Benjamin Carpenter et al v. Paul W. Hanslin et al
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Supreme Court No. 2005-15-Appeal. (WC 03-202) Benjamin Carpenter et al. : v. : Paul W. Hanslin et al. : NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 2223258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court No. 2005-15-Appeal. (WC 03-202) Benjamin Carpenter et al. : v. : Paul W. Hanslin et al. : Present: Williams, C.J., Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ. OPINION Justice Robinson for the Court. The defendants, Paul W. and Mirja Hanslin, appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Benjamin and Linda Carpenter, and the third-party defendant, Lynn Labossiere, in their dispute concerning rights-of-way across certain property owned by the Hanslins in Charlestown, Rhode Island. The trial justice granted the plaintiffs request for declaratory and injunctive relief, and he determined the location of the rights-of-way and the extent of their permissible use. The principal historical fact that ultimately gave rise to this litigation is that in 1931 the Rhode Island Boy Scouts acquired a half-acre parcel of land which borders a fresh water pond known as Pasquisett Pond. Due to the fact that said parcel (which is known as the Panhandle ) was landlocked, the Boy Scouts sought and obtained permission to construct a dirt road across a neighbor s land to gain access to the parcel. That dirt road became known as Pioneer Road. In the mid-1950 s, the Boy Scouts acquired a much larger contiguous parcel, and consequently they no longer needed to use Pioneer Road to gain access to their property. -1- Nevertheless, that dirt road continued to be used by the owners of several other nearby parcels of land as a means of accessing Pasquisett Pond. The Boy Scouts eventually discovered that people and vehicles had been traversing over a portion of their Panhandle property. Presumably, the people doing that traversing were acting on the basis of a misunderstanding as to the location of the deeded rights-of-way. When the Boy Scouts fenced off their property to prevent continued trespass, a detour to access the pond became necessary. Disagreement about the location of the detour is what caused this controversy to begin in earnest. The Hanslins took issue with the fact that the Carpenters and Ms. Labossiere (who had been granted rights-of-way to access the pond in the deeds to their respective properties) had begun clearing and using a portion of the Hanslins property in order to gain access to Pasquisett Pond. The Carpenters and Ms. Labossiere took the position that defendants were obstructing and damaging their deeded rights-of-way. The plaintiffs commenced the instant action on April 10, 2003, by filing a complaint against defendant Paul Hanslin, in which they alleged that he had obstructed their right-of-way and had also intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress upon them. 1 On or around June 20, 2003, the parties stipulated that plaintiffs original complaint could be amended to add Mirja Hanslin and the Rhode Island Boy Scouts as named defendants. In due course, defendants filed a counterclaim, in which they alleged trespass and interference with riparian rights. On January 12, 2004, defendants proceeded to file a third-party complaint against Lynn Labossiere, in which they sought a permanent injunction that would prohibit Ms. Labossiere from trespassing on their property. Ms. Labossiere then filed a counterclaim against the Hanslins and a crossclaim against the Boy Scouts, in which she sought to quiet title to her right-of-way and to prevent 1 The emotional distress allegations were subsequently dismissed by stipulation. -2- the Hanslins or the Boy Scouts from interfering with her right to use that right-of-way. 2 Ms. Labossiere also alleged that she had a prescriptive easement over certain dry land that exceeded the boundaries of the deeded right-of-way. A nonjury trial began on June 29, 2004 in the Superior Court for Washington County. At the start of the trial, the parties stipulated to (1) the boundary line between the Hanslins property and the Boy Scouts property and (2) the chains of title relative to the properties of the various parties. After having heard several days of testimony and having been presented with numerous exhibits, the trial justice issued a thorough and well-reasoned decision on September 29, 2004. In that decision, the trial justice exhaustively reviewed the history of the ownership and use of the properties in question, and he examined the language in the relevant deeds. The trial justice also reviewed the testimony of the witnesses before making his comprehensive findings of fact. The trial justice concluded that plaintiffs had failed to establish all of the elements that are required for there to be a prescriptive easement. However, the trial justice then proceeded to construe the pertinent deeds, each of which contained the grant of a right-of-way, and he determined that the rights-of-way to Pasquisett Pond were located directly adjacent to the boundary line of the Boy Scouts property and that they measured fifteen feet in width. The trial justice also concluded that the grantor of the deeded rights-of-way intended the grants to include vehicular use, which use the trial justice determined included parking and turning vehicles around. 3 The trial justice further found that such vehicular use was permissible even if substantial clearing of trees and vegetation might be required to make it possible. 2 All parties eventually agreed to dismiss the case against the Boy Scouts. A judgment to that effect was entered on June 30, 2004. 3 With respect to the parking of vehicles, the trial justice limited same to two vehicles per grantee per day for no more than twelve hours per day. -3- The trial justice also found that the existence of wetlands along the course of the rightsof-way prevented travel to the shore of Pasquisett Pond, and he therefore ruled that plaintiffs would be permitted to construct a modestly sized boardwalk to enable them to reach the shore of the pond from the point where vehicles could no longer travel. In connection with the latter ruling, he enjoined defendants from interfering with or filing objections to any necessary permit application that might be filed by plaintiffs with respect to the construction of a boardwalk, provided that such application comport with the guidelines set forth in the trial justice s decision. Finally, the trial justice found that the original grantor had inadvertently destroyed much of the thirty-foot-by-thirty-foot area designated in the deeds as a place for mooring boats and for swimming. That inadvertent destruction occurred when the grantor dredged the mouth of a stream, thereby creating a small bay. The trial justice found that it would be consistent