VINCENT EUGENE JACKSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion issued October 22, 2010
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-10-00012-CR
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VINCENT EUGENE JACKSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F08-34005-T
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Moseley, and Myers
Opinion By Justice Morris
        In this case, Vincent Eugene Jackson waived a jury and pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver cocaine in an amount of four grams or more, but less than 200 grams. The trial court assessed punishment at seven years' imprisonment and a $2,500 fine. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his plea and the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to imprisonment. We affirm. The background of these cases and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.
        In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence does not support his guilty plea with respect to the intent-to-deliver element of the offense. He contends the evidence shows he had no intention of delivering the cocaine, he purchased the fifteen grams of cocaine for his own personal use, and he purchased that amount of cocaine every three days to support his drug addiction. Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that when a defendant pleads guilty, he cannot be convicted upon his plea alone without sufficient evidence to support the plea. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (West 2005); see also Wright v. State, 930 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no pet.). There is no requirement, however, that the supporting evidence prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). We will affirm the trial court's judgment under article 1.15 if the evidence introduced embraces every essential element of the offense charged and is sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt. See Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
        Here, appellant signed a written judicial confession and stipulation of evidence admitting he committed the offense as alleged in the indictment. The confession was admitted into evidence without objection. Moreover, appellant orally affirmed to the trial court that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason. He told the trial judge he had purchased fifteen grams of cocaine “on consignment” the day he was arrested, and he admitted possessing baggies and a scale at the time of the arrest. Appellant said he used cocaine “every few days.” We conclude the evidence presented is sufficient to support appellant's guilty plea for possession with intent to deliver cocaine. We resolve appellant's first issue against him.
        In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to imprisonment because his sentence violates the rehabilitative objectives of the penal code. Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in his motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion). After sentencing, appellant did not object to the sentence, and his motion for new trial complained that the “verdict” was “contrary to the law and the evidence.” Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for our review. We resolve appellant's second issue against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JOSEPH B. MORRIS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
100012F.U05