IN THE INTEREST OF N.E., D.E., AND M.E., CHILDREN

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed April 7, 2010.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-09-00891-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF N.E., D.E., AND M.E., CHILDREN
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 302nd District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 05-13680-U
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Lang, and Myers
Opinion By Justice Myers
        Peter J. Edenhoffer appeals the trial court's order vacating a prior order for want of jurisdiction. In his sole issue on appeal, Edenhoffer contends the trial court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to enter the vacated order and asserts the court had jurisdiction to enter judgment nunc pro tunc. He also asserts the trial court erred by not entering judgment nunc pro tunc. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
        This case began as a suit by Edenhoffer for modification of a divorce decree and a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Edenhoffer was represented by Gunnstaks until Gunnstaks moved to withdraw from representing him. When Gunnstaks's motion to withdraw was granted, Gunnstaks filed a petition in intervention for recovery of his attorney's fees. Edenhoffer paid Gunnstaks, and Gunnstaks filed a notice of nonsuit. This appeal concerns the various notices, motions, and orders for the nonsuit of Gunnstaks's claims.
        On September 17, 2007, Gunnstaks filed his original notice of nonsuit, and that same day, the associate judge signed an order dismissing “this case” “with prejudice to [Edenhoffer's] right to refile it.” Two days later, on September 19, 2007, Gunnstaks filed an amended notice of nonsuit, and that same day, the associate judge ordered “this intervention dismissed.” The order did not mention whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.
        Nearly a year later, on September 3, 2008, Edenhoffer filed a motion to vacate the September 17 and 19, 2007 orders, asserting “[e]ach one was obtained on an ex parte basis.” The next day, September 4, 2008, the trial court entered judgment in the case, incorporating the mediated settlement agreement between Edenhoffer and his former wife. The first page of the judgment stated the court found Gunnstaks's intervention “has been non-suited.” The draft of the judgment, when presented to the court, also stated, “It is ordered that the Intervenor's previously not suited [sic] Order Granting Non-suit, signed on September 17, 2007, is vacated, and that the Plea in Intervention for Attorney's fees is dismissed without prejudice”; however, the trial court crossed out that language. The judgment included a Mother-Hubbard clause ordering “that all relief requested in this cause and not expressly granted is denied.” No appeal was taken from this judgment.
        On February 26, 2009, 175 days after the judgment, the trial court signed an order vacating the September 17 and 19, 2007 orders and ordering “that the claims filed by [Gunnstaks] as intervenor in this cause, are dismissed without prejudice.” The order recites that Gunnstaks was given notice of the hearing but did not appear.
        On March 18, 2009, Gunnstaks filed a motion to vacate the February 26, 2009 order asserting he did not receive notice of the hearing and that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because “no matter was currently properly pending in this Court.” Edenhoffer responded that the February 26, 2009 order was within the trial court's authority to correct clerical mistakes. On April 29, 2009, the trial court, following a hearing on Gunnstaks's motion, entered an order vacating the February 26, 2009 order. In findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded the February 26, 2009 order “was voidable for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,” “[t]he Court had jurisdiction only to void the voidable Order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Court did so on April 29, 2009, in the interests of justice and fairness.”
        Appellant now appeals the trial court's April 29, 2009 order vacating the February 26, 2009 order.
JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC
        After the trial court loses its jurisdiction over a judgment, it can correct clerical orders in the judgment by judgment nunc pro tunc. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. 1986). The court cannot correct a judicial error made in rendering a final judgment. Id. Whether an error in a final judgment is a judicial or clerical error is a question of law. Id. at 232. When deciding whether a correction is of a judicial or a clerical error, we look to the judgment actually rendered, not the judgment that should or might have been rendered. Id. at 231. A clerical error is a discrepancy between the entry of a judgment in the record and the judgment that was actually rendered and does not arise from judicial reasoning or determination. Hernandez v. Lopez, 288 S.W.3d 180, 184 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). A judgment is usually rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision-either in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk-on the matter submitted for adjudication. S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995).
        In this case, the trial court's September 4, 2008 judgment was the final judgment in the case because it disposed of all parties and all claims in the case.   See Footnote 1  See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex. 2001). All the prior interlocutory orders were merged into and subsumed by the final judgment. See Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 914 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). No notice of appeal or motion that would extend the court's plenary power was timely filed following the September 4 judgment, so the court's plenary power to change the judgment for anything other than clerical errors expired thirty days later. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d), (e), (f). The court's February 26, 2009 order was more than thirty days after the final judgment, so unless it was the correction of a clerical error, the court was without jurisdiction to enter the February 26, 2009 order.
        In this case, the rendition of the court's judgment is the September 4, 2008 final judgment. Subsumed into the judgment was the September 19, 2007 order stating the petition in intervention was dismissed without stating the dismissal was “without prejudice.” Also, the trial court expressly struck language in the September 4, 2008 final judgment stating the dismissal was “without prejudice.” Nothing in the record shows the court rendered judgment that the dismissal was without prejudice. Accordingly, the February 26, 2009 order was not merely the correction in the entry of the judgment but was a change of the judgment rendered by the court. Because the court's plenary power had expired, it lacked authority to make that change. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in vacating the February 26, 2009 order. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f) (after expiration of plenary power, court “may also sign an order declaring a previous judgment or order to be void because signed after the court's plenary power had expired”).
        Edenhoffer also asserts the trial court erred in not entering judgment nunc pro tunc to provide that the nonsuit was without prejudice. As discussed above, such an order would not be an appropriate order nunc pro tunc. Furthermore, the denial of a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc is not an appealable order. See Shadowbrook Apartments v. Abu-Ahmad, 783 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. 1990); In re Bridges, 28 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding). We overrule Edenhoffer's sole issue.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          LANA MYERS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
090891F.P05
 
Footnote 1 The September 4, 2008 judgment provided that certain claims concerning a life insurance policy were not resolved by the judgment, but the judgment ordered those claims “severed from this cause.” See McRoberts v. Ryals, 863 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Tex. 1993) (“an order granting a severance with a judgment in the cause ordered severed is effective when signed.”).