CARLTON PHERO WILLIAMS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed May 13, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00641-CR
No. 05-07-00642-CR
 
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CARLTON PHERO WILLIAMS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-18303-YW, F06-18306-RW
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OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Richter, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice FitzGerald
        A jury convicted Carlton Phero Williams of aggravated assault and evading arrest or detention causing serious bodily injury. The jury assessed punishment at three years' imprisonment for the aggravated assault and ten years' imprisonment, probated for ten years, for the evading arrest or detention. In three points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction and legally insufficient to support the evading arrest or detention conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
 
 
Background
 
        Teniqua Buckley testified she is the mother of appellant's infant daughter. On October 4, 2006, Teniqua and her mother Gloria Buckley drove to appellant's mother's house to pick up baby clothes. Appellant lived with his mother. Teniqua parked her Ford Expedition in the driveway. Appellant was not at home when Teniqua arrived, and there were no other cars in the driveway. Gloria remained in the Expedition while Teniqua took the baby inside the house. Teniqua visited with appellant's mother for about thirty minutes before appellant got home. When he came inside, appellant was “mad” and took Teniqua to his bedroom. Appellant yelled at Teniqua, choked her with both his hands, and hit her in the face when appellant's mother pulled him away from Teniqua. After appellant's mother left the bedroom, appellant apologized to Teniqua. Teniqua took the baby outside and tried to leave. Appellant had parked a white Minivan behind Teniqua's Expedition, so she had to drive through the yard to leave. Appellant opened the driver's side door and tried to grab Teniqua's hands. After Teniqua stopped the car, appellant went to the back seat where Gloria sat and started punching Gloria in the face. Teniqua ran into appellant's house, called the police, and returned outside. Gloria, appellant, and appellant's mother were “in the street,” and appellant's niece and nephew were on the sidewalk.
        Police officers arrived and told appellant to put his hands up. Appellant ran to the Minivan, got in, and drove away. Teniqua testified she was standing in a neighbor's yard holding the baby when appellant fled the scene. Gloria was on the sidewalk behind the Expedition, and appellant's mother was standing nearby. Appellant drove around the block with officers chasing him in their patrol cars. After appellant circled the block twice, he drove the Minivan into the side of the Expedition, pinning Gloria against a retaining wall. Appellant's mother was also knocked to the ground. Officers arrested appellant. Teniqua testified she gave two written statements to the police that night which failed to mention appellant had choked her or that he had hit Gloria in the face. Teniqua said she was concerned about Gloria and did not write down everything that had happened.
        Gloria Buckley testified she waited in the Expedition while Teniqua took the baby into appellant's mother's house to pick up baby clothes. A short time later, appellant parked a white Minivan behind the Expedition and went into the house. Later, Teniqua came outside and handed Gloria the baby. Gloria, who was sitting behind the driver's seat, put the baby in her car seat. Appellant ran out of the house towards the driver's side door. As Teniqua started to leave, appellant started hitting Gloria in the face. Gloria testified she did not remember why or how long appellant hit her because she went into shock. Gloria remembered getting out of the Expedition and that appellant apologized to her. The police arrived and appellant ran to the Minivan and drove off. Appellant circled the block twice with police officers following him. The last time appellant came around the block, Gloria “only saw headlights.” She woke up in the hospital. Doctors told Gloria both legs were severed and that she would lose one leg but they may be able to rebuild the other leg. Gloria remained in the hospital for thirty-six days.
        Geraldine Swafford testified she lived on the corner across from appellant's house. On October 4, 2006, she heard screaming outside and walked out onto her patio to investigate. Swafford saw a man fighting with a girl who was holding a baby. Swafford went inside and called 911, then went outside to her yard. Police officers arrived with their sirens blaring. The man who was fighting jumped into a Minivan and drove off, and the police chased him. Swafford saw the man drive around the corner and “turn right into this car that was parked,” pinning “a lady standing beside the car” against a brick wall.
        Cedar Hill police officer Ashley Schreurs testified she was dispatched to appellant's residence at 9:30 p.m. on October 4, 2006 on a “major disturbance” call. Schreurs and another officer arrived at the scene in separate marked patrol cars. Both officers were wearing their police uniforms. When she arrived, Schreurs saw a group of people in the street “flailing their arms.” Schreurs and the other officer got out of their patrol cars and walked towards the people. Appellant, who was one of the people standing in the street, looked at the officers, then turned around and walked off. Schreurs yelled for appellant to stop. Appellant looked back at the officers, then ran to a Minivan, backed out of the driveway, made an obscene gesture to the officers, and drove off. Schreurs and the other officer ran back to their patrol cars, activated their lights and sirens, and followed appellant. They saw appellant hit a parked car and several mailboxes as they followed him around the block twice. After appellant made a final lap around the block, he accelerated and ran into an Expedition, pinning Gloria against a wall. Appellant's mother also claimed she was injured at the scene. Schreurs testified that at the time she ordered appellant to stop, she and another officer were attempting to detain him. A DVD from the officer's in-car camera was played for the jury.
        Appellant's mother Cassandra Williams testified on his behalf. Teniqua came to Cassandra's house to pick up baby clothes and to let Cassandra see the baby. Teniqua was inside the house for about forty-five minutes before appellant came home. Cassandra claimed she never heard any arguing between appellant and Teniqua that night, and never saw appellant choke Teniqua. When Teniqua finally left, appellant went outside with her. Cassandra saw Teniqua in the Expedition and driving very slowly across her yard. Appellant walked next to the Expedition while talking to Teniqua. Cassandra did not hear anyone yell or scream. Cassandra thought she saw Gloria choking appellant, so she started to go outside towards the Expedition. By the time Cassandra got close to them, Teniqua and Gloria were outside the Expedition. Appellant and Gloria were talking and they were “holding each other's arms.” When the police arrived, appellant panicked and said, “[M]amma, they going to kill me.” Appellant was “terrified” and ran to the car. Police chased appellant around the block twice. When appellant hit the Expedition, Cassandra was also knocked to the ground.
        Appellant denied he intentionally drove into the side of the Expedition. Appellant admitted he hit and choked Teniqua that evening, but also apologized to her right afterwards. Teniqua left the house and he followed her outside because he wanted to talk to her. When Teniqua got into the Expedition and started moving across the yard, appellant opened the driver's side door and tried to talk to her. Teniqua stopped the Expedition “half way on the curb and half way on the sidewalk.” Appellant saw two patrol car arrive and two uniformed officers approach him. Appellant ran from the officers because he was “confused, upset, in fear.” Appellant drove the Minivan around the block twice. Appellant admitted he was driving “crazy.” After appellant jumped a curb and ran into someone else's yard and hit several mailboxes and a parked car, he realized what he was doing. Appellant decided to give himself up in front of his house. When he took his eyes off the road for a moment, he hit Teniqua's vehicle. Appellant testified he did not intentionally hit the Expedition and did not know anyone was standing beside the vehicle. Appellant testified he was not thinking about anyone's safety at the time he drove into another person's yard, hit mailboxes, and hit a parked car before hitting the Expedition. Appellant admitted he intentionally got into the Minivan and intentionally drove around the neighborhood. Appellant testified he knew his niece, nephew, and other people were standing outside at the scene, but he was confused and not thinking that anyone would be injured.
Applicable Law
 
