STEPHEN JAMES LARREW, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed September 8, 2008.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-07-00232-CR
............................
STEPHEN JAMES LARREW, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 002-80133-06
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, FitzGerald, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Lang
        Appellant Stephen James Larrew pleaded guilty to evading arrest and the trial court assessed punishment at twenty days' confinement in jail.   See Footnote 1  In his sole issue on appeal, appellant asserts his plea of guilty was not voluntary because he did not understand the direct consequence of his plea. The parties are familiar with the procedural and factual history of the case, and we set out only the facts necessary to resolution of the issue raised on appeal. Because all dispositive issues are settled
in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.         Appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary because he did not understand he would be unable to “challenge the legality of his detention and, in essence, the legal and factual sufficiency of his conviction” on appeal. The State asserts the record establishes appellant entered a voluntary plea, and “any unilateral misunderstandings Appellant might have had about the consequences of his plea were not fostered by the State or trial court.”
        A guilty plea, to be consistent with due process of law, must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (plea of guilty may be accepted by court only if free and voluntary). The voluntariness of a guilty plea is determined by the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of the entire record. Griffin v. State, 703 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). Proper admonishment by the trial court creates a prima facie showing that the defendant entered a knowing and voluntary plea. McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (citing Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)); Soto v. State, 837 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.). The burden then shifts to the defendant to establish he did not understand the consequences of his plea. McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 333.
        “A trial court is not required to admonish a defendant about every possible consequence of his plea, direct or collateral, only about those direct consequences that are punitive in nature or specifically enunciated in the law.” Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Although the record must affirmatively show the defendant was admonished as to the range of punishment, no statutory admonishments are required in misdemeanor cases. See Gutierrez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 304, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Perkins v. State, 7 S.W.3d 683, 685 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd). Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the regularity of the trial court's judgment and records. Jones v. State, 77 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Breazeale v. State, 683 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)); Song Sun Hwang v. State, 130 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. ref'd).
        According to the record, appellant pleaded guilty before the trial court to evading arrest, a class B misdemeanor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(a)-(b) (Vernon 2003). The record contains a written “Waiver of Rights” signed by appellant stating, in relevant part, that he understood the range of punishment for that offense. During the plea hearing, the trial court orally asked appellant whether he had read the waiver before signing it, and appellant responded, “Yes, sir.” In addition, the trial court stated, “I will accept your plea. Is anybody forcing you to do this against your will?” Appellant responded, “No, sir.” The trial court's judgment states appellant was “admonished as to the consequences” of his plea in open court.
        The record shows appellant was properly admonished with respect to his guilty plea. See Gutierrez, 108 S.W.3d at 309; Jones, 77 S.W.3d at 822. The trial court's proper admonishments create a prima facie showing appellant entered into a voluntary plea. McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 333. Nothing in the record supports appellant's claim his guilty plea was contingent upon his right to challenge his arrest. Accordingly, we conclude appellant has not met his burden to rebut the prima facie showing that his guilty plea was entered voluntarily. See id. Appellant's sole issue is decided against him.
        The trial court's judgment is affirmed.         
 
                                                          
                                                          DOUGLAS S. LANG
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2
070232F.U05
 
 
Footnote 1 Appellant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, but the trial court gave him permission to appeal.