JOHN E. BELL AND/OR ALL OCCUPANTS, Appellants v. MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. AND OCWEN LOAN SERVICING LLC, Appellees

AFFIRMED; Opinion issued March 28, 2007
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-06-00427-CV
............................
JOHN E. BELL AND/OR ALL OCCUPANTS, Appellants
V.
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.
AND OCWEN LOAN SERVICING LLC, Appellees
 
.............................................................
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 003-579-06
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Whittington, Francis, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Whittington
        In twenty-three issues, John E. Bell appeals the trial court's judgment awarding possession of the property at issue to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        Appellant was the record title owner of the property located at 3201 Sherrye Drive in Plano. After appellant defaulted on the note securing the property, the first lien-holder foreclosed, selling the real property at a substitute trustee's sale. Appellees acquired the property, but appellant refused to vacate the premises. Appellees then filed a forcible detainer suit in justice court. The justice court judge awarded possession to appellees. Appellant filed an appeal with the county court at law and filed a separate suit in district court seeking to have the foreclosure set aside. Following a trial de novo, the county court at law judge awarded possession of the property to appellees. Appellant then filed this appeal.
        In his first three issues, appellant contends the justice court and county court at law lacked jurisdiction over this case. Appellant first argues that appellees failed to establish that a landlord- tenant relationship existed. He then argues jurisdiction rests with the district court because the issue “necessarily involve[d] the determination of title of property.”
        The record contains a copy of the original deed of trust, signed by appellant and admitted at trial as Exhibit 3. The deed of trust provides that if the property is sold by the lender following appellant's default, appellant “shall immediately surrender possession of the Property to the Purchaser . . . If possession is not surrendered, [appellant] shall be a tenant at sufferance and may be removed by writ of possession or other court proceeding.” Thus, appellees' evidence established a landlord-tenant relationship. We overrule appellant's first issue.
        Regarding the remainder of appellant's jurisdictional argument, appellees filed suit for possession of the property. They did not seek to adjudicate title of the property. “The procedure to determine the right to immediate possession of real property . . . is an action of forcible detainer.” Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). “Jurisdiction of forcible detainer actions is expressly given to the justice court of the precinct where the property is located and, on appeal, to county courts for a trial de novo.” Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 708. The justice court had jurisdiction over appellees' forcible detainer suit, and the county court at law had jurisdiction over the appeal of the case. See Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 708-09. We overrule appellant's second and third issues.
        In his fourth and fifth issues, appellant complains of hearsay testimony allowed at trial. In his fourth issue, appellant's complaint on appeal-that appellees failed to authenticate the documents-does not comport with the general hearsay objection made at trial. See Clark v. Walker-Kurth Lumber Co., 689 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“A general hearsay objection does not preserve for appeal a challenge to a proper predicate's being made to admit business records.”) Therefore, he has waived this issue. Similarly, in appellant's fifth issue complaining of appellees' counsel's testimony at trial, appellant claims appellees' trial counsel failed to testify under oath. Appellant's objection at trial, however, was “hearsay.” Because appellant's complaint here does not comport with his objection below, we conclude he waived error, if any. See Rogers v. Stell, 835 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Tex. 1992). We overrule appellant's fourth and fifth issues.
        In his sixth, seventh, ninth, fourteenth, twenty-first, twenty-second, and twenty-third issues, appellant argues (i) the trial judge violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by forcing appellant to testify, (ii) the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's judgment, (iii) his confrontation rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), were violated, (iv) the writ of possession was defective and its execution conflicted with federal and state law, (v) “the trial court violated the Rules Enabling Act” in its procedure in this case, (vi) the trial judge abused his discretion in ruling on appellant's motion for new trial before appellees filed a response and that the denial of his motion for new trial “without giving any explanation is reversible court error,” and (vii)
his rights “were violated in more ways [than] the violations mentioned [in previous issues].”
        The failure to adequately brief an issue effects a waiver of that issue on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h); Gen. Servs. Comm'n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 n.1 (Tex. 2001); Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284-85 (Tex. 1994); see also Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (failure to provide substantive analysis waives issue on appeal). Rule 38.1(h) requires both citation to authority and substantive analysis in regard to an issue; the failure to either cite authority or advance substantive analysis waives the issue on appeal. Huey, 200 S.W.3d at 854; see McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 682 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (appellant failed to adequately brief ground when he offered no legal analysis and cited only generally to law). Because appellant cites only generally to legal authority in support of his arguments and because he completely fails to advance substantive analysis under these points, we conclude he has waived these issues on appeal. We overrule appellant's sixth, seventh, ninth, fourteenth, twenty-first, and twenty-third issues.
