CEDRIC DEMON BROOKINS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion filed December 20, 1989.
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-89-00277-CR
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CEDRIC DEMON BROOKINS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
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On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F89-69807-LV
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OPINION PER CURIAM
Before Justices McClung, Lagarde and Ovard
        Cedric Demon Brookins was convicted in a trial before the court of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The trial court assessed punishment at forty-five years' confinement. In his sole point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he intended to deliver the cocaine he possessed. We disagree. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
        Officer Dennis Davis testified that he had brought his patrol car to a stop at a stop sign when he saw appellant standing on the sidewalk, leading a blind man. He made eye contact with appellant and then saw appellant reach behind his back with one hand. He opened his hand and dropped a tin foil ball. The officer got out of his car and stopped appellant. After patting him down and placing him in the squad car, Officer Davis retrieved the foil ball. He unwrapped it and found five baggies, each containing one "rock" of crack cocaine.
        Officer Davis testified that he was familiar with the area where he arrested appellant and that it was a high-traffic drug dealing area. It was typical for drug dealers in the area to be out on the sidewalk selling to people in cars passing by. The crack cocaine found in the foil package was individually packaged in the manner that crack cocaine is sold on the street. In prior conversations with appellant, appellant had told Officer Davis that he did not use drugs and Officer Davis believed him. Because appellant was not a user and because of the quantity of cocaine found, Officer Davis was of the opinion that he was going to sell the drugs.
        Investigator Harns testified that he has been a police officer for ten years and with the narcotics unit for four and one-half years. He was familiar with the area where appellant was arrested and knew it to be a high-traffic drug area. It was common for dealers to sell out on the streets. These dealers typically do not carry a large quantity of drugs; dealers have told him they carry small amounts so that it is easier to get rid of when the police are spotted, they do not take as large a loss if they get rid of it upon seeing the police, and if they are caught they will not have an aggravated amount and so will avoid prison. Typically, street dealers will have only four or five bags with them.
        Investigator Harns further testified that the rocks of crack cocaine found in the foil packet dropped by appellant were in baggies typically used to package cocaine for sale. The street value of each of the baggies was $20.00. A user would not bag up each rock individually; the individual packaging indicated that they were for sale. Investigator Harns testified that he had known appellant for two years and knew him through crack cocaine sales. In the past six months he has noticed that appellant is wearing more expensive clothes and wearing gold chains and rings. He was not aware that appellant had any legitimate employment.
        Appellant testified that he did not know anything about the foil package found by the police. He worked at Wendy's and also did yard work. He denied that he wore expensive clothes; his mother bought his clothes. His girlfriends bought him the gold jewelry. Appellant stated that he was currently on probation for possession of cocaine.
        Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of possession. Instead, he argues that the State failed to prove his intent to deliver the drug beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant relies upon Turner v. State, 681 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App. -- Dallas 1984, pet. ref'd), to argue that the evidence is insufficient because the evidence raises the reasonable inference that he had just purchased the drugs for personal use. The standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Marroquin v. State, 746 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Garrett v. State, 682 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985).
        When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed: 1) Officer Davis saw appellant drop the foil ball containing crack cocaine; 2) appellant was found in an area well known to the police as a place for dealing drugs; 3) the cocaine was packaged for sale, and a user would not have the five rocks separated in that manner; 4) it was typical for drug dealers to be carrying four or five baggies of cocaine; 5) appellant was known to the police because of former crack cocaine sales; 6) appellant told a police officer that he did not use drugs and the officer believed him; 7) appellant's dress and jewelry showed affluence but he had no known source of legitimate income. In addition to this evidence, appellant denied possession of the drug. He now urges that he possessed the drug with intent to consume it himself. These assertions are inconsistent. While the mere denial of possession does not constitute a showing of intent to deliver, appellant's denial of possession in the case is inconsistent with the inference that he possessed the drug for personal use. See Hawkins v. State, 687 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tex. App. -- Dallas 1985, pet. ref'd).
        This case is distinguishable from Turner, the case relied upon by appellant. In Turner, the facts were as consistent with the inference of purchase for personal use as they were with the inference of possession with intent to deliver. The State failed to produce any evidence tending to show that Turner was not a user. The court therefore held that the two hypotheses were equally reasonable, and that a trier of fact could not find the element of intent to deliver beyond a reasonable doubt. Turner, 681 S.W.2d at 850. In the case at bar, however, the State introduced evidence that appellant was not a user. Thus, there was evidence that supported the inference of intent to deliver and that refuted the hypothesis of possession for personal use. See Hawkins, 687 S.W.2d at 49-50.
        We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the element of intent to deliver beyond a reasonable doubt.
        Appellant's point of error is overruled and the trial court's judgment if affirmed.
                                                          PER CURIAM
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
 
 
 
File Date[12-20-89]
File Name[890277F]