EDWIN SHIELDS and wife RUBY P. SHIELDS, Appellants v. AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE COMPANY, AMC MORTGAGE SERVICES INC., WELLS FARGO BANK MINNESOTA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO NORWEST BANK MINNESOTA, N.A. AS TRUSTEE OF SALOMON BROTHERS MORTGAGE SECURITIES VII, INC., FLOATING RATE MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 1999-AQ2 UNDER POLLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 1999, WITHOUT RECOURSE, AND W.M. SPECIALTY MORTGAGE, L.L.C., Appellees

AFFIRM in part, REVERSE and REMAND in part; Opinion issued November 9, 2007
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-06-01647-CV
............................
EDWIN SHIELDS and wife RUBY P. SHIELDS, Appellants
V.
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE COMPANY,
AMC MORTGAGE SERVICES INC.,
WELLS FARGO BANK MINNESOTA, N.A.,
SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO NORWEST BANK MINNESOTA, N.A.
AS TRUSTEE OF SALOMON BROTHERS MORTGAGE SECURITIES VII, INC., FLOATING RATE MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 1999-AQ2 UNDER POLLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT
DATED AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 1999, WITHOUT RECOURSE, AND
W.M. SPECIALTY MORTGAGE, L.L.C., Appellees
 
.............................................................
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-05-03938-A
.............................................................
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION
 
Before Justices Whittington, Wright, and FitzGerald
Opinion By Justice Whittington
 
        The trial judge granted appellees' no-evidence summary judgment motion. In a single issue, appellants complain the trial judge erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because appellees did not address all causes of action pleaded in their petition. We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's judgment.
 
Discussion
        In their petition, appellants assert causes of action for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, statutory violations, and unreasonable collection efforts. Appellees filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Appellants did not file a response. The trial judge granted appellees' motion and ordered that appellants “take nothing on their claims for breach of contract, negligence, violation of the Texas Debt Collection Act and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, wrongful foreclosure, and breach of the common law tort of unreasonable collection efforts . . . .”
        Appellants allege appellees' motion for summary judgment failed to address their claims for anticipatory breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation, their requests for declaratory relief and an accounting, and their suit to quiet title. If a no-evidence motion for summary judgment is not specific in challenging a particular element or is conclusory, the motion is legally insufficient as a matter of law. Patino v. Complete Tire, Inc., 158 S.W.3d 655, 659-60 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (“The motion must state the elements as to which there is no evidence.”).
        Count II of appellants' petition is entitled “Breach of Contract.” In Count II, appellants allege: “The breach of the contract, the anticipatory breach of the contract, and negligent misrepresentations as set forth above were a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages as set forth below.” Appellees' motion for summary judgment addresses appellants' claims for negligence and breach of contract, but not for negligent misrepresentation or anticipatory breach. The elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim are: (1) the representation is made by a defendant in the course of his business, or in a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest; (2) the defendant supplied “false information” for the guidance of others in their business; (3) the defendant did not exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information; and (4) the plaintiff suffers pecuniary loss by justifiably relying on the representation. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 706 n.24 (Tex. 2002) (citing Fed. Land Bank Ass'n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1991)). Appellees' motion addressing the duty, breach, causation, and damages elements of a common law negligence claim did not state the elements of appellants' negligent misrepresentation claim “as to which there is no evidence” as required by rule 166a(i).
        Similarly, while appellees' summary judgment motion addressed the elements of a breach of contract claim, stating there was no evidence of breach, injury, or damages, and no evidence appellants performed, tendered performance, or were excused from performance, the motion did not address the elements of anticipatory breach of contract. “The elements of common law anticipatory breach are: (1) the defendant absolutely repudiated the obligation (2) without just excuse (3) plaintiff was damaged thereby.” Taylor Pub. Co. v. Systems Marketing, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Appellees' motion did not state the elements of anticipatory breach of contract for which there was no evidence. See Tex. R. App. P. 166a(i).
        Appellants also complain the motion for summary judgment did not address their requests for a declaratory judgment, for an accounting, and to quiet title. In their petition, appellants requested a declaration that they did not materially breach the deed of trust contracts and that, under the terms of the contracts, they are not tenants at sufferance because there was no valid sale of the property. Appellants' suit to quiet title alleges appellees impermissibly declared appellants to be tenants at sufferance in violation of law and requests the court to declare clear and uncontested title and possession of the property to them. Appellants' petition also requests “an accounting of all transactions on their mortgage loans.”
        Appellees argue summary judgment was proper on appellants' requests for declaratory judgment and to quiet title because the portions of the summary judgment motion addressing wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract addressed the factual allegations pleaded by appellants in their declaratory judgment and quiet title claims. However, appellees' summary judgment motion did not specifically address either of these requests for relief. Summary judgment for appellees was not proper as to appellants' requests for declaratory relief and to quiet title. See Double Diamond, Inc. v. Van Tyne, 109 S.W.3d 848, 852 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (where traditional summary judgment motion did not address claim for declaratory judgment, trial court erred in granting summary judgment on declaratory judgment cause of action).
        Appellees also argue appellants are not entitled to an accounting. Appellants' request for an accounting is not a separate cause of action but rather a remedy sought. See Michael v. Dyke, 41 S.W.3d 746, 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (party sought accounting as form of remedy, not separate claim for relief; issue of entitlement to accounting would not be reached unless it is first determined plaintiff is owed at least some damages under breach of contract claim). Because appellants' claims for negligent misrepresentation and anticipatory breach have not yet been resolved in the trial court, it has not yet been determined whether appellants are owed any damages, and, if so, whether an accounting would be an appropriate remedy. We therefore remand the issue of an accounting to the trial court. See Michael, 41 S.W.3d at 755 (court expresses no opinion as to availability of accounting; holds only that claim for accounting was made as part of other causes of action and therefore not addressed in summary judgment order; case remanded to determine other causes of action).
        Because appellees' summary judgment motion was legally insufficient regarding appellants' claims for anticipatory breach and negligent misrepresentation and their requests for declaratory judgment and to quiet title, summary judgment should not have been granted on those causes of action and requests for relief. See Patino, 158 S.W.3d at 659-60; Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Appellants do not challenge the trial judge's grant of summary judgment on their remaining claims. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment as to appellants' claims for anticipatory breach and negligent misrepresentation, and their requests for declaratory judgment, to quiet title, and for an accounting and remand that portion of the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARK WHITTINGTON
                                                          JUSTICE
 
061647F.P05