RUPERT M. POLLARD, Appellant v. MATTHEW R. POLLARD, INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARIE A. MERKEL, DECEASED, Appellee

DISMISSED; Opinion Filed May 10, 2007.
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-06-00375-CV
............................
RUPERT M. POLLARD, Appellant
V.
MATTHEW R. POLLARD, INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF MARIE A. MERKEL, DECEASED, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 05-375-P3(A)
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, O'Neill, and Mazzant
Opinion By Justice Moseley
        Rupert M. Pollard appeals from a probate court order denying his motion for show cause order filed in a declaratory judgment action pending in the probate proceeding. The background of the case and the proceedings below are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We conclude the order is not a final judgment or an appealable order and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
        This case arises out of a probate action in which Pollard filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that he was stilled married to Marie A. Merkel at the time of her death. Pollard claims a community property interest in a house on Beverly Drive that is part of the estate. After filing the declaratory judgment action, Pollard filed a motion for a temporary injunction to enjoin the independent executor from selling the Beverly Drive property and from obtaining signed documents from Pollard requesting a pay off of federal tax liens. In addition, Pollard filed a notice of lis pendens regarding his claims to the Beverly Drive property. We affirmed the trial court's order denying the temporary injunction in a separate interlocutory appeal. See In re Estate of Merkel, No. 05-06-00045-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 6, 2006, no pet.).
        Pollard also filed a motion for show case order seeking to compel the independent executor to appear and show cause why a deed to the Beverly Drive property executed by Pollard to Merkel in connection with their divorce proceedings should not be released, canceled, and declared void. Pollard seeks to appeal the probate court's order denying this motion.
        The question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal, and may be raised by the court if not raised by the parties. See Texas Assn. of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). Courts always have jurisdiction to determine their own subject matter jurisdiction. Camacho v. Samaniego, 831 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1992); Dolenz v. Vail, 200 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). “The 'jurisdiction' to determine jurisdiction is the inherent authority of a court to decide whether documents filed with it invoke its jurisdiction.” Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 209 n. 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
        Normally, parties may appeal only from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Probate orders are an exception to the one final judgment rule because multiple judgments may be rendered on certain discrete issues. See De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006). However, not all interlocutory orders in probate cases are appealable. Id.; see also Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 5(g) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (“All final orders of any court exercising original probate jurisdiction shall be appealable to the courts of appeals.”) (emphasis added). The supreme court has adopted the following test for determining jurisdiction over probate orders:
 
If there is an express statute, such as the one for the complete heirship judgment, declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may logically be considered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory.
 
Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995); see also Art Inst. of Chicago v. Integral Hedging, L.P., 129 S.W.3d 564, 571 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Courts are to consider whether the probate order disposes of all parties and issues in a particular phase of the proceedings or sets the stage for further proceedings to resolve the issues. See De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 579.
        There is no statute authorizing an appeal of an order denying a motion for show cause order. The order does not purport to be a final judgment and does not dispose of all issues and parties in a particular phase of the probate proceedings. See id. The order does not end the declaratory judgment action-which the parties agree is still pending; it merely sets the stage for further proceedings to resolve the disputes. See id. We conclude the order is interlocutory and not appealable.
        Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
JIM MOSELEY
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICE
 
 
 
 
 
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