DWIGHT EDGAR BROWN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Affirmed and Opinion filed November 13, 1989.
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-88-01181-CR
............................
DWIGHT EDGAR BROWN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
.................................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F88-83689-VTH
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O P I N I O N
Before Justices Stewart, Lagarde and Burnett
Opinion By Justice Lagarde
        Dwight Edgar Brown appeals his second degree felony conviction for burglary of a vehicle. The court found one of two enhancement paragraphs in the indictment to be true and sentenced appellant to twenty years in the Texas Department of Corrections. In two points of error, appellant complains that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court committed error in overruling appellant's objection to the prosecutor's improper argument. We overrule appellant's points and affirm the judgment.
        The indictment charged appellant with knowingly and intentionally breaking and entering a vehicle without the consent of the owner, Jimmy Rodgers, with intent to commit theft. At trial, Rodgers, a distribution supervisor for TUElectric, testified that on May 13, 1988, he attended a work-related safety meeting to discuss a gray vehicle that had been seen around the TUElectric premises the day before. Another topic at the meeting concerned recent thefts of copper wire from TU service vehicles. As Rodgers left the meeting, he noticed a gray truck pulling up beside a TU truck and material trailer assembly.
        Rodgers testified that he saw appellant exit the gray truck, jump on the TU trailer, and take a roll of copper wire in each hand. Rodgers yelled at appellant to get off the truck and to leave the wire alone. Rodgers stated that appellant then got off the trailer, threw the wire in the back of the gray pickup truck, and jumped in the passenger side of the truck, which then drove away. Rodgers testified that appellant did not step into the trailer, but stood on an outside step and reached into the trailer to obtain the wire. Rodgers stated that as a supervisor, he had custody of the truck and had a greater right to possession of the TU truck than appellant. He did not give appellant consent to either enter the trailer or take the wire. Rodgers noted the gray truck's license plate number and later identified appellant from a photograph spread. Patricia Herndon, a dispatch clerk for TUElectric, testified that she was not close enough to identify the person who took the wire, but she did see a person near the TU truck. She saw the person's head, and she saw the person's arm pull the wire off the truck.
        Appellant concedes that the evidence establishes that a theft occurred; however, he argues that the evidence fails to establish a burglary of a vehicle. Appellant was indicted for violation of section 30.04 of the Texas Penal Code which, in pertinent part, reads:
Burglary of Vehicles
         (a) A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he breaks into or enters a vehicle or any part of a vehicle with intent to commit any felony or theft.
 
         (b) For purposes of this section, "enter" means to intrude:
 
             (1) any part of the body; or
 
             (2) any physical object connected with the body.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.04 (Vernon 1974). The practice commentary to this section notes "[this section] serves only to make felons of thieves, even though the loss they inflict is not otherwise sufficient to justify felony treatment, if they are so unfortunate or uninformed that they steal or attempt to steal from a vehicle." FN:1
        Entry of the vehicle stands as an essential element of the burglary of a vehicle offense. Grant v. State, 647 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. App.--Austin 1983, no pet.). While the charge defined both "entry" and "break", appellant notes that case law has long held that when entry is alleged, entry includes "break" or "breaking into." See Landry v. State, 653 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). In this case, the definition in the charge for "enter" tracked the previously quoted statutory language of section 30.04(b).
        Appellant cites Love v. State as support for his argument that he did not enter the vehicle. Love v. State, 744 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd). In Love, police arrested appellant while he was in possession of some stolen hubcaps. The appellant challenged his conviction under section 30.04, arguing that no entry of the vehicle occurred. The appellate court agreed that the State failed to prove a burglarious entry. Id. at 249. That court concluded that the mere removal of wheel covers, absent proof of penetration of the vehicle's interior, did not constitute burglary. Id.
        In reliance on Love, appellant says that a theft from a flat bed truck, by reaching over the side board to grasp the wire, does not constitute an entry into the vehicle's interior. We disagree. The back of a pickup truck is part of a vehicle. See Coleman v. State, 608 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (holding that the appellant entered a pickup truck by intruding his entire body into the truck bed); see also Faggett v. State, 673 S.W.2d 700, 701-02 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1984, pet. ref'd) (holding that trespassory entry occurred when the appellant entered the back of a Goodwill donations trailer without effective consent from the owner). We hold that an equipment trailer attached to a truck is a vehicle which can be entered when the accused intrudes any part of his body into the trailer.
        Appellant, while admitting theft, claims that he did not burglarize the TU truck because insufficient evidence exists to show that he entered the vehicle. FN:2 Because appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the crime's essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Faggett, 673 S.W.2d at 702. We initially note that the fact finder weighs the evidence and reaches a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The appellate court ensures the rationality of the fact finders, allowing a verdict to stand unless it is unsupported, or irrationally supported, by a mere modicum of evidence. Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
        While the record reflects no exhibits depicting the trailer, testimony indicates that a sideboard partially enclosed the trailer which also had steps on either side, allowing workers to climb over the sideboard into the trailer bed. The front of the trailer had racks which contained the copper wire coils.
        On cross-examination, Rodgers testified that he did not see appellant break into the trailer. Rodgers testified that he understood the term "break into", which has a common, nonspecialized meaning. Landry, 653 S.W.2d at 29. Rodgers also stated that he never saw appellant enter the trailer; however, enter does have a statutorily defined meaning which was not given to Rodgers during his cross-examination. Rodgers' testimony elsewhere supports the State's contention that appellant did enter or intrude his arm and hand into the trailer. Later, on cross-examination the following exchange took place:
        RODGERS: On these trailers, we have steps on either side where we can step up on that step and get over. Like I say, there's a side board on the trailer approximately this high (indicating) . . . .
 
        APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY: Okay.
 
        RODGERS: . . . so that we can step up on the step over into the bed of the trailer. [Appellant] was up on the step at that time, reaching over in like that (demonstrating).
(Emphasis added).
        The dispatcher, Herndon, also testified that she saw a person on the truck and that she saw this person's arm pulling wire off the truck. Rodgers testified that the wire was on the racks which were located inside the trailer near the front. We hold that after viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential element of entry beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.
        Appellant also contends that the court improperly overruled appellant's objection to the prosecutor's improper argument. In his closing, the prosecutor stated:
                The evidence you are basing your verdict on is the evidence that's been sworn to; not speculation and conjecture. That's your oath as jurors; to base your verdict on the evidence. The evidence has been clear in this case. You're not going to find a better man than Jimmy Rogers, and if he is considered an incredible and unbelievable witness, then all crime can just run rampant.
        Appellant objected to this argument on the grounds that it improperly bolstered Rodger's testimony. Permissible subjects for jury arguments relate to summation of or deduction from the evidence, pleas for law enforcement, and answer to arguments of opposing council. Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Bolstering the credibility of a witness with a closing argument, which is unsworn testimony, constitutes error. Menefee v. State, 614 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The State did attempt to bolster Rodger's credibility, and appellant preserved error by objecting. However, such error was harmless because the State had previously made the same bolstering argument during closing without objection from appellant. FN:3 See Thompson v. State, 537 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
        Furthermore, appellant attacked Rodgers' credibility at length during his closing arguments. While it is improper for a prosecutor to vouch for a witness's credibility, if the argument was in reply to appellant's, then reversible error was not committed. Chapman v. State, 503 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The State vouched for Rodgers' credibility after appellant attacked that credibility. It appears that appellant invited the State's argument; therefore, we do not reverse. Appellant's second point of error is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          SUE LAGARDE
                                                          JUSTICE
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90
881181F
 
FN:1 Searcy & Patterson, Practice Commentory, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.04 (Vernon 1974).
FN:2 Appellant does not dispute that the trailer, attached to the truck, constitutes a vehicle. A vehicle is defined as "[e]very mechanical device, in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including motor vehicles, commercial motor vehicles, truck-tractors, trailers, and semi-trailers, severally, as hereinafter defined, but excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks." Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6704d-11 § 1(1). Cf. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701d-11 § 1(2).
FN:3 The prosecution argued, without objection, as follows:
        
        You have the actual witnesses that were there, from the stand, telling you what happened, and there's no inconsistency in what they told you from the stand, and I submit to you that you're not going to find a more credible man and a more honest man than Mr. Jimmy Rogers, and he's worked out there for 36 years. And what did he tell you?
File Date[11-13-89]
File Name[881181F]