DARRIN DESHON RAY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed November 15, 2010
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-10-00759-CR
No. 05-10-00761-CR
No. 05-10-00762-CR
 
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DARRIN DESHON RAY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F09-41775-LV, F09-41774-SV, F09-41776-SV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Murphy, and Fillmore
Opinion By Justice Murphy
        Darrin Deshon Ray appeals his convictions for burglary of a habitation and fraudulent use or possession of identifying information. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to imprisonment. We affirm the trial court's judgments. The background of these cases and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.
        Appellant waived a jury trial and pleaded guilty to two burglary of a habitation offenses and one fraudulent use or possession of identifying information offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 30.02(a)(1), 32.51(b)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). Appellant also pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs contained in one of the indictments. After finding appellant guilty and the enhancement paragraphs true, the trial court assessed punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment for each burglary conviction and ten years' imprisonment for the fraudulent use conviction.
        Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to imprisonment in each case because the sentences are not necessary to prevent the recurrence of his criminal behavior. Appellant asserts that because he is mentally retarded and was using drugs at the time of the offenses, he should have received the drug treatment that he asked for in the trial court. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the record does not show the sentences violate the objectives of the penal code.
        Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in his motions for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion). After sentencing, appellant did not object to the sentences, and his motions for new trial complained that the “verdicts” were “contrary to the law and the evidence.” Thus, appellant has not preserved his issues for our review.
        In addition, we note that the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offenses. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.34, 30.02(c)(2), 32.51(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the sentences. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We resolve appellant's sole issue against him.         In each case, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARY MURPHY
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
100759F.U05