with the terms of the grant and the intent of the grantor to allow plaintiffs to moor boats in what remained of the designated area and to store boats on whatever land remained within that area. On appeal, defendants contend that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in finding that the original grantor of the rights-of-way intended to permit vehicular traffic in the location that the trial justice determined was the location of the rights-of-way. They contend that, because the original grantor was mistaken as to the correct location of the rights-ofway, he could not have intended vehicular traffic as permitted by the trial justice. The defendants further contend that the trial justice s decision to permit vehicles to park and to turn around constituted clear error. The defendants also argue that, with respect to the area of the property designated for the mooring or storing of boats, the grantor extinguished those portions of the deeded rights-of-way when he partially destroyed the area designated for mooring and for swimming. The defendants -4- further contend that the trial justice s ruling allowing the construction of a boardwalk was clearly erroneous and that he exceeded his authority when he prohibited them from objecting to any necessary permit application that plaintiffs might file in order to receive authorization to construct such a boardwalk. We are in agreement with the well-reasoned decision of the trial justice in virtually all respects. 4 In reaching his conclusion concerning the prescriptive easement issue, the trial justice correctly indicated that plaintiffs had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, ten years of actual, open, notorious, hostile and continuous use of defendants property outside their deeded rights-of-way in order to establish a prescriptive easement. The trial justice also correctly articulated the principle that it was his duty to effectuate the intent of the parties in construing instruments which purport to create easements, and we note that he engaged in impressively meticulous fact-finding in that regard. Because we are in agreement with the trial justice s comprehensive decision (except as discussed below), we have decided to adopt it as our own, and we attach it hereto. We now proceed to address the sole aspect of the trial justice s decision that we deem it advisable to address and clarify in this opinion. Standard of Review The findings of fact by a trial justice sitting without a jury are entitled to great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal unless the record shows that the findings are clearly wrong or unless the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence on a controlling issue. Burke-Tarr Co. v. Ferland Corp., 724 A.2d 1014, 1018 (R.I. 1999); see also In re Dissolution of Anderson, Zangari & Bossian, 888 A.2d 973, 975 (R.I. 2006); Rowland Family Trust v. Pelletier, 673 A.2d 1081, 1083 (R.I. 1996). Moreover, it is within the province of the trial justice to weigh 4 As we will discuss infra, the only aspect of the trial justice s decision with which we are not in full agreement relates to the location of the starting point of the rights-of-way. -5- the credibility of witnesses, and this Court will not disturb determinations of credibility in a non jury trial unless the findings are clearly wrong * * *. Bogosian v. Bederman, 823 A.2d 1117, 1120 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Andreozzi v. Andreozzi, 813 A.2d 78, 82 (R.I. 2003)); see also Opella v. Opella, 896 A.2d 714, 718 (R.I. 2006). Analysis While we are in full agreement with the trial justice s conclusion that the fifteen-foot rights-of-way granted by deed to plaintiffs and to third-party defendant are properly located immediately adjacent to the boundary of the property owned by the Rhode Island Boy Scouts, we are of the opinion that some clarification is necessary with respect to the point where the rightsof-way actually begin. 5 The trial justice determined that the right-of-way granted to each party begins at the terminus of Pioneer Road and continues south and east to Pasquisett Pond. Prior to making that determination, the trial justice found that Pioneer Road ends at the western boundary of the Boy Scouts original parcel of land. He also noted that defendants had no objection to vehicular use, including parking, on Pioneer Road. Consequently, the trial justice determined that extended factual findings with respect to the rights of plaintiffs and third-party defendant concerning the use of Pioneer Road would be unnecessary. It is our view, however, that if, at some point in the future, there should be new owners of defendants land who object to the use of Pioneer Road by plaintiffs or their successors in title, the ownership of a right-of-way that begins at the terminus of that road would be of little value in 5 We need not remand this one issue to the Superior Court. See Tanner v. Town Council, 880 A.2d 784, 801 (R.I. 2005) ( [W]e have all the necessary information available to us such that we may use our inherent power to apply tenets of justice and fairness to the factual findings of the hearing justice, and fashion an appropriate remedy. ). -6- the real world. Accordingly, after studying the record and considering the grantor s intent, we hold that the fifteen-foot-wide rights-of-way at issue run along the entirety of Pioneer Road and do not begin at the terminus thereof. 6 The plaintiffs, for their part, have also challenged the trial justice s denial of their motion to tax costs against the defendants pursuant to G.L. 1956 ยง 9-22-5 and Rule 54 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial justice s ruling in that regard. Conclusion For the reasons set forth in this opinion and in the attached decision of the Superior Court, which we have adopted, the judgment is affirmed. The papers in this case may be remanded to the Superior Court. Justice Goldberg did not participate. 6 Pioneer Road is described in the deeded easements as follows: [P]remises of these grantors, * * * extending generally southerly from the herein described premises to Old Indian Trail, so-called, and from thence along said Old Indian Trail to the State Highway. -7- COVER SHEET TITLE OF CASE: Benjamin Carpenter et al. v. Paul W. Hanslin et al. DOCKET SHEET NO.: COURT: 2005-15-A Supreme DATE OPINION FILED: June 22, 2006 Appeal from SOURCE OF APPEAL: Superior JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT: JUSTICES: County: Washington Judge Edwin J. Gale Williams, CJ., Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ. Not Participating Goldberg, J. WRITTEN BY: Justice William P. Robinson, III, for the Court ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff: Stephen White, Esq. For Defendant: Kelly M. Fracassa, Esq. ATTORNEYS:
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