Dion Jones v. Melissa Rodriguez, et al.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
AT NASHVILLE
September 27, 2010 Session
DION JONES v. MELISSA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Rutherford County
No. 04-8814-WC
J. Mark Rogers, Judge
No. M2010-00366-WC-R3-WC - Mailed - January 26, 2011
Filed - April 12, 2011
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been
referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of
findings of fact and conclusions of law. After the employee sustained an on the job injury,
she sued her employer for workers’ compensation benefits. She alleged that her employer
was a subcontractor for the principal contractor but she sued only the employer, not the
principal contractor. Nearly two years later, the employee requested and received the trial
court’s permission to amend her complaint to add the principal contractor as a
defendant. The principal contractor filed a motion to dismiss based upon the expiration of
the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion. After a trial, the trial
court awarded the employee judgement for workers’ compensation benefits against the
employer. The employee appealed, contending that the trial court erred by granting the
principal contractor’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e) (2008) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery
Court Affirmed
S HARON G. L EE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J ON K ERRY B LACKWOOD,
S R. J., and J ERRI S. B RYANT, S P. J., joined.
Marshall H. McClarnon and Donald D. Zuccarello, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant,
Dion Jones.
Stephen B. Morton and Brad Hearne, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Ole South
Properties, Inc.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Factual and Procedural Background
Ole South Properties (“Ole South”) contracted with Melissa Rodriguez, d/b/a Dove’s
Cleaning Service (“Employer”), to clean subdivision construction sites. Dion Jones
(“Employee”) was hired by Employer to work at the site. Employee alleges that she was
injured on June 16, 2003, and that her injuries arose out of and in the course of her
employment. She filed a lawsuit seeking workers’ compensation benefits on June 16, 2004,
naming Employer as the sole defendant. The lawsuit alleged that at the time of the injury
Employer had contracted with Ole South to perform cleanup services. Although Ole South’s
name, address, and the address of its registered agent were included in the complaint, Ole
South was not named as a defendant or served with process.
Employer filed an answer denying liability. On April 6, 2006, after two trial dates had
been postponed, Employee’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw because Employee had
terminated his services. Counsel was permitted to withdraw. Employee’s new counsel filed
a motion on April 28, 2006, seeking to amend the complaint to add Ole South as a defendant
to the lawsuit. An agreed order was entered allowing the amendment, and an amended
complaint against Ole South was filed on May 23, 2006 – nearly three years after the
injury. Ole South answered the amended complaint, and later filed a motion for summary
judgment asserting that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court
granted Ole South’s motion and dismissed the action as to Ole South. The trial court
subsequently granted Employee’s Tenn. R. App. P. 9 motion for an interlocutory appeal, and
same was denied by the Supreme Court. Employer filed a bankruptcy petition, which stayed
the proceedings, but the petition was ultimately dismissed. Counsel for Employer was
permitted to withdraw. When the case was eventually tried on January 6, 2010, Employer,
who was proceeding pro se and had no workers’ compensation insurance, did not
appear. The trial court awarded Employee 400 weeks of permanent disability benefits,
additional temporary total disability benefits, and open medical benefits. Employee appeals,
contending that the trial court erred by finding that her claim against Ole South was barred
by the statute of limitations.
Analysis
The issue presented is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Employee’s claim
against Ole South because the petition was not timely filed. Because this appeal presents a
question of law only, we review the trial court’s conclusions de novo with no presumption
of correctness. Gray v. Cullom Machine, Tool & Die, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tenn.
2004).
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On the date of Employee’s injury, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203(a)
(1999) provided that the right to receive workers’ compensation is barred unless notice
required by section 50-6-202 is given to the employer and suit is filed within one year after
the accident occurred. Employee’s injury occurred on June 16, 2003. Employer paid
Employee no workers’ compensation benefits. The motion to add Ole South as a defendant
was filed on April 28, 2006, granted on May 23, 2006, and the amended complaint was filed
on May 23, 2006.
