DELEON EDWARDS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed July14, 2008.
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-05-01047-CR
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DELEON EDWARDS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F04-50331-HJ
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OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Francis, and Mazzant
Opinion By Justice Moseley
        Deleon Edwards was indicted for capital murder for causing the death of Brett Dunn and, during the same criminal episode or as part of the same scheme or course of conduct during a separate criminal transaction, causing the death of Phyllis Green. The jury convicted Edwards of the lesser-included offense of the murder of Dunn. Edwards pled true to two prior felony convictions; the trial court found the enhancement allegations true and assessed punishment at forty- six years' confinement. Edwards appeals and argues in eight issues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction (issues seven and eight), and the trial erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence (issues one and two), by admitting extraneous offense evidence (issues three and four), by denying his motion for mistrial (issue five), and by admitting a firearms report (issue six). We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
        On February 27, 2004, Dunn and Green were sitting in Dunn's car when they were shot from behind at close range with a shotgun and killed. Edward Wright, after giving varying statements about his involvement in the shootings, eventually confessed to being the shooter, pleaded guilty to the murders, and received a sentence of life in prison. The State's theory was that Edwards planned to murder Dunn with Wright's help. The record indicates that Edwards was a known drug dealer and Dunn, Green, and Wright were drug users. Dunn lived with his mother, Shirley Dunn, and Green lived with him there from time to time. Wright also stayed at Shirley Dunn's house for a time and was a friend of Edwards. The relationship between Dunn and Edwards was strained; Edwards claimed Dunn owed him money and, for a time, Green left Dunn and dated Edwards. About a week before her death, Green left Edwards and returned to Dunn.
        There was evidence Edwards frequently carried guns and Dunn was afraid of him. Shirley Dunn testified that Edwards and his friend Jeff Otto came to her house twice with guns looking for money from Green and Dunn. Both times, Green and Dunn were not home, but Shirley Dunn gave Edwards money so he would leave. She was too afraid to call police.
        According to Wright, about two weeks before the murders, he, Edwards, and another man planned to kill Dunn. Wright was to lure Dunn in front of a sliding-glass door in his house while Edwards and the other man waited in the alley to shoot Dunn. However, Wright warned Dunn to stay away from the door and told him that Edwards was trying to kill him. Another witness, Kristi Hawkins, testified that Edwards told her he wanted to shoot Dunn through the sliding-glass door but that Wright “chickened out.”
        Wright testified that after he warned Dunn of the plan, Dunn began spreading a rumor that Wright was going to kill Edwards for Dunn. Wright felt betrayed by Dunn for spreading this rumor and said he might have killed Edwards only if he barged into Shirley Dunn's house again, but not in any other situation. Later, after Shirley Dunn threw him out of her house, Wright went to stay with Edwards. Edwards asked Wright about the rumors and, after Wright assured him they were untrue, Edwards told Wright he could stay with him and not to worry about it.
        On the day before the murders, Wright was with Edwards, Hawkins, and Otto at Otto's repair shop. According to Wright, Otto accused him of sending federal agents to his shop (though they later concluded it must have been Green who did so). Edwards told Otto the rumor about Wright planning to kill Edwards was not true, but Otto wanted Wright to do something to prove himself. Wright testified he was afraid not to kill Dunn because he believed Edwards would kill him if he refused.
        That evening, Edwards, Wright, Hawkins, and Otto were all at Edwards's house. Hawkins noticed that Edwards and Wright kept whispering to each other. Wright testified that he and Edwards discussed a plan to kill Dunn by waiting at the house next to Dunn's for an opportunity to shoot him. Edwards got a sawed-off shotgun, loaded it with two green shotgun shells, and gave it to Wright.
        Edwards and Wright left in a white car; a short time later, Hawkins and Otto left in Otto's truck. Wright said they drove to within a few blocks of Dunn's house, he got out with the shotgun, and walked to Dunn's house. Edwards waited in the car. Shirley Dunn noticed Wright in the hedges; when Wright asked her if Dunn was home, she said he was not. Wright returned to Edwards's car, and they drove back to Edwards's house. Hawkins testified she drove Otto by Dunn's house shortly after Edwards and Wright left and saw Edwards sitting in the white car a few blocks down on the corner. When she drove back by a few minutes later, the car was gone. Edwards and Wright were at Edwards's house when Hawkins and Otto returned.
