JACKIE LEWIS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed November 8, 2010.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-09-00299-CR
............................
JACKIE LEWIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F08-00867-N
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OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, O'Neill, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Lang-Miers
        The State charged appellant with the offense of securing the execution of a document by deception. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.46(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010). The indictment alleged that the offense affected the complainant's pecuniary interest in the amount of $20,000 or more but less than $100,000, a third-degree felony. See id. § 32.46(b)(5). Appellant waived a jury and pleaded not guilty to the trial court. The court found him guilty and assessed punishment, enhanced by a prior conviction, at three years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. In two issues on appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
Background
 
        Arthur Wilson purchased a house at 219 Trees Drive, Cedar Hill, Texas, for his daughter Yolanda Wilson. When Ms. Wilson could no longer make the mortgage payments, the mortgage company gave notice of foreclosure. Ms. Wilson moved out of the house and listed it for sale. She periodically drove by the house to “check on it.”
        Appellant was a pastor and also assisted homeowners who were facing foreclosure. Because he had been through the foreclosure process personally, he believed he could help others through the process and help them stay in their homes. His fee for this service was based on the value of the home.
        Gloria Harrison wanted a larger home. She was referred to appellant by a friend whom appellant had helped through the foreclosure process.
        Unbeknownst to Arthur or Yolanda Wilson, appellant leased their house to Harrison. The lease agreement required Harrison to pay appellant $1600 per month rent for two years. Harrison gave $700 of the first month's rent to her friend to give to appellant, and Harrison and her adult children moved into the house. The key Harrison was given did not open the front door. They used the back door to come and go. The testimony showed that the back door had been kicked in.
        During one of Yolanda Wilson's periodic checks, she saw a light on in the house. She knocked on the front door and asked Harrison what she was doing in her father's house. Harrison told Ms. Wilson she was renting the house. Ms. Wilson called the mortgage company to ask whether the house had been foreclosed and sold. The mortgage company said no and told her to call the police. She did. The ensuing investigation led to appellant's indictment for securing the execution of the lease agreement by deception. Harrison lived in the house about 12 days. Her friend had never given appellant the $700, and Harrison got the money back soon after moving out of the house.
 
Standard of Review
 
        We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction under the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia. Brooks v. State, No. PD-0210-09, 2010 WL 3894613, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)). We examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at *5 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). We defer to the fact-finder's credibility and weight determinations because the fact-finder is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. We must presume the fact-finder resolved conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecution and defer to that resolution. Id. at n.13 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).
 
Analysis
 
        A person commits the offense of securing the execution of a document by deception when “with intent to defraud or harm any person, he, by deception . . . causes another to sign or execute any document affecting property or service or the pecuniary interest of any person[.]” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.46(a)(1). The offense is a third-degree felony if the value of the property, service, or pecuniary interest affected is $20,000 or more. Id. § 32.46(b)(5).
        The State alleged that appellant
 
with intent to defraud and harm Gloria Harrison, cause[d] Gloria Harrison to sign and execute documents, namely: a residential lease for real property located at 219 Trees Drive, Cedar Hill, Texas, which documents affected the pecuniary interest of said Gloria Harrison, the value of which pecuniary interest was $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, and the defendant caused said Gloria Harrison to sign and execute said documents by deception, namely, by creating and confirming by words and conduct false impressions of facts that were likely to affect the judgment of said Gloria Harrison in the transactions that the defendant did not believe to be true, and by failing to correct false impressions of facts that were likely to affect the judgment of said Gloria Harrison in the transactions, that the defendant had previously created and confirmed by words and conduct that the defendant did not then believe to be true . . . .
 
        Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the element of intent to defraud-he argues only that the evidence is insufficient to show that Harrison's pecuniary interest was affected in the amount of $20,000 or more.
        Appellant first contends that the State's theory is “legally unsustainable” because Harrison had no pecuniary interest in the lease and the State should have alleged Wilson as the complainant because he owned the house. The statute, however, does not require the complainant to have a pecuniary interest in the document itself. Rather, it requires the execution of the document to affect the pecuniary interest of any person. See id. We have said that “pecuniary” is a synonym for “financial,” and that “pecuniary interest” means “a direct interest related to money . . . .” Fisher v. State, 803 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd); Goldstein v. State, 803 S.W.2d 777, 791 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). We conclude that the lease affected Harrison's financial interest because it purported to require her to pay appellant $1600 per month for two years.
        Appellant also contends that Harrison's pecuniary interest was not affected because she paid only $700 of the first month's rent and she got that money back. Appellant does not cite any authority to support his argument that a pecuniary interest is not affected if there is no actual pecuniary loss. See Woodley v. State, No. 08-00-00470-CR, 2003 WL 550298, at *5 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.) (stating “pecuniary interest” not equivalent to “pecuniary loss”). The statute does not require the State to prove that actual harm resulted from the intent to defraud. Id.; Fisher, 803 S.W.2d at 829-30 (securing issuance of citation through deception affected complainant's pecuniary interest by subjecting complainant to potential liability through loss of limitations defense); Smith v. State, 681 S.W.2d 71, 75-76 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983) (offense completed when person causes another to execute document with intent to defraud or harm; no requirement to prove resulting harm), aff'd, 722 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).         The lease agreement purported to obligate Harrison to pay $1600 per month for two years, or a total of $38,400. We conclude a rational trier of fact could have found that the lease agreement was a document affecting Harrison's pecuniary interest in the amount of $20,000 or more. See Goldstein, 803 S.W.2d at 792.
        Citing excerpts of Harrison's testimony, appellant also argues the evidence is insufficient because Harrison contradicted herself and was not credible. Several witnesses testified for the State and the defense. Appellant also testified during guilt/innocence. The trial court, as fact-finder, was the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See Brooks, 2010 WL 3894613, at *5 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). As fact-finder, the court resolved inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecution. See id. n.13. We must defer to those findings. Id.
        In his reply brief, appellant argues for the first time that the lease agreement was voidable because it was procured by fraud and the State is estopped from contending that the lease could subject Harrison to liability. We do not consider an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief when it is not responding to an issue raised by the State. See State v. Sanchez, 135 S.W.3d 698, 700 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003), aff'd, 138 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Barrios v. State, 27 S.W.3d 313, 322 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1024 (2001).
        We resolve appellant's two issues against him.
Conclusion
 
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
090299F.U05