ROX PETROLEUM, L.L.C. v. NEW DOMINION, L.L.C.

ROX PETROLEUM, L.L.C. v. NEW DOMINION, L.L.C.
2008 OK 13
184 P.3d 502
Case Number: 104664
Decided: 02/12/2008

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Rox Petroleum, L.L.C., Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
New Dominion, L.L.C.; GingerLynn, Inc.; Oklahoma Title Clearing Corporation; Norma L. Doerfler; and Hoster Brothers, Inc., Defendants/Appellees,
and
Markeeta A. Hopwood, Defendant.

ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I

¶0 In a 1927 mineral deed, the grantor conveyed one-half of mineral interests underlying specified property for a term of ten years and so long after as oil and gas is produced. In 1955 quitclaim deeds, the grantors conveyed the property except "all oil, gas and other minerals, all that portion of such minerals now owned by the grantors being reserved by them." The plaintiff sought to quiet title in the minerals arguing that the 1955 quitclaim deeds clearly excepted the possibility of reverter in the minerals from the grant. Both the plaintiff and defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants' motion. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. This Court granted certiorari.

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED;
DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED.

Timothy C. Dowd, Elias, Books, Brown & Nelson, Oklahoma City Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Fred M. Buxton, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee, New Dominion, L.L.C.
Gary S. Chilton, Holladay, Chilton & DeGiusti, P.L.L.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee, Oklahoma Title Clearing Corp. and Norma L. Doerfler.
Craig W. Hoster and Mark D. Christiansen, Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee, GingerLynn, Inc. and Hoster Brothers, Inc.

Taylor, J.

¶1 The plaintiff, Rox Petroleum, L.L.C. (Rox) brought this suit against the defendants, New Dominion, L.L.C., GingerLynn, Inc., Oklahoma Title Clearing Corporation, Norma L. Doerfler, and Hoster Brothers, Inc.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶2 This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Summary judgment is a pretrial procedure available where there is no dispute as to the material facts, Pickens v. Tulsa Metropolitan Ministry,

II. FACTS

¶3 In 1927, Jennie Clauer was the record owner of the surface and mineral interest in the property. On December 3, 1927, Jennie Clauer and her husband executed a mineral deed conveying an undivided one-fourth interest in the minerals to Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Company and an undivided one-fourth interest to Foster Petroleum Corporation (conveyed minerals) for "a period of ten (10) years, and as long thereafter as oil and gas is produced from said land . . . ."

¶4 In 1942, the property vested in Jennie A. Clauer, Henry Irving Clauer, Jack B. Clauer, and Mary Jane Herring.

EXCEPT all the oil, gas and other minerals, all that portion of such minerals now owned by grantors being reserved by them, with the right of ingress and egress for mining and producing the same . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

¶5 In 1956, The Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce conveyed the property by warranty deed to American First Title and Trust Company. This warranty deed, as does the subsequent deeds in this chain of title, contains the following or similar language: "Less and except all oil, gas, minerals which may be produced from all of the property herein described and conveyed." The surface owners trace their title back to the 1955 quitclaim deeds and claim title to the minerals based on them.

¶6 Jennie A. Clauer and Mary Jane Herring died, leaving Jack B. Clauer as the sole surviving joint tenant. Jack B. Clauer died with the residue of his property passing to the Board of Trustees of Carleton College. Rox claims the reversionary interest to the conveyed minerals passed under this residue clause and claims title based on it through a series of conveyances.

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT

¶7 Rox moved for summary judgment, and the surface owners responded and also moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the surface owners and, in its order, allocated the shares in the minerals nineteen thirty-sixths to Rox, Inc. and seventeen thirty-sixths to the surface owners and nondefendants. Appeal was taken pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 1.36, 12 O.S.2001, ch. 15, app. 1. No appellate briefs were ordered to be filed, and appellate review is confined to the record actually presented to the trial court. Id. at rule 1.36(g). Feeling constrained by Ford v. Raab,

¶8 Rox argued that the reservation in the two 1955 quitclaim deeds conveying the property to The Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce reserved the reversionary interest to the conveyed minerals underlying the property. Relying on Ford v. Raab,

IV. ANALYSIS

¶9 In determining whether a reversionary interest is reserved or excepted in a deed, the foremost consideration is the parties' intent. Knight v. Kimble,

¶10 Under the rule that a reservation of a reversionary interest must be clearly expressed, a person conveying real property is presumed to convey all his interest in the property. Kassner,

¶11 In the 1955 quitclaim deeds, the grantors excepted "all that portion of [the oil, gas, and other] minerals now owned by grantors being reserved by them." We must determine the interest in the conveyed oil, gas, and minerals owned by the grantors at the time the 1955 quitclaim deeds were executed. In doing so, we examine the 1927 mineral deed to determine what interest the grantors retained in the conveyed minerals. A deed, such as the 1927 mineral deed, given for a term and so long after as oil and gas is produced transfers a determinable fee upon a conditional limitation. Ludwig v. William K. Warren Foundation,

¶12 Here, the 1927 mineral deed conveyed a determinable fee with the possibility of reverter. The grantors retained the possibility of reverter in the conveyed minerals which they still owned at the time of executing the 1955 quitclaim deeds. The 1955 quitclaim deeds excepted "all that portion of such minerals now owned by the grantors being reserved by them" which included the possibility of reverter in the conveyed minerals. (Emphasis added.) This is a clearly expressed intention, without ambiguity, to reserve the possibility of reverter since it was part of the oil, gas, and other minerals owned by the grantors at the time. To find otherwise would require rewriting the deed to eliminate the words "all that portion of such minerals now owned by the grantors being reserved." Within the four corners of the 1955 quitclaim deeds, the grantors clearly expressed their intent to reserve from the grant all their interest in the conveyed minerals, which would include the possibility of reverter.

V. CONCLUSION

¶13 In the 1927 mineral deed, the grantor retained one-half of the minerals which have passed to Rox, Inc. In the 1927 mineral deed, the grantor conveyed a determinable fee on conditional limitation in the other half of the minerals and retained a possibility of reverter. The 1955 quitclaim deeds effectively reserved the possibility of reverter which was alienable and passed also through chain of title to Rox, Inc. No interest in the conveyed minerals passed to the surface owners. Title in the conveyed minerals should have been quieted in the plaintiff, Rox, Inc.

¶14 The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated. The district court's judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED.

ALL JUSTICES CONCUR.

FOOTNOTES

1 Markeeta A. Hopwood was initially named as a defendant but by quitclaim deed conveyed her interest to Rox and has been dismissed from this suit.

2 The facts which caused the property to vest are disputed, but these facts are not material. At some point, Mary Jane Herring's last name changed to Funken. We will refer to her as Mary Jane Herring.

3 It appears that Henry Irving Clauer had died before the deeds were executed and his interest passed to the surviving tenants.