        Wright testified that after they returned, Otto asked about their “earlier conversation” and Edwards said “Oh, yeah,” got the sawed-off shotgun, and gave it to Wright. Hawkins heard Wright say he had to call someone, but Edwards said not from his house and he would take Wright to the store to call. Wright and Edwards left in Otto's truck. Hawkins also testified she saw the sawed-off shotgun that night and that she had seen it at Edwards's house several times before.
        Wright called Dunn from the store and told him that Wright had shot Edwards and to come to the store alone. Edwards then took Wright behind the store so he could hide the shotgun. Their plan was for Wright to tell Dunn he had left the shotgun there after shooting Edwards, and then shoot Dunn when they went to pick it up. Edwards dropped off Wright back at the store and drove to the end of alley to wait. When Dunn drove up, Wright noticed that he was with Green; Wright complained, but Dunn said Green would not say anything. Wright got into the backseat of the car and told Dunn to drive behind the store to pick up his stuff. Green told Dunn not to go and Dunn parked on the street and told Wright to go down the alley. Wright went into the alley and picked up the shotgun. Wright got back in the car behind Dunn and told him to drive around a few minutes and he would take them to buy drugs. Wright said he was trying to work up the nerve to shoot Dunn and was waiting for Edwards to pull up behind them.
        Wright then placed the barrel of the shotgun on the headrest behind Dunn and shot him in the back of the head. Green screamed and begged Wright not to shoot her, but Wright told her he could not let her go. He ejected an empty shell from the shotgun, tried to fire, but the gun would not fire. He tried to fire once again and shot Green in the head. The car rolled to a stop and Wright jumped out and ran. He threw the shotgun into a backyard and ran to Edwards's house.
        Hawkins testified that about twenty minutes after Wright and Edwards left to go to the store, she saw Wright running across the yard to the house. She called Otto and told him Wright was there, but not Edwards or the truck. Otto stopped Wright at the door and “pat-searched” him. Wright was agitated and “paranoid.” Hawkins heard Wright tell Otto, “[Green] was with him. I had to do her too.” Edwards arrived a few minutes later. Otto went outside to talk to Edwards. When Edwards came in, he said he needed to get away from town and go to Otto's ranch. Wright said he also heard Edwards tell Otto, “It's done.”
        According to Wright, Edwards took him to retrieve the shotgun and, when they returned, told him to take off his bloody clothes and shoes and gave him clean clothes and shoes. Edwards told Wright to put his bloody clothes in separate plastic bags. They then drove to some dumpsters and dropped the bags in different places. The next morning, however, Wright found his bloody jeans in the backseat of the white car and the shotgun in the trunk. Otto got the shotgun out of the trunk and Wright hid it in a shed. Wright later threw the shotgun into the creek and it was never recovered. Edwards promised to get rid of the bloody jeans as he left in the white car.
        Edwards went to Kimberly Rivera's house, and asked her to go away with him to Otto's ranch for a couple of days. Rivera saw Edwards throw a pair of jeans in the trash next to the curb as he walked toward the house. After Edwards left to get ready for the trip, Rivera retrieved the jeans from the trash and gave them to her brother; she noticed they had blood stains on the legs. Edwards came back later that evening driving a black Mustang, and they returned to his house to finish loading the car. Edwards gave Rivera a plastic bag with tennis shoes in it and told her not to let it out of her sight. After the car was loaded, they drove off.
        A short time later Edwards was stopped for speeding. He did not immediately produce identification and gave two or three different names. He then retrieved his black organizer, which he said contained his identification. Police took the organizer to look for weapons and found multiple identification cards in different names, as well as crack cocaine and a scale inside a small container. Edwards eventually identified himself, and he was arrested on outstanding warrants for traffic violations under his true name. Police found a duffel bag in the trunk of the Mustang containing loose ammunition, including shotgun shells, several firearms, and 1.6 pounds of marijuana. An assault rifle was also removed from the vehicle.
        Police later retrieved the plastic bag with the tennis shoes from the vehicle and the discarded jeans from Rivera. DNA tests revealed that the blood on the jeans and shoes was Dunn's. Steel shot pellets and plastic shot wad recovered from the autopsies of Dunn and Green and the fired shotgun shell recovered from Dunn's car were found to be consistent with the unfired shotgun shells from Edwards's duffel bag.
