In re Markus E.
Annotate this Case
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of Parents, the parents of an infant (Markus) who suffered more than twenty rib fractures, holding that the evidence in the record did not clearly and convincingly show that Parents' failure to protect Markus from the non-accidental rib fractures was "knowing."
Tenn. Code Ann. 37-1-102(b)(22)(A)(i) defines several child abuse as "knowing" failure to protect a child from abuse or neglect likely to cause serious injury or death. In the instant case, the trial court terminated Parents' parental rights on the ground of severe abuse. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence did not clearly and convincingly show that both parents were aware of facts, circumstances, or information that would alert a reasonable parent to take affirmative action to protect the child and yet they failed to act; and (2) the trial court erred in terminating Mother's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan.
Court Description: Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith
In this appeal, we address the standards for severe child abuse as a ground for termination of parental rights. The statute defining severe child abuse includes knowing failure to protect a child from abuse or neglect likely to cause serious injury or death. Tenn. Code Ann. 37-1-102(b)(22)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016). The statutes do not define knowing. We hold that, for severe child abuse, a person’s conduct is considered knowing, and a person is deemed to knowingly act or fail to act, when he actually knows of relevant facts, circumstances or information, or when he is either in deliberate ignorance of or in reckless disregard of such facts, circumstances, or information presented to him. Under this standard, the relevant facts, circumstances, or information would alert a reasonable parent to take affirmative action to protect the child. For deliberate ignorance, a parent can be found to have acted knowingly when he has specific reason to know the relevant facts, circumstances, or information but deliberately ignores them. For reckless disregard, if the parent has been presented with the relevant facts, circumstances, or information and recklessly disregards them, the parent’s failure to protect can be considered knowing. Here, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents of an infant who suffered over twenty rib fractures, in part for knowing failure to protect the child. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse, holding under the particular circumstances of this case that the proof in the record does not clearly and convincingly show that the parents’ failure to protect the child was knowing.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.