JOHN T. MCDONNELL AND ASHLAND BRANNICK, L.L.C., Appellant v. A-1 ORNAMENTAL, INC., Appellee

VACATE and REMAND; Opinion issued August 26, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00899-CV
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JOHN T. MCDONNELL AND ASHLAND BRANNICK, L.L.C., Appellant
V.
A-1 ORNAMENTAL, INC., Appellee
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On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 07-04757-H
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Whittington, Bridges, and Francis
Opinion By Justice Bridges
        Appellants John T. McDonnell and Ashland Brannick, L.L.C. bring this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction in favor of appellee, A-1 Ornamental, Inc. (A-1). In a single issue, appellants assert the trial court erred in granting the temporary injunction because there was no evidence of imminent harm or irreparable injury. Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We vacate the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction in favor of A-1 and dissolve the temporary injunction.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 
        McDonnell was an employee of and shareholder in A-1, a custom iron works business. He sold all of his stock to Greg and Laura Harding. As part of the Stock Purchase Agreement, McDonnell agreed to a covenant not to compete. McDonnell continued to be employed by A-1 for several months after the stock sale. In November 2006, McDonnell resigned from A-1 and formed a company called Ashland Brannick, L.L.C. He later went to work for CT&S, another custom metal works business. A-1 filed suit against McDonnell and Ashland Brannick, L.L.C. for breach of contract and sought to enforce the covenant not to compete. A-1 sought a temporary injunction to stop McDonnell from interfering or competing with A-1 during the pendency of the trial on the breach of contract claims. After a hearing, the trial court granted a temporary injunction in favor of A-1. McDonnell filed this interlocutory appeal from that order.
 
II. TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ORDER
 
        In the argument in support of their sole issue, appellants note that “[t]he Temporary Injunction does not state the irreparable harm or why A-1 has no adequate remedy at law.” Because it is dispositive of this appeal, we address whether the trial court's order complies with the mandatory requirements for such an order.
A. Applicable Law
 
        To be entitled to a temporary injunction, an applicant must plead and prove (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires every order granting a temporary injunction to state the reasons for its issuance and to be specific in its terms. Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. The procedural requirements of rule 683 are mandatory, and must be strictly followed. Qwest Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1966) (per curiam). If a temporary injunction order fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of rule 683, it must be declared void and the temporary injunction dissolved. Qwest Commc'ns Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 337; InterFirst Bank, 715 S.W.2d at 641. The right to raise the issue on appeal is not waived by failing to make an objection in the trial court. Qwest Commc'ns Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 337. “An appellate court can declare a temporary injunction void even if the issue has not been raised by the parties.” City of Sherman v. Eiras, 157 S.W.3d 931, 931 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); see also AutoNation, Inc. v. Hatfield, 186 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
        To comply with rule 683, the trial court must set out in the temporary injunction order the reasons it believes the applicant will suffer injury if it does not grant the injunction. State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex. 1971); AutoNation, Inc., 186 S.W.3d at 581. The reasons must be specific and legally sufficient, and not mere conclusory statements. Charter Med. Corp. v. Miller, 547 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ); see also AutoNation, Inc., 186 S.W.3d at 581. Furthermore, “[a]n injunction that fails to identify the harm that will be suffered if it does not issue must be declared void and be dissolved.” Fasken v. Darby, 901 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ); see also Metra United Escalante, L.P. v. Lynd Co., 158 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.). The decision to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. A trial court abuses its discretion by issuing a temporary injunction order that does not comply with the requirements of rule 683. Charter Med. Corp., 547 S.W.2d at 78.
B. Analysis
 
        The trial court's order recites the findings and conclusions on A-1's probability of prevailing at trial, and the facts supporting A-1's alleged breach of contract cause of action. Then, the order states, “A-1 will be irreparably harmed and any remedy at law would be inadequate.” It goes on to describe in detail the acts to be restrained. However, the temporary injunction order does not state the specific probable, imminent, and irreparable harm A-1 will suffer if the injunction does not issue. See Qwest Commc'ns Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 337; Fasken, 901 S.W.2d at 593; see also InterFirst Bank, 715 S.W.2d at 641; Metra United Escalante, L.P., 158 S.W.3d at 541. In regard to that element, required by rule 683 to be included in the order, the order simply recites a conclusory statement. See Charter Med. Corp., 547 S.W.2d at 78; see also AutoNation, Inc., 186 S.W.3d at 581 (holding that order stating party “will suffer irreparable harm” and “has no adequate remedy at law” does not satisfy requirements of rule 683). Therefore, we conclude the temporary injunction order does not meet the mandatory requirements of rule 683 and is void. See Qwest Commc'ns Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 337; InterFirst Bank, 715 S.W.2d at 641; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. We sustain McDonnell's sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
 
        We vacate the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction in favor of A-1 Ornamental, Inc., dissolve the temporary injunction, and remand this cause for further proceedings.
 
                                                          
                                                          DAVID BRIDGES
                                                          JUSTICE
 
070899F.P05