Discussion
         A. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Corroboration of Accomplice Testimony
        Edwards's seventh and eighth issues challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Under these issues, he also contends Wright's accomplice testimony was not corroborated by other evidence as required by the accomplice-witness rule. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14 (Vernon 2005). The accomplice-witness rule is a separate standard imposed by statute and “is not derived from federal or state constitutional principles that define the legal and factual sufficiency standards.” Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 627 (U.S. 2007). Thus, we apply the well-accepted standards for reviewing legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence by considering all the evidence, including the accomplice testimony, in the light favorable to the verdict for legal sufficiency and in a neutral light for factual sufficiency. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (legal sufficiency); Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (legal sufficiency). See also Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (factual sufficiency); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (factual sufficiency); Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In our review under the accomplice-witness rule, we eliminate the accomplice testimony from consideration and then examine the remaining portions of the record to see if there is any evidence that tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime. Castillo v. State, 221 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
        1.
 
Legal Sufficiency
 
        The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause prohibits a criminal conviction except upon proof sufficient to persuade a rational fact finder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 95. When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational jury could have found the accused guilty of all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 95 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Further, our review encompasses all the evidence, whether properly or improperly admitted. See Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 625. We judge the legal sufficiency of the evidence against the elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Fuller, 73 S.W.3d at 252.
        A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (c) (Vernon 2003). A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both. See id. § 7.01(a). A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. See id. § 7.02(a)(2). In determining whether the accused is guilty as a party, the fact finder may consider events occurring before, during, and after commission of the offense. Michel v. State, 834 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.).
        Edwards argues there was no evidence he actually shot the victims or participated in the actual shooting. However, Wright testified Edwards planned to kill Dunn, provided the loaded shotgun to Wright, drove him to meet Dunn, and helped Wright dispose of evidence. Wright was afraid Edwards would kill him if he did not shoot Dunn. Hawkins testified Edwards told her about the previous plan to shoot Dunn from the alley, but Wright “chickened out.” Before the shootings, Hawkins heard Wright say he needed to call someone, but Edwards would not let him call from his house and took Wright to the store to call. Edwards was also found in possession of Wright's tennis shoes and had disposed of Wright's jeans, both of which had Dunn's blood on them. The shotgun shell recovered from Dunn's car was consistent with the type of shotgun shells Edwards was carrying in the Mustang.
        Considering all the evidence (including that summarized above) in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 95. Thus, we overrule Edwards's legal sufficiency argument.
        2.
 
Factual Sufficiency
 
        The court of criminal appeals has held that we also have statutory and constitutional authority to reverse a conviction and remand the case for new trial in the event the evidence is factually insufficient to support the conviction. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414. Evidence that is legally sufficient can still be factually insufficient when the verdict seems clearly wrong or manifestly unjust or against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 625 (citing Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414).
        When reviewing a criminal conviction for factual sufficiency, we answer only one question: “Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was the fact finder rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 415. We set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak that it is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or the contrary evidence is so strong that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof could not have been met. Garza v State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). In turn, a verdict is clearly wrong and unjust if jury's finding is “manifestly unjust,” “shocks the conscience,” or “clearly demonstrates bias.” Garza, 213 S.W.3d at 334 (citing Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).        
        Edwards contends the evidence is factually insufficient because Wright's testimony at trial was merely the last of several conflicting accounts of the shooting. Before Edwards or Wright were charged with the murders, Wright was in a hotel room with Edwards. After Edwards promised to send him to California with a new identity, Wright wrote a letter admitting the shootings, but stating he acted alone, contrary to the widespread rumors he and Edwards were partners in the crime. Wright gave the letter to Edwards's wife. Wright was later arrested on other charges and gave several pretrial statements. He initially denied committing the murders. Later, he gave a statement saying Edwards promised him drugs, a car, and a place to stay if he would kill Dunn, but Wright believed it was Edwards who killed Dunn and Green. In a third statement, Wright said he was sitting next to Edwards in Dunn's car when Edwards shot Dunn. Wright jumped out and heard a second shot as he ran away. Wright later called a police detective from jail and admitted shooting Dunn and Green, that Edwards was not in the car, but that Edwards provided the gun and helped dispose of the bloody clothing.
