JOHN HOWARD WILLIAMS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed July 11, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00909-CR
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JOHN HOWARD WILLIAMS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F05-48354-VI
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Wright, Bridges, and Mazzant
Opinion By Justice Wright
        John Howard Williams appeals his conviction for robbery. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant pleaded guilty and the trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed him on community supervision for four years. Thereafter, the State moved to adjudicate appellant guilty, alleging he had violated several conditions of his probation. After appellant pleaded true to the allegations, the trial court verbally granted the State's motion to adjudicate, set the case for rehearing in three months, and placed appellant in a “sanctions program.” Appellant did not appear for the scheduled hearing. He was arrested about three months later and was taken before the court. At that time, the trial court signed a judgment adjudicating appellant guilty and assessing punishment at twelve years' confinement. In two issues, appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred by failing to consider appellant's competency to be sentenced; and (2) his plea of true was involuntary. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
        In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to consider his competency at the sentencing hearing. According to appellant, because he was mistaken about the purpose of the sentencing hearing, he did not have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him and the trial court erred by failing to consider his competency.
        We review a trial court's failure to conduct a competency inquiry under an abuse of discretion standard. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Brown v. State, 129 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but rather we decide whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
        A person is presumed to be competent unless proven incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(b) (Vernon 2006). A person is legally incompetent to stand trial if he does not have (1) a rational as well as factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings against him, and (2) sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006); McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). If evidence suggesting the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the attention of the trial court, the court on its own motion shall suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(b) (Vernon 2006). The court must then conduct an informal competency inquiry to determine whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(c) (Vernon 2006). A competency inquiry is not required, however, unless the evidence is sufficient to create a bona fide doubt in the mind of the trial court about whether the defendant is legally competent. McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d at 710 (applying article 46.02 of the code of criminal procedure). Evidence capable of creating a bona-fide doubt about a defendant's competency may come from the trial court's own observations, known facts, evidence presented, motions, affidavits, or any other claim or credible source. LaHood v. State, 171 S.W.3d 613, 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd); Brown v. State, 129 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Evidence is usually sufficient to create a bona fide doubt regarding competency if it shows “recent severe mental illness, at least moderate mental retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant.” McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 710.
        Here, appellant contends appellant did not understand the nature of the proceeding against him at the sentencing hearing. In support of this contention, appellant relies on his attorney's admonition to him at the conclusion of the hearing on the State's motion to adjudicate to “do everything the probation office tells you to” and to be back in the courtroom on March 16, 2006 or his probation could “be revoked” and he “could go to prison.” However, nothing at the June 27, 2006 sentencing hearing suggests that appellant did not have a rational as well as factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings against him, or that he lacked the sufficient ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
        To the contrary, the record shows appellant was admonished and questioned by the trial court. Appellant acknowledged he was the same person who pleaded guilty to robbery on March 23, 2005, and was placed on probation, was brought before the court on a motion to revoke and the trial court found he had violated certain conditions of his probation, and the case was “set over.” Appellant then took the stand and was questioned by his attorney. Appellant acknowledged he had been placed in the sanctions program and knew he was supposed to be in court on March 16th, but did not comply because he was “dealing with like a whole bunch of stuff. My mom was sick and stuff.” Appellant responded clearly and logically to questions from both the trial court and from trial counsel. After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a competency inquiry during the punishment hearing. We overrule appellant's first issue.
        In his second issue, relying on the same admonition by his attorney, appellant claims that his plea of true to the allegations in the State's motion to adjudicate was involuntary. However, again the record does not support appellant's claim. Prior to the adjudication hearing, appellant signed a document admitting he violated several conditions of his probation. The document described the nature of the proceeding against him and the consequences of his plea of true. The document also contains an acknowledgment that he was signing the document freely and voluntarily. At the hearing, appellant orally acknowledged his plea of true was “freely and voluntarily” given and that he had reviewed the motion to adjudicate and his plea papers and understood the allegations against him. He also acknowledged he had the right to a hearing and to be present and cross-examine witnesses, but was giving up his right to do so.
        A record showing the trial court properly admonished the defendant constitutes a prima facie showing that the defendant entered into a knowing and voluntary plea. The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he did not understand the consequences of the plea. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Here, appellant failed to meet his burden. His signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence was admitted into evidence without objection. Also, appellant admitted he failed to comply with several conditions of his community supervision. The fact that appellant's attorney admonished him to do what the probation office required or his probation could be revoked and he could be sent to prison does not somehow render his plea of true involuntary. Having reviewed the record, we conclude appellant's complaint lacks merit. We overrule appellant's second issue.
        Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          CAROLYN WRIGHT
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070909F.U05