TROY ALAN DAVIDSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

 
AFFIRMED and Opinion filed July 24, 2008.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00452-CR
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TROY ALAN DAVIDSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F06-44792-QV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Bridges, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Moseley
        Troy Alan Davidson was charged with aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon; the deadly weapon was the auto he took from the complaining witness, who was run over during the incident. Davidson pleaded guilty to the offense and pleaded true to one enhancement paragraph. At the hearing on his plea, Davidson admitted he stole the complainant's car to “drive back to Sherman to report to [his] parole officer.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the evidence substantiated Davidson's guilt and assessed punishment at sixteen years' confinement. Davidson appeals, claiming his guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily and, therefore, violated his due process rights; and that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence.         The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well-known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in the law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, 47.4. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
        In his first and second points of error, Davidson contends his guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily and, therefore, violated his due process rights. When considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we must examine the entire record. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam). If the trial court properly admonished the defendant before a guilty plea was entered, there is a prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. See id.
        Davidson argues he would not have entered a guilty plea if he had known: (1) he could be found guilty only if the complainant was threatened and placed in fear of imminent bodily injury and death as a result of his own conduct; and (2) the State was required to prove legal causation. Thus, his guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily.
        However, the records show the trial court properly admonished Davidson orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2007); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Additionally, Davidson testified during the plea hearing that he understood the charges in the indictments, understood the punishment ranges for the offenses, and was voluntarily and freely pleading guilty to the indictments. Thus, the record demonstrates Davidson's guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily; therefore, his due process rights were not violated. We overrule Davidson's first two points of error.
        In his third point of error, Davidson contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence harmful hearsay testimony. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial, that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). As a general rule, hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by the rules of evidence or by statute. Tex. R. Evid. 802; Garcia v. State, 868 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We review a trial court's decision to admit testimony over a hearsay objection under an abuse of discretion standard. Coffin v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
        At trial, the complainant testified that she jumped on the hood of her car as Davidson stole it; she said she let go when she realized he would not stop, and that “[h]e sped off while running over me, going the wrong way.” However, the complainant had previously testified that she was unconscious as soon as she fell off the car. Defense counsel made an objection that “[t]hose were facts not in evidence,” and observed that the complainant didn't know what happened unless she was “siding with what someone else told her.” In response, the complainant stated: “I'm siding with what the emergency people told me.” Defense counsel then objected on the basis of hearsay, which the trial court overruled.
        The State argues the testimony is not hearsay, and that as it did not elicit the statement it had no burden of demonstrating that the statement fit some exception to the hearsay rule. We conclude the statement was hearsay, and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting complained-of statement over a hearsay objection. See Coffin, 885 S.W.2d at149; see also Tex. R. Evid. 801(d).
        We next consider whether admission of this testimony was harmful. A nonconstitutional error that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Substantial rights are not affected by the erroneous admission of evidence if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the finder of fact, or had but a slight effect. Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365.         Here, the hearsay testimony was that Davidson ran over the complainant's ankle. There was substantial evidence to prove this fact independent of the hearsay testimony. The complainant testified that she fell off the moving vehicle, lost consciousness, and awoke in the same area with a crushed ankle, being placed in a stretcher. She also testified about the extent of the injury, including the four surgeries required and her inability to work for six months. Finally, Davidson himself testified that he was high on methamphetamine and “ice” at the time and, although he did not think he ran over the complainant, he realized that he could have and believed her if she said he did. Thus, we find the admission of the hearsay testimony harmless error because we have fair assurance the error did not influence the fact-finder or had but a slight effect. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365. We overrule Davidson's third point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
                                                          
                                                          JIM MOSELEY
                                                          JUSTICE
 
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070452F.U05