JESSE JACOBI SCROGGINS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion issued September 9, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00809-CR
No. 05-07-00810-CR
No. 05-07-00811-CR
 
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JESSE JACOBI SCROGGINS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F05-55592-NV, F05-55593-PV, F05-56097-LV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Whittington, and O'Neill
Opinion By Justice Whittington
        Jesse Jacobi Scroggins waived a jury and pleaded guilty to three aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon offenses. The trial judge assessed punishment at twenty-five years' imprisonment in cause no. 05-07-00809-CR, thirty-five years' imprisonment in cause no. 05-07-00810-CR, and fifteen years' imprisonment in cause no. 05-07-00811-CR. Appellant now complains his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily and the trial court should have sua sponte withdrawn the guilty pleas. We affirm the trial court's judgments. The background of the cases and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.
        Appellant contends in two issues that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily and knowingly entered because he did not commit the offenses. Appellant contends the acceptance of his guilty pleas, in the wake of his professed innocence, violated due process. Appellant asserts that because he only enticed the men to an apartment to be robbed, but did not actually participate with others in robbing or beating them, his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Thus, appellant contends, the trial court should have sua sponte withdrawn the guilty pleas.
        When considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we must examine the entire record. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam). The record shows the trial court properly admonished appellant orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2007); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Appellant's signed judicial confessions and stipulations of evidence that he committed the offenses exactly as alleged in the indictments are also included in the record. A judicial confession admitted into evidence and contained in the clerk's record is sufficient to prove appellant's guilt. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
        When the trial judge acts as the fact finder in a case, even if evidence is presented that raises an issue as to the defendant's guilt, the judge is not required to withdraw a defendant's guilty plea sua sponte and enter a plea of not guilty because no purpose would be served by doing so. See Aldrich v. State, 53 S.W.3d 460, 467 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001), aff'd, 104 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Rather, the trial judge's duty is to consider all of the evidence submitted. The trial judge may find the defendant guilty as charged, guilty of a lesser-included offense, or not guilty, as the evidence requires. See id. Thus, the trial judge had no duty to sua sponte withdraw appellant's guilty pleas.         Having reviewed the record, we conclude appellant's guilty pleas were voluntary. See Kirk, 949 S.W.2d at 771. We resolve appellant's two issues against him.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARK WHITTINGTON
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070809F.U05