        In his eighth issue, appellant argues that because he received inadequate notice of trial, he was unable to request a jury trial in the county court at law. Generally, a request for a jury trial must be made in writing and “not less than thirty days in advance” of trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 216. Nevertheless, when compliance with rule 216 is made impossible by the trial court's failure to give the forty-five-day notice required by civil procedure rule 245, “the jury demand will be deemed timely.” In re V.R.W., 41 S.W.3d 183, 195 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (citing Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Abbott, 863 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied)), disapproved of on other grounds by In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 267 (Tex. 2002).
        In this case, the record does not reflect that the trial judge was aware appellant intended to request a jury trial in the county court at law. Appellant did not file a request for a jury trial. He did not file a motion for continuance requesting a jury trial, nor did he object at trial that he was deprived of a jury trial. See Martin v. Black, 909 S.W.2d 192, 198 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (objection by trial counsel at enforcement proceeding was sufficient to preserve error on appellant's complaint that she was deprived of jury trial); Browning v. Holloway, 620 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas) (plaintiffs preserved issue for appellate review when they strenuously objected to proceeding specifically on grounds that they were denied their right to trial by jury), writ ref'd n.r.e., 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981) (per curiam). Because appellant did not inform the trial judge, by written motion or otherwise, that he wanted a jury trial, we cannot conclude the trial judge erred in setting the case for a nonjury trial. We overrule appellant's eighth issue.
        In his tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth issues, appellant complains (i) the trial judge erred in ordering that appellees could seek writ of possession within six days of the judgment date because that decreased the amount of time appellant had for filing a supersedeas bond, (ii) the trial court clerks abused their discretion and duty by failing to accept appellant's cash deposit, and (iii) the trial judge abused his discretion in not fixing an amount of supersedeas bond.
        Regarding his first complaint, the property code provides that a “writ of possession may not be issued before the sixth day after the date on which the judgment for possession is rendered.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.0061(b) (Vernon 2000). In this case, the judgment was rendered March 24, 2006; thus, a writ of possession could not issue before March 30, 2006. The judgment provides that appellees “may seek writ of possession on March 30, 2006.” The date set by the judgment conforms to the mandate of the property code. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.0061(b). Nevertheless, appellant claims this prevented him from filing a supersedeas bond within ten days of the date of judgment as provided by section 24.007 of the property code. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.007 (Vernon 2000). We disagree. Although appellees could have sought a writ of possession on March 30, 2006, the record reflects they did not do so until April 4, 2006. The writ did not issue until April 6, 2006. Thus, appellant had more than ten days in which to request the trial judge set a supersedeas amount and to file a supersedeas bond. With respect to his remaining arguments, we note that appellant did not file a motion requesting that a supersedeas bond amount be set. Because appellant did not request a supersedeas bond amount be set, we cannot conclude the trial judge erred in not doing so. See Underwood v. Clark, 103 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, no writ) (judge sets amount of supersedeas bond “at the request of defendants”). Finally, we note that although the clerks could accept a cash deposit in lieu of supersedeas bond, the amount of the cash “deposit must be in the amount” set by the trial judge. See Tex. R. App. P. 24.1(c)(1)(A), 24.1(c)(2), 24.2(a). Thus, the clerks could only accept appellant's deposit after the trial judge set the supersedeas bond amount. We overrule appellant's tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth issues.
        In his fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth issues, appellant contends (i) the written demand for possession did not comply with section 24.002 of the property code, see Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.002(b) (Vernon 2000), and (ii) his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution were violated when he and his family were evicted from the property. See U. S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 19. In his twentieth issue, appellant raises numerous complaints regarding purported deficiencies in the eviction notice, appellees' original petition, appellees' brief in support of petition for forcible detainer, and appellees' response to appellant's request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
        As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show the complaining party timely requested, objected, or moved for relief and that the trial judge ruled or refused to rule on said request, objection, or motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). In most instances, an appellate complaint cannot be reviewed unless the same, specific complaint was first made in the trial court. See City of San Antonio v. Schautteet, 706 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex. 1986); McCain v. NME Hosps., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ); Pojar v. Cifre, 199 S.W.3d 317, 327 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied). Requiring parties to raise complaints at trial conserves judicial resources by giving trial judges the opportunity to correct an error before an appeal proceeds. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Tex. 2003) (citing In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Tex. 1999)). This promotes fairness among litigants by not allowing a party to “waive, consent to, or neglect to complain about an error at trial and then surprise his opponent on appeal by stating his complaint for the first time.” In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d at 350 (quoting Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam)).
        The complaints raised in appellant's fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth issues were not presented to the trial judge. Rather, they are raised for the first time on appeal. Because appellant did not complain of these issues below, we conclude these issues have been waived. We overrule appellant's fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth issues.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MARK WHITTINGTON
                                                          JUSTICE
 
060427F.P05