C.I.T. LEASING CORPORATION, Appellant v. DALLAS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee

REVERSE and REMAND; Opinion Filed December 13, 2007.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-06-01546-CV
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C.I.T. LEASING CORPORATION, Appellant
V.
DALLAS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 04-12969-E
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Richter, Francis, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Francis
        In this tax lawsuit, C.I.T. Leasing Corporation appeals the trial court's order granting Dallas Central Appraisal District's plea to the jurisdiction. For reasons set out below, we reverse the trial court's order and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
        In its petition, C.I.T. alleged that it erroneously rendered a Gulfstream G-III aircraft for property taxes in 2002 in Dallas County. As a result, the appraisal district assessed property taxes on the aircraft for approximately $290,000. C.I.T. discovered its error and attempted to resolve this issue with the appraisal district. No resolution was reached, and in June 2003, several months after the taxes became delinquent, C.I.T. paid the taxes, penalties, and interest under protest. Subsequently, C.I.T. filed a motion with the appraisal review board under section 25.25 of the Property Tax Code to correct the tax roll for 2002. After a hearing, the board dismissed the motion
without considering its merits because C.I.T. failed to timely pay the 2002 taxes.
        C.I.T. sued the district to correct the 2002 tax roll by eliminating the aircraft. The district filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of the suit on the sole ground that C.I.T. had failed to comply with section 42.08 of the Texas Property Tax Code because it did not timely pay the taxes on the property. C.I.T. did not file a response to the plea, but did file a motion for summary judgment. The plea and motion were set for a hearing on the same day. On that day, the trial court heard arguments on the plea first and granted the plea, precluding any need to determine the summary judgment motion.
        We review the trial court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction, including its construction of pertinent statutes, de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998); Cooke County Tax Appraisal Dist. v. Teel, 129 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet. ) We consider only the pleadings and evidence relevant to the question of jurisdiction and do not look to the merits of the case. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). The plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
        Under the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, failure to comply with the administrative review procedures of the tax code to their fullest extent precludes judicial review. Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Fund Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 470 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied). This requirement is jurisdictional. Id.
        Under the tax code, a taxpayer is entitled to appeal a determination of an appraisal review board on a motion filed under section 25.25 by filing a petition with the district court. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.01(1)(B), 42.21 (Vernon 2001). Section 25.25 of the tax code allows the appraisal review board to change the appraisal roll at any time during a five-year period to correct clerical errors that affect a property owner's liability for a tax imposed in that tax year. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.25(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2007). A property owner who files a motion, however, must comply with the payment requirements of section 42.08 or forfeit the right to a final determination of the motion. Id. at § 25.25(e). Section 42.08 requires a property owner to pay, before the delinquency date, the lesser of (1) the amount of taxes due on the portion of the taxable value of the property that is not in dispute or (2) the amount of taxes due on the property under the order from which the appeal is taken. Id. at § 42.08.
        In its plea to the jurisdiction, the appraisal district asserted that C.I.T. failed to comply with the prepayment requirement by the delinquency date. Attached to the petition was the affidavit of the manager of the Dallas County Tax Ofice, who averred that the property was listed under Account Number 99N323JH000000000; the assessed value of the property was $10,340,000; and no tax payment was made before the February 1, 2003 delinquency date. The appraisal district contended that by failing to pay the taxes by the deadline, C.I.T. failed to meet the statute's jurisdictional requirement.
        C.I.T. does not dispute that it did not timely prepay the taxes. Rather, it asserts, as it did in its petition and below at the hearing, that it complied or substantially complied with the statute because it was disputing “the entire amount of taxes allegedly due on the Aircraft for the year 2002” and consequently was not required to “prepay any taxes” under section 42.08. (The appraisal district did not address this issue in its brief to this Court.)
        Section 42.08 clearly requires a property owner to pay the lesser of (1) the undisputed amount of taxes due or (2) the amount due under an order from which the appeal is taken. Here, C.I.T.'s petition alleged that it was disputing the entire amount of taxes. Thus, given the allegations in the petition, the amount of taxes “not in dispute” is zero. Consequently, C.I.T.'s failure to prepay taxes could not constitute a violation of section 42.08. That C.I.T. paid the full amount of the taxes late does not alter this analysis.
        We conclude that, based on the plain wording of the statute and C.I.T.'s pleadings in this case, the trial court erred in dismissing C.I.T.'s lawsuit for want of jurisdiction. Our opinion is based solely on the argument presented and we expressly do not decide any issues raised in C.I.T.'s motion for summary judgment or the appraisal district's response to the motion. We sustain the sole issue.
        We reverse the trial court's order granting the plea to the jurisdiction and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MOLLY FRANCIS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
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