MICHAEL ROBERT O'GRADY,FROM A DISTRICT COURT APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT DALLAS
 
NO. 05-88-00376-CR
 
MICHAEL ROBERT O'GRADY,FROM A DISTRICT COURT
 
        APPELLANT,
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
 
        APPELLEE.OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
 
 
BEFORE JUSTICES HOWELL, OVARD AND THOMAS
OPINION BY JUSTICE OVARD
JUNE 27, 1989
 
         Michael O'Grady appeals his jury conviction for murder. The jury assessed punishment at fifteen years' confinement. In his sole point of error, O'Grady contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the trial court's charge on O'Grady's defense of a third person. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
        At 10:00 p.m., on March 31, 1985, a City of Dallas police officer responded to a telephone call from Zelta Campbell. Upon arriving at Campbell's condominium, the officer found O'Grady standing at the top of a stairway holding two handguns. John Alsip's body lay on the bottom steps of the stairway. Alsip died from six gunshot wounds, inflicted by O'Grady. At the time of the shooting, Campbell, who had lived with Alsip previously, lived with O'Grady.
        At trial, testimony was presented that Alsip had repeatedly threatened O'Grady and Campbell. On March 31, Alsip threatened to kill O'Grady and Campbell at Campbell's condominium. O'Grady presented a theory of defense that he killed Alsip in self-defense and in defense of Campbell.
        In his sole point of error, O'Grady contends that the trial court erred in overruling his written objection to the charge on defense of a third person requiring that one must retreat. The charge was presented to the jury as follows:
                You are instructed that under our law a person is justified in using force or deadly force against another to protect a third person if, under the circumstances as he reasonably believes them to be, such person would be justified, as set out above, in using force or deadly force to protect himself against the unlawful force or deadly force of another which he reasonably believes to be threatening the third person he seeks to protect, provided he also reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person.
 
                Therefore, even if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of John Hubert Alsip, Jr. by shooting John Hubert Alsip, Jr. with a handgun, as alleged, but you further believe from the evidence, or you have reasonable doubt thereof, that at the time he did so, the defendant reasonably believed that John Hubert Alsip, Jr. was using or attempting to use unlawful deadly force against Zelta Campbell and that he reasonably believed that the use of force and the degree of force used were immediately necessary to protect Zelta Campbell against John Hubert Alsip, Jr.'s use or attempted use of deadly force, and that a reasonable person in the situation of Zelta Campbell would not have retreated, you will find the defendant not guilty (emphasis added).
At trial, O'Grady's counsel objected to the words, "and that a reasonable person in the situation of Zelta Campbell, would not have retreated." O'Grady argues, on appeal, that the language regarding the defense of a third person should have focused on his reasonable belief that a person in Campbell's situation would not have retreated, not on the belief of a reasonable person. See Hughes v. State, 719 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
        The trial court is required to fully instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. TEX. R. CRIM. APP. P. ANN. art. 36.14 (Vernon 1988). A written objection to the charge shall distinctly specify the ground of objection. Id. This includes errors claimed to be committed in the charge as well as omitted from the charge. Id. A general objection to the charge is insufficient unless the ground for objection is obvious. Vaughn v. State, 607 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex. 1980).
        We hold that O'Grady's written objection to the charge at trial was not sufficiently specific. We are unable to ascertain whether his objection was to the improper inclusion of the words "and that a reasonable person in the situation of Zelta Campbell would not have retreated," or to the improper omission of words emphasizing O'Grady's reasonable belief. A general objection is equivalent to no objection. McGowan v. State, 664 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). We conclude that O'Grady's objection was too general and did not notify the trial court of a specific error. Consequently, we view it as no objection.
        Where there is no objection to the charge, a reversal will only be had if the error in the charge was egregious and the error created such harm that appellant did not receive a fair and impartial trial. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). We will assume, without deciding, that the charge was erroneous. We now consider whether O'Grady has shown that he was egregiously harmed. For this analysis, we assay actual harm in light of the entire jury charge, state of the evidence, contested issues, arguments of counsel, and any other relevant information reached by the record as a whole. Id. at 171.
        The trial court did not include words in the charge about O'Grady's reasonable belief immediately preceeding the words, "a reasonable person in the situation of Zelta Campbell would not have retreated." The charge did, however, twice direct the jury to view the circumstances of the defense of a third person from the point of view of O'Grady's reasonable belief. This could be construed to require the jury to consider all aspects of O'Grady's defense of a third person from his reasonable belief. O'Grady's counsel argued to the jury, without objection, that defense of a third person is viewed from O'Grady's standpoint alone. He emphasized this by arguing that "she [the trial judge] keeps saying that time, after time, after time." The charge did not require nor imply that O'Grady personally retreat before invoking his defense of a third person.
        The evidence shows that O'Grady shot Alsip six times. Alsip did not exhibit a firearm or deadly weapon at the time of the offense. O'Grady and Campbell were not injured during the incident. The State did not argue that O'Grady or Campbell had a responsibility to retreat.
        Upon reading the record, we conclude that O'Grady was afforded a fair trial and he did not suffer egregious harm due to the trial court's failure to specifically focus O'Grady's reasonable belief on Zelta Campbell's responsibility to retreat. O'Grady's sole point of error is overruled.
        The judgment is affirmed.
                                                  
                                                  JOHN OVARD
                                                  JUSTICE
 
 
 
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90
88-00376.F
 
 
 
 
File Date[01-02-89]
File Name[880376]