        In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The fact- finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
        In a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court views all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 282 (2007); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 87 (2007). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
        To obtain a conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused serious bodily injury to Gloria Buckley, and appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a motor vehicle, during commission of the assault. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
        To obtain a conviction for evading arrest or detention, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally fled in a motor vehicle from a person appellant knew was a peace officer attemtping to lawfully arrest or detain him, and that Gloria Buckley suffered serious bodily injury as a direct result of appellant fleeing from an officer who was attempting to apprehend him. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(a), (b)(2)(B) (Vernon 2003).
Discussion
 
        In his first two points of error, appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction because he did not intend to cause bodily injury to a person and did not intend the result of his actions. Appellant asserts he was not aware of a substantial risk that a person outside the Expedition would be injured. In his third point of error, appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support the evading arrest or detention conviction because the officers did not observe appellant committing an offense in their presence. The State responds the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's aggravated assault conviction and legally sufficient to support appellant's evading arrest or detention conviction.
        The jury was charged on three culpable mental states: intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly. A person acts intentionally, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003). A person acts knowingly, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct, when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. See id. § 6.03(b). A person acts recklessly, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct, when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. See id. § 6.03(c).
        There was evidence presented from which a rational jury could conclude appellant was aware of a risk of harm to others but consciously disregarded that risk. Schreurs saw appellant driving recklessly around a neighborhood, hit several mailboxes with his vehicle, and accelerate his speed right before appellant collided with a vehicle that pinned Gloria to a retaining wall. Appellant admitted he drove “crazy” through the neighborhood and hit mailboxes and a parked car right before he hit the vehicle that pinned Gloria against a retaining wall. Appellant knew his niece and nephew and others were standing around the scene, but claimed he was confused and upset and not thinking clearly. It was the jury's function to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9. The jury was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence, and we must afford due deference to its determination. See Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 625. The jury was free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence presented by either side. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
        Viewing the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for aggravated assault with serious bodily injury and a deadly weapon. See Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 524; Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191-92. We overrule appellant's first two points of error.
        Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, the records show two officers were dispatched on a major disturbance call and had a basis for approaching and temporarily detaining appellant. Appellant admitted he saw the uniformed officers and he intentionally fled from them after they told him to stop. We conclude a rational fact finder could find appellant intentionally fled from police officers in a motor vehicle knowing they were attempting to detain him. Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's evading arrest or detention conviction. We overrule appellant's third point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          KERRY P. FITZGERALD
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070641f.U05