discretion has been shown. See In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Tex. 2008) (mandamus relief granted only when no adequate remedy by appeal exists and the trial court has clearly abused its discretion). /Carolyn Wright/ CAROLYN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE 181222F.P05 –2–