Williams vs. Sweetwater

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE SPECIAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL AT KNOXVILLE FILED MAY 29, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk SHIRLEY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff/Appellant v. SWEETWATER HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant/Appellee ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) MONROE CHANCERY NO. 03S01-9607--CH-00084 HON. EARL H. HENLEY, CHANCELLOR For the Appellant: For the Appellee: John W. Cleveland Cleveland & Cleveland 120 W. Morris Street Sweetwater, Tennessee 37874 Lynn C. Peterson Wimberly Lawson Norton & Luhn, PLLC P. O. Box 2467 Knoxville, Tennessee 37901-2467 M E M O R A ND U M O P I N I O N MAILED: MAY 29, 1997 Members of Panel: E. Riley Anderson, Justice John K. Byers, Senior Judge Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge AFFIRMED BYERS, Senior Judge This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff alleged a work-related aggravation of a pre-existing non-work-related back condition. She alleged that medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits had been paid by the employer but sought permanent partial disability, future medical expenses and discretionary costs. The trial court found that the temporary aggravation of her back condition had resolved with no permanent impairment and awarded no future benefits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, a registered nurse, injured her back at home in June, 1992. Dr. David Hauge, orthopedic surgeon, performed lumbar disk surgery at L4-L5 on November 19, 1992 and returned plaintiff to work the following January with lifting restrictions. Plaintiff alleged that on January 25, 1993, she re-injured her back while lifting a patient at work. Dr. Hauge placed her on temporary total disability for three weeks and treated her conservatively, after which she returned to work again. Dr. Hauge opined that 20 percent of patients who have disk surgery experience recurrent herniations of the same disk. There are various causes of such recurrences, some related to the surgery itself and some which are due to just normal activity. He could not state within reasonable medical certainty whether or not plaintiff s recurrent herniation was work-related. Dr. Hauge opined that the original, non-work-related injury resulted in eleven percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole: I would state that the 11% impairment to the body . . . is a result of the injury she sustained in June, 1992 and her subsequent surgery. The percentage impairment this patient has did not change as a result of the January, 1993 incident, although it certainly can be argued that she was much more likely to have an aggravation requiring medical treatment because of the existence of this previous problem. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the 2 record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN . § 50-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers compensation cases. Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMS, 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). Where, as in this case, the medical testimony is presented by deposition, this Court is able to make its own independent assessment of the medical proof to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. Cooper v. INA, 884 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. 1994). We have carefully reviewed the medical evidence, including the deposition and correspondence of Dr. Hauge, and we are persuaded that the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court s conclusion that the plaintiff sustained a temporary aggravation of a previous non-work-related injury with no increase in permanent partial disability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with costs assessed to the appellant. John K. Byers, Senior Judge CONCUR: E. Riley Anderson, Justice Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge 3 FILED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE JULY 11, 1997 SHIRLEY WILLIAMS. Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. SWEETWATER HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION Defendant/Appellee, ) Monroe Chancery Cecil Crowson, Jr. ) No. 11,824 Appellate C ourt Clerk ) ) Hon. Earl E. Henley ) Chancellor ) ) ) ) ) S. Ct. No. 03S01-9607-CH-00084 ) JUDGMENT ORDER This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers Compensation Panel, and the Panel s Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference; Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the Memorandum Opinion of the Panel should be accepted and approved; and It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel s findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the Judgment of the Court. Costs on appeal are taxed to the plaintiff/appellant and John W. Cleveland, surety, for which execution may issue if necessary. 07/11/97 4

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