WOODY CLAVER HURST, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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AFFIRMED; Opinion Issued May 23, 2008
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-07-00195-CR
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WOODY CLAVER HURST, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F06-38109-PT
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OPINION
Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Wright and Maloney
Opinion By Justice Maloney   See Footnote 1 
        On his plea of guilty, the trial court found Woody Claver Hurst guilty of possession of methamphetamine, sentenced appellant to ten years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, suspended the imposition of sentence, placed appellant on community supervision for ten years, and assessed a $1500 fine. In a sole point of error, appellant argues the trial court incorrectly denied his written motion to suppress evidence because he did not give consent to search his automobile. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
        Cawthon,   See Footnote 2  an Irving Police Officer, saw appellant's vehicle approach an intersection in a manner that appeared as if he would not stop at the stop sign. Appellant, however, slammed on his brakes well into the intersection. After Cawthon stopped appellant's vehicle, he determined appellant did not have a driver's license. A search ensued and the officer found a container inside a backpack that contained drug paraphernalia as well as magnets. Finding magnets led him to search underneath the chassis where he found methamphetamine.
SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT HAVE DENIED
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ?
 
 
        In his sole point of error, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He contends (1) the traffic stop became a forty-five minute fishing expedition; (2) the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that appellant consented to the vehicle search; (3) no evidence existed to show any crime was committed; and (4) the officer never arrested appellant for a traffic offense, so no search incident to arrest could exist.
        The State responds that although appellant gave consent to search his vehicle, this was also a search incident to arrest. Specifically, the State contends that after a lawful arrest, the officer had every right to do an inventory search of the vehicle or, in the alternative, a search incident to arrest.
1. Standard of Review
 
        We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress that does not turn on evaluations of credibility and demeanor. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We defer to a trial court's determining the historical facts that the record supports, particularly on credibility and demeanor. See id.; see also Leach v. State, 35 S.W.3d 232, 234-35 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). In determining whether the State proved voluntary consent to search by clear and convincing evidence, we review the historical facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We uphold a trial court's evidentiary ruling if any valid theory exists to support that ruling, regardless of whether the State argued that theory at trial or on appeal. See Graham v. State, 893 S.W.2d 4,7 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no pet.).
2. Applicable Law
 
        At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and their testimony's weight. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When a trial court denies a motion to suppress without explanation, probable cause rests entirely on the witnesses' demeanor and credibility-a decision to which we give almost total deference. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
 
3. The Evidence
a. Officer Cawthon
 
        Cawthon testified that he was on patrol near a motel that has problems with drugs and prostitution when he saw a vehicle that he thought was about to run a stop sign. When the driver saw Cawthon, the driver slammed on his brakes “well after the intersection.” Cawthon followed the vehicle into the hotel parking lot, stopped the vehicle, and appellant got out of his vehicle. Cawthon asked appellant for consent to search his person. During the search of appellant's person, Cawthon asked appellant for permission to search his truck and appellant replied “no problem.”
        Cawthon searched appellant's truck. In the vehicle, Cawthon saw a “fix-a-flat” can inside an open backpack. Cawthon explained that this type can opens and has a hollow area in which to store items. When he opened the can, it contained drug paraphernalia. At that point, he arrested appellant. Further search revealed magnets which caused Cawthon to search under the truck. That search revealed a box underneath the truck's cab held in place by magnets.
        On cross-examination, Cawthon testified that when appellant went through a second stop sign, Cawthon stopped appellant. Next, appellant questioned Cawthon on whether appellant had a suspended driver's license or no license. Additionally, appellant explored the length of time Cawthon detained appellant before transporting him downtown. Appellant offered and played the videotape of the stop and search of his vehicle.   See Footnote 3 
b. Appellant
 
        Appellant testified that he did not have a valid driver's license so he was “very cautious” when driving. Cawthon never asked appellant for consent to search his truck and he never agreed to Cawthon searching his truck.
        Appellant explained that he had checked into the hotel on the day in question. The police had blocked the first entrance to the hotel which caused him to continue to a second entrance. At the scene, he recognized a yellow Mazda that belonged to an “acquaintance of an acquaintance.” Appellant had spoken with her earlier and was to meet her at the motel. But, she never “went around the way she came in.” While being detained by the officers, appellant saw the officers go over to the person he was meeting at least two or three times.
        On cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that the “acquaintance” was Amy Ligit. He saw her pull her Mazda forward and then back-up behind a building.
4. Application of Facts to Law
 
        Appellant does not challenge the initial stop, rather he attacks that which occurred after a “traffic stop.” Consequently, we address only whether appellant consented to the search of his vehicle.
        Cawthon testified that he saw appellant roll through a stop sign and slam on his brakes “well after the intersection.” After Cawthon stopped appellant, appellant admitted he did not have a valid driver's license. Appellant gave Cawthon permission to search appellant's person. During this search, Cawthon testified that he asked appellant for permission to search his truck and appellant responded “no problem.” In contrast, appellant testified that Cawthon never asked if he could search the truck.
        The trial court denied appellant's motion without explanation. When confronted with conflicting testimony, the trial court determined the more credible testimony. We defer to the trial court's decision. Having deferred to the trial court's decision on the facts, we examine whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts. As the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and their testimonial weight, the trial court was not required to accept appellant's version of the facts and could find appellant consented to the search. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress the evidence.   See Footnote 4 
        We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          FRANCES MALONEY
                                                          JUSTICE, ASSIGNED
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
 
Footnote 1 The Honorable Frances J. Maloney, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment.
Footnote 2 Nowhere in the record does Cawthon's first name appear. Nor does the Court reporter enclose an index to allow this Court to determine his name. Consequently, we refer to the officer in the same manner as the court reporter.
Footnote 3 The videotape contains six hours of recorded traffic stops. Although the testimony indicates the recording of appellant's stop lasts some forty minutes, nowhere does the record identify where we can find the recording of appellant's stop.
Footnote 4 Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding appellant consented to the search, we need not address the arguments the search was an inventory search of the vehicle or a search incident to arrest.

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