BRANDON DEION GREEN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED as Modified; Opinion Filed November 19, 2007.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-07-00100-CR
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BRANDON DEION GREEN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F04-33104-KP
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OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Wright, and Moseley
Opinion By Justice Moseley
        Brandon Deion Green waived a jury and pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment and a $1500 fine, ordered appellant to boot camp, then placed him on community supervision for five years. Subsequently, the State moved to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging several violations. The trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment. In two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient and his pleas of true were involuntary. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
Legal and Factual Insufficiency
 
        In his first point of error, appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he violated a condition of community supervision by committing a new offense. Appellant asserts the State failed to prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that he was under arrest or being detained at the time he talked to the police and that he gave a material false statement to them.
        Appellate review of a probation revocation is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, and we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, appellant violated the conditions of his probation. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In a revocation proceeding, the trial judge is the sole trier of the facts, and determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony. See Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc).
        In its amended motion to revoke, the State alleged appellant violated ten different conditions of community supervision, including committing two new offenses, making a false statement to a police officer, and giving a false and fictitious name, address, and date of birth to a police officer who had lawfully arrested or detained appellant. During the revocation hearing, appellant pleaded not true to making a false statement to a police officer, and pleaded true to the remaining nine allegations, including giving a false and fictitious name, address, and date of birth to a police officer. Appellant's signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence was admitted into evidence without objection.
        Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, the evidence is sufficient to support revocation of appellant's community supervision. See Cobb, 851 S.W.2d at 874. Appellant testified he gave a false name, address, and date of birth to the police because he had an outstanding arrest warrant, and admitted he violated eight other conditions of his community supervision. Appellant's admission he committed a new offense by giving a false name, address, and date of birth to a police officer, standing alone, is sufficient to support the trial court's order revoking community supervision. See Watts v. State, 645 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Lewis v. State, 195 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
        Because the evidence is sufficient to prove appellant violated a condition of his community supervision, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision. See Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493-94; Cobb, 851 S.W.2d at 874. We overrule appellant's first point of error.
Involuntary Pleas
 
        In his second point of error, appellant argues his pleas of true to the allegations in the amended motion to revoke were unknowing and not voluntary. Appellant asserts he did not understand the consequences of his pleas of true, and he only entered the pleas of true because he believed he would receive help with all of his cases. The State responds that the record shows appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered pleas of true to nine of the ten allegations in the amended motion to revoke.
        Nothing in the record supports appellant's claims. The trial judge properly admonished appellant both orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2006). A record showing the trial court properly admonished the defendant constitutes a prima facie showing that the defendant entered into a knowing and voluntary plea. The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he did not understand the consequences of the plea. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd).
        Here, appellant failed to meet his burden. His signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence was admitted into evidence without objection. Also, appellant admitted he committed the new offense of giving a false name, address, and date of birth to a police officer and that he violated eight other conditions of his community supervision. The fact that appellant received greater punishment than he hoped for does not render his pleas of true involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). Having reviewed the record, we conclude appellant's pleas of true were voluntary. We overrule appellant's second point of error.
 
Modify Judgment
 
        In a cross-point, the State asks us to modify the trial court's judgment to reflect a $1500 fine originally imposed by the trial court. The record shows the trial court originally imposed a $1500 fine when it ordered appellant to complete the boot camp program. The fine was not probated. After revoking appellant's community supervision, the trial judge did not repronounce the fine when he imposed the ten-year sentence. The trial court's judgment does not include the fine.
        Generally, when a conflict exists between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written memorialization of the sentence, the oral pronouncement controls. See Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). However, an unprobated fine orally imposed at the original plea hearing may be included in the judgment revoking regular community supervision even though the fine was not repronounced at the revocation hearing. See id. at 329. Because the trial court pronounced and imposed the fine at the original plea hearing, the court was not required to repronounce the fine at the conclusion of the revocation hearing. See Davis v. State, 977 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.). We sustain the State's cross-point. We modify the trial court's judgment to show a fine of $1500. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).
        As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          JIM MOSELEY
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
070100f.u05