WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER STAFFORD, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed June 26, 2008.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-07-00912-CR
............................
WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER STAFFORD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F07-47600-WI
.............................................................
OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Francis, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Moseley
        Appellant William Christopher Stafford waived a jury and pleaded not guilty to burglary of a habitation. After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.
Applicable Law
 
        In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The fact- finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
        In a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court views all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 282 (2007); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 87 (2007). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, No. 0182-07, 2008 WL 2081638, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. May 14, 2008).
        To obtain a conviction for burglary of a habitation, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally and knowingly entered a habitation without the effective consent of Songa Jones, the owner, with the intent to commit an assault against Songa Jones. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003).
Background
 
        There is evidence in the record that, on January 12, 2007, appellant visited the complainant, Songa Jones, at her apartment. They drank beer, smoked crack cocaine, and had sex. They later argued; Jones claimed they argued about appellant's going in and out of the apartment. She asked appellant to leave, but he refused and, after further argument, he hit Jones in the face with a closed fist several times. Jones ran to the kitchen, grabbed a knife, and appellant ran out the front door. Jones tried to close the door, but appellant stuck his foot in the doorway and tried to push back inside. Jones told appellant to go and that she was going to call the police. Jones eventually closed the door, locked it, and called 911. While Jones was talking to the 911 operator, appellant jumped over the patio fence and came to the back door. Jones heard glass breaking, then saw appellant stick his hand through the door and unlock the bottom deadbolt. As appellant reached for the top deadbolt lock, Jones grabbed a vase, smashed it on appellant's hand, and then relocked the bottom deadbolt. Appellant continued trying to unlock the top deadbolt. Appellant yelled, “[I]'m going to kill you, I'm going to get you.” The 911 operator told Jones to stay on the line with her. A few seconds after appellant threatened to kill Jones, he stopped and “it got quiet.” The police arrived and arrested appellant.
        Jones testified she did not stab appellant's hand with the knife, and appellant did not receive a phone call from another woman that evening. Jones also testified she had prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance, aggravated assault, robbery, theft by check, and terroristic threat.
        Appellant's testimony differed from Jones's in several respects. He said they began arguing after she asked appellant to get more crack cocaine and he said he was out of money. During the argument, an old girlfriend called appellant's cell phone; Jones answered the call, argued with the woman, and then went into the kitchen and grabbed three or four knives. Appellant grabbed his tools from the coffee table and ran out the front door, but he realized he did not have his shoes, shirt, or coat. Jones started to shut the front door, but appellant put his foot in the doorway, apparently in an effort to get back in and get his clothes. As appellant tried to push the door open, Jones stabbed his hand with a knife. When appellant jumped back, Jones closed the door and locked it. Appellant began beating on the door and yelling, “[t]hrow my stuff out. That is all you got to do. It is cold out here.” Appellant then realized Jones had walked out onto the patio and was yelling at him to get away from her door. Appellant ran to the patio and saw Jones standing outside with a vase in her hand. Jones tried to run inside, but broke a window out on the patio door when the vase “knocked” into it. Jones went inside and locked the door. Appellant jumped over the fence and onto the patio, and yelled through the broken window on the door. Jones threw the vase at the door. Appellant heard Jones on the telephone telling the police that someone was breaking into her apartment. Appellant jumped back over the fence and stood near the front door waiting for the police to arrive.
        Appellant denied he hit Jones at any time that evening. He testified he had prior convictions for assault, delivery of a simulated controlled substance, theft, and forgery.
        Officer Craig Redden testified he responded to a disturbance call at Jones's apartment. As he drove up, the dispatcher upgraded the call to a burglary-in-progress. Redden saw appellant standing in a breezeway in front of Jones's front door. Appellant was wearing a pair of shorts, but no shoes or a shirt, and his hand was bleeding. Appellant told Redden he wanted to get inside to get his jacket. Redden went inside and talked with Jones, who was hysterical, screaming, and crying. Jones told Redden appellant had hit her in the face and threatened to kill her. She pushed him out of the apartment, and he jumped over the patio fence, broke a window pane from the patio door, and tried to get in. Jones said she was afraid appellant was going to get back in and assault her, so she picked up a vase and hit his hand with it to prevent him from unlocking the door. Redden saw glass from the patio door inside the apartment, indicating it had been broken from the outside; no glass was seen on the patio. He observed glass from a broken vase on the floor near the patio door on the inside of the apartment. Redden found a steak knife on the floor by the kitchen, but saw no blood on the knife. Redden arrested appellant and transported him to jail.
Discussion
 
        Appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because Jones's testimony was not credible, both Jones and appellant drank alcohol and used drugs that day, and appellant only tried to reenter the apartment to get his clothes. Appellant asserts his testimony shows he did not have the culpable mental state to enter Jones's apartment with the intent to assault her.
        In a bench trial, it is the trial judge's role to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The fact finder may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness's testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); McCray v. State, 861 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.).
        We conclude a rational trier of fact could have found appellant entered Jones's apartment without her consent and with intent to commit an assault. Thus, the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction. See Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 524; Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191-92; Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 97. We resolve appellant's issues against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          JIM MOSELEY
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
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