        The jury heard these conflicting statements and Wright's explanation for his attempts to lie his way out of the crimes. The jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to give their testimony. Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A jury is entitled to accept one version of the facts and reject another, or reject any part of a witness's testimony. Id. The fact-finder alone determines what weight to place on contradictory testimonial evidence because that determination depends on the fact-finder's evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 626. Considering all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the fact finder was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 415. We need not further detail the rest of the evidence. See Roberts v. State, 221 S.W.3d 659, 664-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We overrule Edwards's factual sufficiency argument.
        3.
 
Corroboration of Accomplice Testimony
 
        Article 38.14 provides that a conviction cannot stand on accomplice testimony unless there is other evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14. “The corroborating evidence under article 38.14 need not be sufficient, standing alone, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed the offense.” Joubert v. State, 235 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1446 (U.S. 2008). “All that is required is that there is some non-accomplice evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense.” Id. “The appellant's liability as a principal or under a parties theory is of no relevance under an Article 38.14 analysis. The question is whether some evidence 'tends to connect' him to the crime; the connection need not establish the exact nature of his involvement (as a principal or party).” Id.         Excluding Wright's testimony, other evidence tends to connect Edwards with Dunn's murder. Hawkins said Edwards told her he was going to shoot Dunn from the alley through the sliding-glass door, but Wright chickened out. Hawkins saw a sawed-off shotgun in Edwards's house the night of the murders, and saw Wright leave with Edwards to make a phone call at the store. Edwards was found with Wright's shoes and disposed of Wright's jeans, both having Dunn's blood on them. The fired shotgun shell recovered from Dunn's car was consistent with the type of shotgun shells Edwards was carrying in his duffle bag.
        Considering the non-accomplice evidence in the record, we conclude there is some evidence that tends to connect Edwards to the crime. See Joubert, 235 S.W.3d at 731; Castillo, 221 S.W.3d at 693. We overrule Edwards's seventh and eighth issues.
         B. Suppression of Evidence
        Edwards's first and second issues argue the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained after he was stopped in the black Mustang. He contends the traffic stop was not justified, his detention was prolonged, and the search of his organizer exceed the proper scope of the search.
        Whether a specific search or seizure was reasonable is a mixed question of law and fact and is reviewed de novo. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a ruling on a motion to suppress, giving almost total deference to the trial court's determination of the facts, particularly when the finding involves an evaluation of a witness's credibility and demeanor. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Similarly, we afford the same deference to mixed questions of law and fact if resolving those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. However, mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor may be reviewed de novo. Id.
        The record indicates police were looking for Edwards in connection with the murders and had distributed his photograph and description to officers. An undercover plain-clothes officer reported he saw a black Mustang speeding and that Edwards could be driving. A uniformed patrol officer, Robert Harmon, responded, saw the Mustang driving the opposite direction, and estimated it was speeding. He turned around and paced the Mustang, estimating it was traveling 50 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone. Harmon then stopped the vehicle for speeding.
        Harmon approached the Mustang and asked for identification. The driver said he did not have any identification and then gave two or three different names. Harmon was suspicious and thought the driver could be Edwards, but wanted to confirm his identity. The driver eventually said he had identification in his organizer in the trunk of the Mustang. The driver pulled down the backseat of the Mustang, reached into a duffel bag in the trunk, and removed the organizer. When Edwards got out of the car, another officer, Jay Darst, took the organizer to check for weapons and look for identification. Darst opened it, found several loose identification cards for different people and a smaller black container. Darst opened the black container and found a piece of crack cocaine and a small scale. When the driver reached into the trunk, Harmon noticed a tattoo on the driver's neck similar to one in the Edwards's photograph. Harmon asked if he was Edwards and the driver admitted he was.
        After Edwards confirmed his identity, police checked for outstanding warrants and confirmed he had several traffic warrants. He was placed under arrest and police then performed an inventory search of the Mustang according to standard procedure before impounding it. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress and stated the search of the container in the organizer was reasonable because it could have contained Edwards's identification.         We conclude the initial stop for speeding was reasonable. The Mustang was stopped after the police paced the vehicle at speeds in excess of the speed limit. Operating a vehicle in excess of the speed limit is “is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent and that the speed is unlawful.” Tex. Transp Code Ann. § 545.352 (Vernon Supp. 2006). An officer may lawfully stop and reasonably detain a person for a traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
        After the stop, the detention was not improperly prolonged while the officers attempted to obtain the driver's true name. Edwards did not give his true name, denied having identification, and gave two or three different names. Checking for a valid driver's license and outstanding warrants is a component of a routine traffic stop, and it is clear here this component was not completed until the driver gave a true identification. See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63-64 (traffic stop fully resolved after computer check of driver information shows valid driver's license, no outstanding warrants, and car not stolen). Here of course, Edwards eventually gave his correct name, the computer check identified outstanding warrants for Edwards, and he was arrested on those warrants.
