LAVADA BAILEY ARMSTRONG, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion issued July 24, 2008
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00134-CR
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LAVADA BAILEY ARMSTRONG, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 204th District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F04-55313-NQ
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OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Bridges, and O'Neill
Opinion By Justice Bridges
        Lavada Bailey Armstrong appeals her murder conviction. A jury convicted appellant and sentenced her to ten years' confinement. In a single point of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a life insurance policy covering the decedent, appellant's estranged husband. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        Because appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary. Appellant and Clayton Armstrong were married but separated at the time of the murder. On August 20, 2004, appellant went to Armstrong's apartment at approximately 10 p.m. After they ate dinner, appellant began to feel dizzy and did not remember anything until the next morning when she woke up in bed with Armstrong the next morning. Appellant and Armstrong were both naked. When appellant “started getting up,” she “saw the gun.” Armstrong asked appellant how she could “disrespect [him] with this other man” and told appellant they were “both gonna die today.” Armstrong had the gun in his right hand, and he reached down to get the phone off the floor. Appellant grabbed the gun, and “it went off,” shooting Armstrong in the head and killing him. Appellant eventually turned herself in to police. A jury convicted appellant, and this appeal followed.
        In a single issue, appellant argues the trial court should not have admitted evidence that Armstrong had a $300,000 life insurance policy naming appellant as the beneficiary. Appellant objected that this evidence was not relevant and, if relevant, its probative value was greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Rule 401 of the Texas Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 401. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Tex. R. Evid. 403.
        A trial court, when undertaking a rule 403 analysis, must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with (2) the proponent's need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
        Here, the complained-of evidence showed appellant was the beneficiary of Armstrong's $300,000 life insurance policy. On October 4, 2004, approximately five weeks after Armstrong's murder, appellant attempted to claim the money under Armstrong's life insurance policy. As part of the claim process, appellant provided a written statement to Robert Bull, an insurance investigator who “gathers information and takes statements and gets records for underwriting.” In her statement, appellant wrote that, “On August 21, 2004, Clayton was home, I was at friends - a friend of Claytons was with Clayton + Clayton was accidentally shot.” Appellant testified her statement was “not exactly” what really happened.
        The indictment charged appellant with knowingly and intentionally causing Armstrong's death by shooting him. Appellant's contention at trial was that Armstrong had a gun and threatened that he and appellant were “both gonna die today.” When Armstrong was distracted and reaching for a phone, appellant grabbed the gun and “it went off,” killing Armstrong. Dallas County medical examiner Reade Quinton testified Armstrong's head wound was a “contact wound, meaning the gun was pressed up against the skin when it was fired. Dallas police detective Marvin Ned testified Armstrong's body was lying across the bed, and Armstrong's position was inconsistent with appellant's story that she was in bed with Armstrong and grabbed the gun and shot Armstrong while he was leaning over the side of the bed to get a phone.
        The fact that appellant may have been motivated to shoot Armstrong by the $300,000 life insurance policy was relevant to the State's attempt to prove appellant acted knowingly and intentionally. See Reaves v. State, 970 S.W.2d 111, 118 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.) (evidence of wife's extramarital affair under rules 401 and 403 to show motive to kill and to show wife had reason to murder her husband and claim self-defense). The trial court could have reasonably concluded the existence of Armstrong's life insurance policy related directly to the charged offense, did not have a tendency to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues in the case or have any tendency to be given undue weight by the jury. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 642. Appellant admitted she shot Armstrong but claimed it was partially in self-defense and partially an accident. See id. Thus, the evidence of the life insurance related to the allegation she acted intentionally and knowingly and did not serve to mislead the jury. See id. Finally, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that it was unlikely that presentation of the evidence of life insurance would consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. See id. Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Armstrong's life insurance policy. See id; Reaves, 970 S.W.2d at 118. We overrule appellant's single issue.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          DAVID L. BRIDGES
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070134F.U05