Com. v. Rose, S. (dissenting)
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J-E02002-13
2013 PA Super 305
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEVENSON LEON ROSE,
Appellant
No. 45 WDA 2011
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 7, 2010
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CC 2008-0810, CP-02-CR-0000810-2008
BEFORE: STEVENS, P.J.,* BENDER, BOWES, GANTMAN, DONOHUE, ALLEN,
OLSON, OTT, and WECHT, JJ.
DISSENTING OPINION BY GANTMAN, J.:
FILED NOVEMBER 25, 2013
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to vacate and
remand the case for re-sentencing. Instead, I think the trial court correctly
sentenced Appellant to a term of twenty (20) to forty (40) years’
imprisonment for his third degree murder conviction, pursuant to 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(d); and I would affirm the judgment of sentence. Hence, I
dissent.
Appellant contends he “completed” the criminal deeds related to third
degree murder before the 1995 enactment of 18 Pa.C.S.A § 1102(d).
Appellant asserts the trial court “retroactively” applied Section 1102(d) and
imposed a sentence that violates the ex post facto clauses of both the state
and federal constitutions, because the 1995 addition of Section 1102(d)
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*
President Judge Stevens did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.
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increased the maximum punishment for third degree murder from twenty to
forty years, and the court applied Section 1102(d) to “acts, conduct and
events” which occurred before the effective date of that subsection.
Appellant concludes the court should have imposed a term of imprisonment
consistent with the sentencing statute in effect when Appellant attacked the
victim in 1993.
Historically, settled law has held: “Murder is committed only when the
victim of the assault dies.”
208, 68 A. 184, 185 (1907).
Commonwealth v. Ramunno, 219 Pa. 204,
See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a) (including
“death of another human being” as element of criminal homicide); 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5552(d) (explaining, in relevant part, that for purposes of
commencement of statute of limitations: “(d) Commission of offense.−An
offense is committed…when every element [of the offense] occurs…”). “[A]
person who has been convicted of murder of the third degree…shall be
sentenced to a term which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 40
years.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(d).
Instantly, Appellant and his cohort brutally attacked the victim in
1993. The victim, however, did not die in 1993. On May 14, 1995, Section
1102(d) went into effect. The victim in this case finally succumbed to her
injuries on September 17, 2007, which is the date the homicide occurred.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with criminal homicide on October 9,
2007, and a jury convicted Appellant of third degree murder on October 13,
2010.
Using the statute in effect when the homicide occurred, the court
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sentenced Appellant on December 7, 2010, to twenty to forty years’
imprisonment, pursuant to Section 1102(d).
Here, Appellant did not “commit” the murder until the victim died on
September 17, 2007.
See Ramunno, supra.
Although the attack
happened years before, there was no murder until the final element of the
offense, the victim’s death, actually occurred. In my opinion, the court did
not “retroactively apply” Section 1102(d); rather, the court utilized the
sentencing statute in effect at the time of the murder. Therefore, the court’s
sentence was proper because Section 1102(d) went into effect in 1995,
before the murder occurred. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed.
648, ___ (1798) (defining ex post facto law as “law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the
crime, when committed”).
Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the offense at issue is murder, which
occurred in 2007, when the victim died.
Consequently, I agree with the
Commonwealth’s position that the court properly sentenced Appellant per
the statute in effect at the time of the murder. Based upon the foregoing, I
am convinced the sentence imposed did not violate the state and federal
constitutions as ex post facto; and I would affirm.1 Accordingly, I dissent.
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1
I question whether Appellant is entitled to any credit for time served.
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