        Edwards also contends the search of the black container inside his organizer exceeded the proper scope of the search. The trial court found the search of the container in the organizer was reasonable because it could have contained Edwards's identification. The record also indicates Darst took the organizer and opened it to check for weapons. The black container was not offered in evidence and the record does not disclose its size or dimensions, although there is some indication it could have contained an identification card. The organizer and its contents were in Edwards's possession before he identified himself and was arrested. The record is not entirely clear on whether the officer opened the container before or after Edwards was identified and arrested on the outstanding warrants. However, once an officer has probable cause to arrest, he may search the defendant's person or areas within the person's immediate control, incident to an arrest. State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “It is irrelevant that the arrest occurs immediately before or after the search, as long as sufficient probable cause exists for the officer to arrest before the search.” State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We conclude the search of the container was reasonable as part of the check for weapons and as part of a search incident to arrest.
        Edwards sought to suppress all the evidence obtained after the stop and relies on the plurality opinion in Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) to argue the Texas constitution affords greater protection than the federal constitution for inventory searches. We have previously concluded that Autran, a plurality opinion by three judges, is not binding precedent; there is no substantive difference between the Fourth Amendment and article one, section nine of the Texas constitution; and “article one, section nine does not provide greater protection from inventory searches than does the Fourth Amendment.” Trujillo v. State, 952 S.W.2d 879, 881-82 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.); see also Rothenberg v. State, 176 S.W.3d 53, 57-61 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd). An inventory search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as they are done as part of standard police procedures and not done in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. Rothenberg, 176 S.W.3d at 57; Trujillo, 952 S.W.2d at 882.
        Based on the totality of the circumstances and giving appropriate deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and credibility determinations, we conclude the search and seizure were reasonable. We overrule Edwards's first and second issues.
         C. Extraneous Offense Evidence
        Edwards's third and fourth issues argue the trial court abused its discretion by admitting extraneous offense evidence over his objections under evidence rules 403 and 404(b). Tex. R. Evid. 403, 404(b). The admission of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Absent an abuse of discretion, we do not disturb a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Id.; Dillard v. State, 931 S.W.2d 689, 698 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, pet. ref'd). As long as the trial court's ruling was within the “zone of reasonable disagreement,” there is no abuse of discretion, and we must uphold the trial court's ruling. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh'g).
Generally, evidence of extraneous offenses is not admissible at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial to prove the character of a person in order to show they acted in conformity therewith. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). However, evidence of extraneous offenses is admissible “if it has relevance apart from supporting the conclusion that the defendant acted in conformity with his character.” Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 168; see also Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence that is relevant under rule 404(b), may still be excluded if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see Tex. R. Evid. 403.
        Shirley Dunn testified about a conversation between Edwards and Dunn about drugs and a man named Brad. Shirley Dunn asked Edwards about having a “run-in” with Brad. Edwards responded by explaining he had a test for people and he would put money and drugs stacked on his desk and leave the person in the room alone. When Edwards returned, he said he could tell if the money or the drugs had been moved. If they had, Edwards said he would take his unloaded pistol, put it against the person's head, and pull the trigger. Then he would tell the person he was leaving the room again and when he came back he wanted everything back where it was supposed to be. Dunn then got up and went into the kitchen; Edwards told Shirley Dunn, “if you ever have anybody that you want killed, just tell me; and he goes like this at-at Brett [Dunn]. He kind of grins. And I just look at him.” This incident occurred during the first two weeks of January before the February murders.
        Edwards objected at trial and argues on appeal that this evidence was too remote and dissimilar to be relevant for any purpose under 404(b) and any probative value it had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The State argues the evidence is relevant to Edwards's motive and relationship with Dunn. While the actual events described in Edwards's “test” differ from the actual murder, Edwards told the story in Dunn's presence. He then made the offer to kill and made a threatening gesture at Dunn after he left the room. This evidence tends to show how Edwards dealt with people who owed him money or stole drugs from him. There was other evidence Dunn obtained drugs from Edwards and owed him money at times. Shirley Dunn said Dunn was discussing drugs with Edwards when she asked about the run-in with Brad. We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in concluding this evidence had some tendency to make it more probable than not that Edwards had a motive to kill Dunn for drug debts. See Tex. R. Evid. 401.