Employee argues that the broad remedial purpose of the workers’ compensation act
supports the conclusion that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-113 and 50-6-203
should be construed together to protect workers from uninsured subcontractors. Employee
asserts that the one-year statute of limitations is tolled until the conclusion of proceedings
against the employer; that based on the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6113, an employer and general contractor are jointly and severally liable for any recovery by
the employee; that the general contractor is the guarantor for all workers’ compensation
claims brought against their subcontractors based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 506-113; and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113 makes the general contractor
the “employer at law” that is afforded all protections against tort liability as the employer
under workers’ compensation law, thereby making the general contractor the alter ego or
proxy of the employer. Thus, the argument goes, a timely suit against the employer satisfies
the requirement of a timely suit against the general contractor.
We disagree. The language of section 50-6-113 does not support Employee’s
position. The statute gives an employee who is injured while working for any of the
subcontractors of the principal, intermediate contractor or subcontractor the right to collect
benefits from a principal, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor to the same extent as the
immediate employer. The employee, however, cannot receive a double recovery and
recovery of full compensation from one employer bars recovery by the employee against any
others. The statute does not make the general contractor the “guarantor” of benefits for
claims against the subcontractor, nor does it make the general contractor the alter ego or
proxy of the employer. The statute does not indicate that suit need not be timely filed against
a general contractor by an employee who seeks benefits or that suit against only the
immediate employer is sufficient to expose the general contractor to liability. Employee cites
no authority and we are aware of no authority which supports her interpretation of section
50-6-113.
Employee also argues that the one-year limitation period contained in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-203(a) is not applicable to general contractors with liability to a
subcontractor’s injured employee under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113, but
that the ten-year limitation period under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-110 is
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applicable. She analogizes her situation to cases in which successful litigants seek to “pierce
the corporate veil” to collect a judgment from the owners of a corporation. Again, Employee
cites no Tennessee case applying this reasoning to section 50-6-113 liability and we are
aware of none. In our view, this argument amounts to a reconfiguration of Employee’s
unsuccessful assertion that a principal contractor is a guarantor of workers’ compensation
judgments obtained against its subcontractors.
Finally, Employee argues that she could not name Ole South as a defendant within the
limitation period because section 50-6-113(c) required her to bring suit against her immediate
employer as a prerequisite to suing Ole South. She argues that, because of that alleged
requirement, the statute implicitly suspends the limitation period as to intermediate and
principal contractors until her action against her immediate employer is concluded. Her
premise is incorrect. In P.H. Reynolds & Co. v. McKnight, 148 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Tenn.
1941), the Supreme Court held that section 113(c)’s requirement to first “present” a claim
to the immediate employer
relates to the notice and to the service of the notice. To the
preliminaries of suit on the claim, not to the suit itself. The principal
contractor and the subordinate contractors being by the statute made
liable ‘to the same extent’ as the immediate employer, . . . all of them
may be sued in the same action.
This section of the workers’ compensation law was more recently considered in Potts
v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01S01-9212-CH-00138, 1994 WL 30088 (Tenn. Feb. 7, 1994). In
that case, the insurer of a principal contractor contended that it was not liable because the
employee had failed to sue his immediate employer, a subcontractor. The Court held that the
subcontractor was not a necessary party, if the other conditions of section 50-6-113 were
satisfied. Id. at *3.
Employee was not barred from naming Ole South as a defendant in her original
complaint. Moreover, she was clearly aware of the existence of the contractual relationship
between her employer and Ole South and of its location and the identity of its registered
agent, because this information was contained in the complaint. Under the circumstances,
there is no factual or legal basis for her position. Employee failed to timely sue Ole South
and therefore, her claim is barred.
Ole South argues that this appeal is frivolous, and requests that sanctions be imposed
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122. In our discretion, we decline to do
so.
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Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are taxed to the Appellant, Dion
Jones, and her surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
_________________________________
SHARON G. LEE, JUSTICE
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
DION JONES v. MELISSA RODRIGUEZ ET AL.
Chancery Court for Rutherford County
No. 04-8814-WC
No. M2010-00366-SC-WCM-WC - Filed - April 12, 2011
JUDGMENT ORDER
This case is before the Court upon the motions for review filed by Dion Jones and Ole
South Properties pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(5)(A)(ii), the
entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Panel, and the Panel’s Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
It appears to the Court that the motions for review are not well-taken and are therefore
denied. The Panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated by
reference, are adopted and affirmed. The decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the
Court.
Costs are assessed to Dion Jones, and her surety, for which execution may issue if
necessary.
It is so ORDERED.
PER CURIAM
Sharon G. Lee, J., not participating
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