TERRANCE BRUSHIRE JONES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed November 19, 2007
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00316-CR
No. 05-07-00317-CR
 
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TERRANCE BRUSHIRE JONES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F05-71868-SR, F06-86571-NR
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OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Richter, and Lang
Opinion By Justice O'Neill
        Terrance Brushire Jones waived a jury and pleaded guilty to stalking and failure to register as a sex offender. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 42.072 (Vernon 2003); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(a) (Vernon 2006). In the stalking case, the trial court deferred adjudicating appellant's guilt, placed him on seven years' community supervision, and assessed a $2000 fine. The trial court later adjudicated appellant guilty and assessed punishment, enhanced by a prior felony conviction, at twenty years' imprisonment. In the registration case, the trial court assessed punishment at two years' confinement in a state jail facility and a $2000 fine. In two issues, appellant contends the sentences violate the United States and Texas Constitutions. We affirm the trial court's judgments.         Appellant argues the sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the United States and Texas Constitutions, and are grossly disproportionate to the offenses. See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, XIV; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 13. Appellant argues that because he became homeless and had no address to register, and removed his monitor because he became homeless, the trial court should have assessed less punishment. The State responds that appellant did not preserve his complaints for appellate review and, alternatively, the sentences do not violate the United States or Texas Constitution.
        Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in his motions for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Even constitutional rights, including the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, may be waived. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Castaneda, 135 S.W.3d at 723. Moreover, there is no evidence the sentences are cruel or unusual, and they are within the statutory punishment range for the offense. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.33; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(b)(1); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd).
        We conclude the sentences are neither cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the offenses. We resolve appellant's issues against him.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070316F.U05