        In determining whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the trial court must consider the following factors: (1) the probative value of evidence; (2) the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in some irrational, but nevertheless indelible way; (3) the time the proponent needs to develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent's need for the evidence. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389-90). As discussed above, the trial court determined the “test” evidence was probative of Edwards's motive. Other evidence was introduced regarding Edwards's use of firearms and Shirley Dunn's experiences with him coming to her house with guns and demanding money from Dunn or Green. The “test” evidence does not appear to have had the potential to impress the jury in an irrational or indelible way; other evidence showed Edwards's use of guns and threats against Dunn. The record does not show this evidence required an extensive amount of time to develop, and the State's need for the evidence was strong because Edwards was not the actual shooter and his intent and motive were disputed. We conclude the trial court's decision to admit the evidence is within the zone of reasonable disagreement and was not an abuse of discretion. We overrule Edwards's third and fourth issues.
         D. Motion for Mistrial
        Edwards's fifth issue argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial following the trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard Shirley Dunn's testimony that she had been told Edwards was “pimping” Green. Shirley Dunn was asked whether Edwards and Green sometimes had a dating relationship and she responded, “I was told he was pimping her.” She repeated the statement when the prosecutor said, “I'm sorry?” Defense counsel objected and requested an instruction to disregard. The trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the answer and then denied Edwards's motion for mistrial.
        We will not disturb a trial court's ruling denying a motion for mistrial unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim App. 1999). A trial court should only grant a mistrial in extreme cases when error is so prejudicial as to appear calculated to inflame the minds of the jury members. Id. Whether an error necessitates a mistrial depends on the particular facts of the case. Id. Generally, a prompt instruction to disregard will cure a witness's inadvertent reference to an extraneous offense. Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Unless the extraneous offense is so calculated to inflame the minds of a jury or is of such a nature as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced, an instruction to disregard can cure any improper impression. Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
        Shirley Dunn's statement was not so calculated to inflame the minds of a jury and was not of such a nature as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced. Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 696-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Other testimony indicated that Green worked as a prostitute to get money for drugs and left Dunn for periods of time to be with Edwards. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Edwards's request for a mistrial because the prompt instruction cured any improper impression created by the witness's answer. See Ovalle, 13 S.W.3d at 783. We overrule Edwards's fifth issue.
         E. Firearms Report
        Edwards's sixth issue argues the trial court erred in admitting a forensic firearms report without expert testimony regarding its contents. We review this issue under an abuse of discretion standard. Wheeler, 67 S.W.3d at 888. The firearms report was offered as a business record of the Southwestern Institute of Forensic Sciences (SWIFS) through testimony of Timothy Sliter, chief of the physical evidence department. Edwards objected to the admissibility of the report as confusing to the jury; the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the report. The State argues this objection was not specific and Edwards failed to preserve error. While general, the objection appears to have been that the report should be excluded under evidence rule 403 because the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. See Tex. R. Evid. 403.
        The report states the shot pellets and plastic wadding recovered from the autopsies and the fired shotgun shell recovered from Dunn's car were compared with the unfired shotgun shells recovered from Edwards's duffle bag. The report indicates the shot size, material type (steel), and wad type of the unfired shotgun shells were consistent with the items recovered from the autopsies. The fired shotgun shell was the same gauge and from the same manufacturer as the unfired shells and the manufacturer's original load identifiers were consistent with the unfired shotgun shells. The physical evidence identified in the report was admitted in evidence.
        The statements in the report tended to explain the physical evidence already admitted at trial. The report also tended to support Wright's testimony that Edwards provided him a loaded shotgun to shoot Dunn. Although Sliter testified he did not have any particular expertise in firearms and ballistics, he was able to explain that the statement the items were consistent was a description of similarities and observations of the items (and not, for example, an opinion that the fired shotgun shell came from the box of shells recovered from Edwards). The report was probative and necessary for the State's case. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the report. We overrule Edwards's sixth issue.
Conclusion
        Having overruled all of Edwards's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
JIM MOSELEY
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICE
 
 
 
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
051047F.U05