ERNEST ALONZO OTTO, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed December 20, 2010
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-10-00333-CR
No. 05-10-00334-CR
No. 05-10-00335-CR
 
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ERNEST ALONZO OTTO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F09-54569-M, F09-71651-M, F09-71765-M
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Bridges, and O'Neill
Opinion By Justice O'Neill
        Ernest Alonzo Otto appeals from three theft convictions. In a single issue, appellant contends his guilty pleas were involuntary. We affirm. The backgrounds of these cases and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the cases is well settled.
Background
 
        Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to two offenses of theft of property from a person and one offense of theft of property from an elderly person. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(B), (f)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2010). Appellant also pleaded true to one enhancement paragraph in the theft of an elderly person case. After finding appellant guilty and the enhancement paragraph true, the trial court assessed punishment at twenty years' imprisonment for theft from an elderly person and two years' confinement in state jail for each theft from a person.
        Appellant filed a motion for new trial and request for an evidentiary hearing, arguing the trial judge knew one of the complainants and showed bias. The trial court initially denied the motion for new trial, then later rescinded that order and granted the motion for new trial. After the cases were transferred to another court, appellant again waived a jury, pleaded guilty to the indictment in each case, and pleaded true to one enhancement paragraph. After finding appellant guilty and the enhancement paragraph true, the trial court assessed punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment for theft from an elderly person and twenty months' confinement in state jail for the other two theft convictions.
Involuntary Plea
 
        Appellant contends he entered guilty pleas to the charges in the indictments only because he believed the trial court would grant him community supervision and drug treatment for his cocaine addiction. The State responds that appellant failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the mere belief that he would receive a lesser punishment than that assessed does not render his pleas involuntary.
        When considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we must examine the entire record. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam). If the trial court properly admonished a defendant before a guilty plea was entered, there is a prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. See id.
        Here, the record shows the trial court properly admonished appellant both orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (West Supp. 2010); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App. -Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). During the plea hearing, appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictments and the punishment range for the offenses. Appellant's signed judicial confessions and stipulations of evidence were admitted into evidence. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (it is well settled that a judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon a guilty plea). Appellant told the trial court he had a longstanding cocaine addiction, and he asked the trial court for community supervision and drug treatment.
        The fact that appellant received greater punishment than he hoped for does not render his pleas involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). We conclude the trial court did not err in accepting appellant's pleas. We resolve appellant's sole issue against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgments.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
100333F.U05