Ryan O'Neal Jones v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 203rd District Court of Dallas County

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

RYAN O=NEAL JONES,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee.

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No. 08-03-00166-CR

Appeal from the

203rd District Court

of Dallas County, Texas

(TC#F-0273413-NP)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ryan O=Neal Jones was indicted for forgery. He entered an open plea of guilty and was convicted and sentenced by the trial court to two years= confinement. We affirm.

Procedural Background

At the plea hearing, the trial court admonished Jones, both orally and in writing, of his right to a jury trial, the range of punishment for the offense, and the consequences of pleading guilty. The court asked Jones a series of questions to determine whether his plea was knowing and voluntary. A judicial confession was admitted into evidence. Jones then testified in support of his request for probation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated, A[T]he court finds that your waiver of right to a jury trial, your plea of guilty and your signed written Judicial Confession have all been freely and voluntarily made . . . [and] that you are mentally competent to enter your plea. The court finds you guilty on your plea . . . .@ The court then proceeded to sentence Jones. The written judgment of conviction states that Jones=s plea Awas accepted by the court.@

Acceptance of the Plea

On appeal, Jones argues that his sentence is void because the trial judge did not expressly accept his plea before sentencing him. He relies on article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That statute requires the trial court to give the defendant certain admonishments A[p]rior to accepting a plea of guilty@ and provides that A[n]o plea of guilty . . . shall be accepted by the court unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary.@ Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). Jones infers from this language that a trial court must expressly state in open court that it accepts a defendant=s plea.

Although the statutory language indicates that the trial court=s acceptance of a plea is part of the plea process, the language does not require that the trial court expressly state its acceptance of the plea. Jones does not cite any cases holding that a trial court must expressly state its acceptance of a defendant=s plea or that the trial court=s failure to do so renders a sentence void. Nor does Jones cite any policy or interest that would be advanced by requiring the trial court to state that it accepts a plea.

We decline to adopt Jones=s interpretation of article 26.13. Cf. Watson v. State, 974 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, pet. ref=d) (holding that a trial judge=s finding of guilt does not have to be Aexplicitly verbalized@). In this case, the trial court obviously accepted Jones=s plea when it stated, AThe court finds you guilty on your plea . . . .@

Conclusion

Jones=s issue on appeal is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

SUSAN LARSEN, Justice

June 10, 2004

Before Panel No. 1

Larsen, McClure, and Chew, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)